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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that the current dual accountability model in Nigerian public 
procurement model is one with vertical accountability and horizontal accountability 
which is weakened by an inefficient horizontal accountability system, and in order 
to unleash the true benefits of a dual accountability system there needs to be an 
enhancement of horizontal accountability. It argues that the key to this 
enhancement lies in improved access to information and enhanced legal 
empowerment of certain actors in the public procurement process.  
 
This thesis tackles one of the most critical sectors in the Nigeria public sector – 
public procurement, specifically because of the effect that this sector has on the 
general development of a country. The thesis argues that in order to reduce 
corruption in the sector, the focus needs to be placed on ensuring accountability in 
the stage before corruption – conflict of interest. It puts forward the position that in 
order to ensure accountability at the conflict of interest stage, horizontal 
accountability can be extremely beneficial, and therefore the thesis creates a 
theoretical model - the Transparency and Accountability Matrix (TAM) to determine 
the level of horizontal accountability within certain interactions in the Nigerian 
public procurement process. Using the TAM as a baseline measurement for 
horizontal accountability, solutions are proffered on how to enhance the efficacy of 
horizontal accountability and this is applied to specific conflict of interest scenarios 
within the Nigerian public procurement process.  
 
The key contributions of this thesis are the creation of the TAM – a theory backed 
model as a horizontal accountability measurement tool; and a very thorough 
analysis on the accountability framework of the Nigerian public procurement 
process with  a focus on the surrounding access to information legislations, which 
has been a hitherto unexplored gap in the research on Nigerian public procurement.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Consider the following real-life scenarios that occurred in Nigeria: 
 
• In 2013, the Nigerian Federal Minister of Aviation was investigated by the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) over her alleged 
involvement in the N9.4 billion (£18.9 million) contract for the supply of 
security equipment to twenty-two (22) airports across the country. The 
investigation was instigated by a petition made by a company claiming that 
the Minister hijacked a contract which had been previously awarded to them. 
The company alleged the contract was then awarded to a different company 
(a firm they allege the Minister had interests in) without following due 
process. It claimed that the Minister made extortionate demands which 
included engaging a newly incorporated company to act as their technical 
partners, and a request that the petitioner issue post-dated cheques totalling 
several billions of Naira (millions of pounds) in favour of a company they 
allege were front companies belonging to a friend and business partner of 
the Minister. The Minster denied all the allegations; however, a strong case 
was made, and the investigation is still active and has not been closed1. 
 
• In 2016, the Director General (DG) of the Pension Transitional Arrangement 
Directorate (PTAD) was suspended indefinitely, and then arrested by the 
EFCC over allegations of fraud of N2.5 billion (£5.5 million), the DG allegedly 
awarded several suspicious contracts to cronies and staff of PTAD, who 
served as fronts for businesses owned and controlled by the DG2. The case is 
yet to go to trial, and the investigation is still ongoing. 
 
 
1 Eniola Akinkuotu and Leke Baiyewu, 'EFCC Seizes Stella Oduah’S Passport Over Alleged Fraud' (Punch Newspapers, 2018) 
<https://punchng.com/efcc-seizes-stella-oduahs-passport-over-alleged-fraud/> accessed 25 October 2019. 
2 Akintayo Eribake, 'EFCC Arrests Pension DG, 3 Others Over N2.5Bn Fraud' Vanguard (2016) 
<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/04/efcc-arrests-pension-dg-3-others-n2-5bn-fraud/> accessed 25 October 2019. 
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• In March 2016, a Senate Report indicted the Secretary to the Federal 
Government for awarding a contract to a company which he had at one time 
been a Director and had incorporated but ceased to be a Director in, just a 
few weeks before the contract was awarded. He was suspended by the 
Federal Government after a Senate Report indicted him, and thereafter 
arrested by the special procurement fraud unit of the EFCC. He is yet to be 
charged and the investigation is still ongoing3. 
 
All the above have a common theme - they are stories of alleged breach of the public 
duty and trust by public officers in the public procurement sector in Nigeria. These 
are anecdotal instances4, however what they do represent is an indication of a 
system that is failing to ensure adequate transparency and accountability, and one 
in which public officials seem to be acting in breach of their public duty when there 
is a conflict of interest. In this thesis we will highlight and address how the system 
is failing, and what can be done to address these failings.  
 
Specifically, this thesis puts forward the position that under the current Nigerian 
procurement model, the accountability and transparency model for public officials 
is a dual accountability model – it operates both vertical accountability and 
horizontal accountability; with the vertical accountability system being the primary 
system; and in order to unleash the true benefits of transparency and accountability 
there needs to be an enhancement of the horizontal accountability system. Only by 
having a strong horizontal accountability system which complements the vertical 
accountability model, can there be true accountability within the public 
procurement process in Nigeria. In other words, this thesis will show that when a 
public procurement system enhances horizontal accountability mechanisms in 
order to support its vertical accountability model, it fosters better transparency and 
accountability and serves to better manage and control the issues of conflict of 
interest which arise within the public procurement process. 
 
3 Editorial - The Guardian, 'Babachir Lawal: A Matter of Honour' (2017) <https://guardian.ng/opinion/babachir-lawal-a-
matter-of-honour/> accessed 25 October 2019. 
4 Anecdotal instances are used in this introduction in order to set the tone for the discussion that will follow, in the sense that 
these anecdotal instances referenced serve to illustrate the perception which the ordinary Nigerian has about the 
pervasiveness of the accountability problem in Nigerian public office. These anecdotal instances, and ones similar to them, are 
what make the headlines and are the examples that people frequently point to when speaking about the lack of accountability 
in the system. 
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To give a basic illustration of the argument of this thesis, we will use a five-person 
family unit with a live-in nanny. A father, mother, two daughters, and one son. The 
parents give the son the duty of keeping the living room tidy, and when he does not 
do his duty at all or doesn’t do it properly, the parents punish him, either by making 
him do it again or by reducing his weekly allowance. The parents check on the living 
room once a day. The boy’s sisters use the living room every day, and when they see 
that it is untidy, they sometimes remind the boy to clean it, or they report to their 
parents. Now, when the parents are not available, the sisters can report their 
brother to the nanny, and the nanny can tell the boy to clean the living room, or to 
clean it properly.  
 
This basic family analogy where multiple people try to keep the boy accountable to 
his task of cleaning the living room is the public procurement process. The parents 
are the vertical accountability system that have the ultimate power to tell him what 
to do, when to do it, and sanction him if he does not do it. The sisters are in the 
horizontal accountability system, in some cases they can remind him to do it, but if 
he refuses, they can report him to their parents, or report him to the nanny, they 
have no direct power over him but because he knows they are watching and can 
take him up on it if he does not do his duty, he is wary and tries not to slack in his 
duties. The parents (vertical accountability system) are the primary and most 
effective way to ensure the boy does his duty, however they cannot be there all the 
time, and therefore to ensure the boy does his duty when the parents are 
unavailable, the sisters (horizontal accountability) are watching and can report to 
either the parents or the nanny (the courts). For the system to work effectively, all 
the members of the family (and the nanny) must play their part. This thesis 
therefore focuses on how the job of the sisters can be enhanced and improved so 
that even if the parents start to slack in their vigilance, the sisters are there to pick 
up the slack. 
 
The focus of this thesis will be on public procurement, not because that is the only 
area where conflict of interest manifests itself, but because it is a very important 
aspect of a country’s economy. It allows the government to carry out its role in the 
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society. Due to the sheer volume of operations which go on in public procurement 
its activities have immense economic benefits and wide-ranging implications 
throughout the economy. Public goods and services have a direct or indirect effect 
on economic performance and living standards, especially the living standards of 
the poor as they have to depend on the government since they have very limited 
access to private alternatives for things like education, healthcare etc.5 Therefore, 
ensuring a smooth and efficient public procurement process should be a priority for 
every country. In fact, organisations like the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) and the World Bank are very keen proponents of ensuring 
countries have efficient and transparent public procurement processes. A recent 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) report6 emphasised 
the potential for Government procurement to be used as a tool for industrial 
development. This is due to the large sums spent on public purchasing making 
government activities in the marketplace, the purchase of goods and services or 
sometimes the marketing thereof, to have a tremendous impact and in some cases 
shape the market itself. Based on the most recent budget in Nigeria, the size of the 
government procurement for capital expenditure and recurrent expenditure is N6.1 
Trillion (£13.5 billion)7. This is a sizeable sum and that is why the process and 
procedure through which the government spends these funds is so important. 
 
As mentioned above, the thrust of this thesis is that in order to manage conflict of 
interest within the public procurement process, there has to be the enhancement of 
horizontal accountability to complement the current dominant system of vertical 
accountability. This thesis therefore examines the ways in which horizontal 
accountability can be enhanced within the public procurement process and argues 
that the key to this lies in improved access to information and enhanced legal 
empowerment of certain actors in the public procurement process. Using public 
procurement in Nigeria as the locus to understand the underlying issues which exist, 
 
5 Kamala Dawar and Simon Evenett, 'Government Procurement', Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development: A 
Handbook (The World Bank 2011). 
6 Kamala Dawar and Seung Chul Oh, ‘The Role of Public Procurement Policy in Driving Industrial Development’ (2017), UNIDO 
Working Paper 8/2017. < https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/WP_8_FINAL_0.pdf > accessed 31 October 
2019 
7 '2019 Budget - Budget Office of the Federation - Federal Republic of Nigeria' (Budgetoffice.gov.ng, 2019) 
<https://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/index.php/2019-budget> accessed 31 October 2019. 
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and the challenges which exist, this research will answer the following sub-
questions: 
 
• Does Horizontal Accountability improve the management of conflict of 
interest within public procurement? 
 
• Can a theoretical model be created to identify the level of horizontal 
accountability within the public procurement process in Nigeria? 
 
• How can Transparency be guaranteed within the public procurement sector 
in order to enhance the effectiveness of horizontal accountability? 
 
• What are the potential regulatory and legal challenges to the improvement 
of horizontal accountability in the Nigerian procurement process? 
 
• How can these challenges be managed effectively? 
 
1.2 Summary of Chapters 
 
Chapter one sets out the aim of this thesis and the methodology that has been 
adopted for this research. It provided foundational knowledge across the thematic 
areas which the thesis straddles – public procurement, conflict of interest, 
transparency and accountability, and access to information, and sets the foundation 
for the argument that the enhancement of horizontal accountability is the key to 
managing the conflict of interest problem in public procurement in Nigeria.  
 
Chapter two provides a historical view of the evolution of public procurement 
regulation in Nigeria, and the challenges that have continued to bedevil the system 
leading up to the current challenges being faced, and this is made evident when the 
current loopholes within the public procurement process which facilitate conflict of 
interest are highlighted and discussed. In chapter three, the thesis introduces the 
transparency and accountability matrix as a framework within which to address the 
issue of horizontal accountability and how to determine which aspects of the 
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horizontal accountability equation need to be strengthened in different scenarios, it 
introduces us to the terms declaratory accountability, conditional accountability, 
and full accountability, as representing the varying degrees of horizontal 
accountability obtainable in the Nigerian public procurement process based on the 
transparency and accountability matrix.  
 
The thesis then moves in chapter four to a discussion on the first aspect of the 
transparency and accountability matrix – access to information, and its importance 
to the accountability process. It introduces access to information as having two 
levels – transparency by request and transparency by default. It identifies the 
Nigerian public procurement system as having one of transparency by request, and 
therefore analyses the efficacy of this transparency by request system. It highlights 
the failings and suggests solutions for improvement. Ultimately arguing that a move 
to transparency by default should be the goal of the system, but that move should 
only be made when the relevant structural safeguards around data access, data 
reliability and data protection have been addressed.  
 
Chapter five addresses the second half of the horizontal accountability equation, 
legal empowerment, and emphasizes its importance and the legal framework 
governing its accessibility, issues like locus standi and the available remedies are 
addressed, and the impact which properly engaging with legal empowerment can 
bring on the conflict of interest loopholes identified in the Nigerian public 
procurement process, arguing that the actors within the process need to exercise 
their legal empowerment rights more as a number of the tools would be addressed 
in this way. Chapter six is the concluding chapter and provides a conclusive 
summary of the arguments made in the thesis, sets forth some recommendations, 
and sets an agenda for future research. 
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
In answering our research questions, this research adopts a doctrinal approach. The 
reason why this research will adopt a doctrinal approach is because, a doctrinal 
study seeks to understand a legal system and to create a well-reasoned body of 
information from that which has been produced by legislation, court decisions, 
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academics and researchers, and international bodies and institutions. It seeks to 
identify the legal position, identify gaps in the law and suggest features of it that can 
be improved8. In this method, the essential features of the legislation and case law 
are examined critically and then all the relevant elements are combined or 
synthesised to establish a comprehensive statement of the law on the matter in 
hand9. The research being conducted for this thesis involved reviewing legislation, 
regulations, and case law in order to synthesise an accurate position on conflict of 
interest specific to public procurement, this information was not readily available 
in one document and a doctrinal approach to obtaining this information was 
therefore critical.  
 
Doctrinal research, at its best, involves rigorous analysis and creative synthesis, the 
making of connections between seemingly disparate doctrinal strands, and the 
challenge of extracting general principles from an inchoate mass of primary 
materials10. This thesis in its doctrinal approach adopts an ‘inside-out’ approach as 
explained by Brownsword11 as an approach which works with the values that are 
already recognised by a particular legal regime, organise those values in the most 
defensible way, and then assess whether the practice is consistent with the best 
interpretation of the legal system’s own values. In this research we use the doctrinal 
method to evaluate whether or not the public procurement system in Nigeria is 
faithfully adhering to its own commitments, specifically those of transparency and 
accountability. 
 
The research for this thesis consisted primarily of desk-based research, reviewing 
the relevant laws – domestic and international, and an academic literature review. 
The approach for deciding which cases to review and include was two-fold – for 
cases which discussed general principles of law applicable in Nigeria, cases which 
are considered locus classicus cases within the Nigerian legal system were 
specifically chosen when analysing the legal principles of law. However for specific 
 
8 Jenny Steele, ‘Doctrinal Approaches’ in Simon Halliday (ed), An Introduction to the Study of Law (W Green 2012) 
9 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research’ in Watkins and M Burton (eds) ‘Research Methods in Law’ (Routledge 2013) 
10 Council of Australian Law Deans Statement on The Nature of Legal Research - submissions to the Department of Education, 
Science and Training (DEST) in relation to the Research Quality Framework (RQF), May and October 2005 
11 Roger Brownsword, 'An Introduction to Legal Research' (2006) <https://docgo.net/detail-doc.html?utm_source=an-
introduction-to-legal-research> accessed 31 October 2019.  
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areas, for example in Freedom of Information litigation, due to the fact that there is 
no centralised database for cases, and that most freedom of information cases are 
not adjudicated beyond the High Court (where cases are not reported in any main 
law reports), reliance had to be placed on the cases which had been undertaken by 
non-governmental organisations, details of which were shared on their websites. 
For information about investigations and prosecutions for procurement fraud, the 
organisation responsible for conducting the investigations and prosecutions – the 
EFCC refused requests for the information, and therefore most of the cases 
referenced are high profile cases which were reported in the print, news and online 
media. Finally, for information regarding bid review decisions by the Bureau Public 
Procurement, this was obtained and analysed from data published on the Bureau of 
Public procurement website – annual reports filed.  
 
1.4 Key Concepts of this Thesis 
Throughout the course of this thesis, certain key concepts will be discussed to 
contribute towards our ultimate understanding of the promise of enhanced 
horizontal accountability as a solution to the conflict of interest problem in public 
procurement in Nigeria. Therefore, for clarity of thought and to set a foundation for 
the basis of this thesis, it is important that these key concepts are understood in the 
context of this research, and to guide us along in the chapters of this thesis. 
 
1.4.1 Public Procurement 
Public procurement or Government procurement12 has been defined as the 
purchase of goods and services by the public sector, at all levels of government. This 
may include providing defence, law and order, health, education, and other public 
services13. The Nigerian Public Procurement Act defines public procurement as ‘the 
acquisition by any means of goods, works or services by the government’14. In other 
words, public procurement is when the government enters contracts for 
goods/works/services.  
 
 
12 These terms are used interchangeably in this thesis; however, they should be taken to mean the same thing. 
13 John Black, Nigar Hashimzade, and Gareth Myles, A Dictionary of Economics: Oxford University Press, 2012.  
14 Public Procurement Act 2007 (PPA 2007), s 60 
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The reality is that public procurement is more complex than this, as public 
procurement in some countries includes disposal of government assets, 
public/private partnerships with private individuals etc. However, in order to 
properly address the issue of conflict of interest in public procurement in Nigeria, 
the approach taken here will be to start from this simplified basis - when the 
government enters contracts for goods/works/services.  
 
As we will be examining public procurement within the Nigerian context, it is 
important to give a brief background of the development of public procurement in 
Nigeria. There are two key events that had a profound impact on the development 
of the Nigerian public procurement process, firstly, in the year 1999, a team 
comprising of members of the World Bank, and a Government Task Force 
representing public and private sector organisations in Nigeria with the assistance 
of consultants financed by the World Bank and the Government of Denmark  
conducted a Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) on Nigeria15, with the 
primary objective of reviewing and assessing the public sector procurement 
structure, and to develop a detailed action plan for reform to achieve institutional 
improvements. The CPAR discovered various critical issues with the procurement 
process in Nigeria16 which needed to be addressed and recommended amongst 
others the introduction of a public procurement law based on the United Nations 
Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model, and the establishment 
of an independent public procurement regulatory body.  The CPAR was important 
to the development of Nigerian public procurement because it was the first in-depth 
analysis that identified the failings within the procurement process and created a 
roadmap for how they could be addressed. Prior to the CPAR the procurement 
process was fraught with so many inefficiencies and loopholes for conflict of interest 
and corruption, and these inefficiencies were exploited at will by public servants 
involved in the procurement process so much so that as at the year the CPAR was 
conducted, it was estimated that 60% of funds spent by government was being lost 
 
15 'Nigeria - Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR)' (World Bank 2000). 
16 Issues discovered included: Lack of a body specifically charged with regulating the procurement process; Lack of an 
oversight body to control public procurement; Lack of clarity and transparency in the Financial Regulations - an internal set 
of rules for financial/economic control of the Federal administration and the activities of Tender Boards (TB), and regulations 
concerning the procurement process.; Proliferation and ineffectiveness of Tender Boards; Lack of professionalism in 
procurement; Lack of an effective piece of legislation regarding public procurement 
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to corruption and procurement fraud.  The Federal Government of Nigeria was 
losing an estimated US$10 billion annually due to fraudulent practices in the award 
and execution of government contracts. The CPAR signalled an attempt to stem this 
tide, and that is why it is an important event in the history of procurement in Nigeria.  
 
The second key event was the passage of the Public Procurement Act (PPA) in the 
year 2007, this was Nigeria’s first legislation dedicated solely to the public 
procurement process and it revolutionised the procurement process in Nigeria. The 
law, as with many other procurement laws in developing and emerging countries 
around the world was modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of 
Goods, Construction and Services, 1994. Apart from the obvious benefit of the 
existence of a law for managing the procurement process, one of the most critical 
interventions of the PPA was the creation of the Bureau of Public Procurement 
(BPP), an independent agency tasked with the regulation of the public procurement 
sector. This event is important because it is the bedrock of the current public 
procurement process and will be the basis for the legal analysis concerning public 
procurement in this thesis.  
 
1.4.2 Conflict of Interest 
The term conflict of interest is a quite common term, and its applicability is not 
limited to only the public sector. Generally, it refers to situations where individuals’ 
professional responsibilities converge with other interests, and there is a clash. 
Conflict of interest is common in the legal sector, medical and healthcare sector, 
accounting and financial services sector etc. In fact, it may be said that one of the 
very first documented instances of a conflict of interest was in the Bible when 
Rebekah used privileged information to advise Jacob about how to get Esau’s 
blessings17. While this might seem a trivial analogy to make, it goes to the root of 
what exactly a conflict of interest is, it is the use of a privileged role to further other 
interests - Rebekah used information obtained in her role as a wife to unfairly 
benefit Jacob in her role as a mother, to the detriment of Esau. The modern day 
understanding of conflict of interest is not too dissimilar to the situation with 
 
17 Genesis 27: 1- 41 New International Version (NIV) 
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Rebekah, where two roles have collided and in giving primacy to one over the other, 
there has been a detriment suffered.  
 
As can be seen from this illustrative analogy, conflict of interest is a term that is 
ubiquitous and can be seen in our everyday lives. However, in the context of this 
research, conflict of interest will be limited to conflict of interest within the public 
procurement process, and how it arises when public officials are exercising their 
duties.  
 
A question that causes some measure of confusion when discussing conflict of 
interest, is with respect to the nature of conflict of interest, and whether it is a type 
of corruption or a state of affairs which precedes it. This discrepancy was 
highlighted by Reed18, specifically, in the conflict of interest law in force in the Czech 
Republic between 1992 to 2006, the law provided thus: 
 
A conflict between the public interest and personal interest is understood to be conduct 
[of a public functionary] or failure [of a public functionary to act] which undermines 
trust in his/her impartiality or by which a public functionary misuses his/her position 
in order to obtain unauthorized benefit for him or herself or another individual or legal 
entity. 
 
In other words, the Czech Law on conflict of interest took the approach that conflict 
of interest is an act that involves the misuse of a position for unauthorized benefit – 
an illegal act. Therefore, that characterization seemed to suggest it is a type of 
corruption. The view of conflict of interest as a type of corruption however seems to 
be in the minority, there is agreement among scholars of conflict of interest that 
conflict of interest is not a type of corruption, but rather it is a state of affairs which 
can serve as a precursor to corruption.  Speck explains that the “the concept of conflict 
of interest does not refer to actual wrongdoing, but rather to the potential to engage 
in wrongdoing.”19 He believes that conflict of interest describes role conflicts with 
an uncertain outcome, a risk from the viewpoint of fulfilment of public interest. 
Speck’s view is very important in understanding the essence of a conflict of interest, 
in fact it is that uncertainty or probability for separate outcomes that is the essence 
 
18 Quentin Reed, 'Sitting on The Fence: Conflicts of Interest and How to Regulate Them' (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre 
2008) <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3160-sitting-on-the-fence.pdf> accessed 31 October 2019. 
19 Bruno W. Speck, 'Conflict of Interest: Concepts, Rules and Practices Regarding Legislators in Latin America' [2008] The Latin 
Americanist 49 
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of conflict of interest. Reed20 believes that conflict of interest is a situation, not an 
action, and a public official may find him or herself in a conflict of interest situation 
without behaving corruptly. Also, Rose21 states that conflict of interest does not 
necessarily entail an actual abuse of power, private gain, or any sort of actual 
transaction, as the mere existence of incompatible private and public interests may 
be sufficient to create a conflict of interest. Catchick22 summarises the widely held 
view succinctly, when he explains that a conflict of interest therefore exists where 
an official could abuse their position for private gain, whereas corruption exists 
where an official does abuse their position for private gain. In other words, a conflict 
of interest doesn’t always lead to corruption, but corruption always requires a 
conflict of interest.  
 
In the context of the public official, there have been several attempts at defining 
conflict of interest, this thesis however posits that for a public official to have a  
conflict of interest, there must be three key elements – the first is that the public 
official must have a public duty i.e. a duty or obligation to act in fidelity to his/her 
official role as a public officer and act in the interests of that role. The second 
element which should exist is that there must be the existence of a private interest(s), 
in the context of other external factors outside of the public duty which the public 
official has - he/she is an individual who has other responsibilities outside of the 
public office responsibilities as a family member, society elder or religious leader 
etc. The final element is the fact that these private interests when put within a 
certain context could have the capacity to improperly influence the performance of 
the official duties and responsibilities.  
 
Rose-Ackerman defines23 conflict of interest as conflicts between public roles and 
private financial interests, she believes that the complexity of modern society means 
that individuals play multiple public and private roles with accompanying tensions 
between their conflicting demands. Therefore, as a result of these complexities of 
 
20 Reed (n 17)  
21 Cecily Rose, 'Corruption and Conflicts of Interest in The United Kingdom' in Jean-Bernard Auby, Emmanuel Breen, and 
Thomas Perroud (eds), Corruption and Conflicts of Interest. A Comparative Law Approach (Edward Elger 2014). 
22 Paul Catchick, 'Conflict of Interest: Gateway to Corruption' (ACFE European Fraud Conference, 2014). 
 
23 Susan Rose- Ackerman, ‘Corruption and Conflicts of Interest’ in Jean-Bernard Auby, Emmanuel Breen, and Thomas Perroud 
(eds), Corruption and Conflicts of Interest. A Comparative Law Approach (Edward Elger 2014). 
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modern society whenever there are competing demands, a conflict of interest arises. 
Guzetta24, in discussing conflict of interest in the public sector believes that a conflict 
of interest could be defined as a situation where an individual’s pursuit of private 
interest conflicts with a public interest for which he or she has the entitlement and 
obligation to discharge. Outlining the basic elements of a conflict of interest situation 
as: a) a legally qualified position, b) two different interests in actual or potential 
contrast, and c) a ‘power-duty’ to discharge. He asserts that the default assumption 
when public interests are at stake is that there is always a coexistence (within the 
same person) of at least two different sets of interests- public and private. The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has provided a 
widely accepted25 definition of conflict of interest as involving a ‘conflict between the 
public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has 
private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their 
official duties and responsibilities’26.   
 
All three definitions are important to our understanding of the concept of conflict of 
interest throughout the course of this thesis. Rose-Ackerman’s definition makes a 
key point in that it acknowledges the many hats which individuals in public life wear, 
they are not cardboard cut-outs created specifically for just their public role, they 
are social beings who interact with their environment as others would, having 
friendships, relationships and other roles outside of their daily lives as public 
officials. This humanisation of the public official is key in our discussion, as it sets 
the foundation properly for how conflict of interest occurs. Further, she 
conceptualises conflict of interest as only having a private interest which is financial 
in nature. This narrow outlook on a conflict of interest, though the most obvious 
type, is by no means the only type of private interest which is capable of coming into 
conflict with a public interest/duty.  
 
24 Giovanni Guzzetta, ‘Legal Standards and Ethical Norms: Defining the Limits of Conflicts Regulations’ in Christine Trost , 
Alison L. Gash (eds), Conflict of Interest and Public Life: Cross-National Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2008) 
25 Jan Christoph Richter, ‘Conflict of Interest of Heads of State: The Example of Madagascar’ in Anne Peters (ed), Conflict of 
Interest in Global, Public and Corporate Governance: (Cambridge University Press 2012); Carolyn Moser, ‘Conflict of interests 
of government members and the risk of corruption: An assessment of pre-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt’ in Jean-Bernard 
Auby, Emmanuel Breen, and Thomas Perroud (eds), Corruption and Conflicts of Interest. A Comparative Law Approach (Edward 
Elger 2014); Bernardo Mattarella, ‘The conflicts of interests of public officers: Rules, checks and penalties’ in Jean-Bernard 
Auby, Emmanuel Breen, and Thomas Perroud (eds), Corruption and Conflicts of Interest. A Comparative Law Approach (Edward 
Elger 2014). 
26Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'Managing Conflict of Interest in The Public Sector: A Toolkit' 
(OECD 2005) <https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/49107986.pdf> accessed 31 October 2019. 
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Guzetta’s definition introduces the fact that the public role which the public official 
has is one where there is the entitlement/obligation to discharge. Therefore, a 
conflict of interest is not merely one where two interests are at morally 
diametrically opposite positions, it is one in which the public role carries with it 
certain legal obligations or expectations. The private interest is therefore cast as an 
interloper into the sphere of the legal public duty.  
 
Finally, the OECD definition has three key elements which are quite instructive and 
indicative of what a conflict of interest is. It states that there is a public duty, there 
must be private-capacity interests, and that it is a conflict of interest if the private-
capacity interests could improperly influence the performance of the public duty. 
 
These three definitions seem to echo the same attributes with varying layers of 
emphasis, and the definitions therefore provide the bedrock of our understanding 
and discussion on conflict of interest.  Throughout this thesis, the concept of a 
conflict of interest will be the analysed through the prism of two separate interests – 
public and private, with the potential that the public can be improperly influenced by 
the private.  
 
1.4.3 Transparency and Accountability 
The terms ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ are frequently used together in 
conversations about good governance, however there is some debate as to whether 
these concepts are two peas in a pod which are one and the same, or are 
complimentary concepts wherein the success of one naturally feeds into the other, 
or even that they are concepts which are at odds which each other. Hood27 believes 
that the relationship could exist in three possible ways. Firstly, they could be 
considered as ‘siamese twins’ in the sense that they are interlocked and linked to the 
point where a meaningful distinction between them cannot be made. The second 
viewpoint would be that of an awkward or incompatible couple with diverse goals 
and elements which could frequently be said to be in tension with each other. The 
 
27 Christopher Hood, ‘Accountability and Transparency: Siamese Twins, Matching Parts, Awkward Couple?’, (2010), West 
European Politics, 33:5, 989-1009 
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third viewpoint of the relationship would be that accountability and transparency 
exist as matching parts – as complementary parts in the good governance equation.  
 
This thesis will adopt the position that transparency and accountability are 
matching parts, and that transparency (access to information) is a critical element 
of the accountability process. Accountability without transparency makes it difficult 
for there to be proper accountability because all the relevant information is not 
available; and transparency without an accountability mechanism is mere provision 
of information, with no liability or consequences attached to the information. 
 
1.4.3.1 Transparency 
The immediate link most people make when they hear the word ‘transparency’ in 
the context of good governance is to associate it with the International organisation 
– Transparency International28, and the reason is that organisations like 
Transparency International have been at the forefront of the fight to use 
transparency as a tool to foster good governance and fight corruption. Due to this 
focus on good governance, transparency is therefore generally defined as the 
principle of enabling the public to gain information about the operations and 
structures of a given entity29. It is often considered synonymous with openness and 
disclosure, although one can find some subtle differences among these terms30. It 
refers to the degree to which information is available to outsiders that enables them 
to have an informed voice in decisions and/or to assess the decisions made by 
insiders31.  
 
The term ‘transparency’ is a derivative of the word ‘transparent’, which the Oxford 
English Dictionary32 defines as ‘having the property of transmitting light, so as to 
render bodies lying beyond completely visible’. Therefore, transparency meaning the 
 
28 An International organisation created to stop corruption and promote transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels 
and across all sectors of society 
29 David Heald, ‘Varieties of transparency’ in Christopher Hood and David Heald (eds), Transparency: The Key to Better 
Governance? (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 23–45 at p. 26; 
30 Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord, ‘The Surprising Logic of Transparency’, International Studies Quarterly, 43 (1999), 
315–39 at p. 316. 
31 Ann Florini, ‘The Battle Over Transparency’ in Ann Florini (ed), The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World, 
(Columbia University Press, 2007) 
32 'transparent, n' (OED Online, OUP November 2018) < http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/204969> accessed 15 November 
2018. 
  
16 
 
quality/condition of being transparent.  Importing this definition into the context of 
good governance and public administration therefore would suggest that for a 
public official/agency to be one with transparency, then a key attribute is for people 
outside to be able to know what is going on within the agency and how it conducts 
its operations. This is why the term is used synonymously with ‘openness’ and 
‘disclosure’. For an organisation to have transparency, then there has to be a high 
level of openness of its activities.  
 
Transparency is one of those mystic concepts that have attained almost magical 
connotations in that when people use the word, they seem to suggest that it would 
be an elixir for the good governance problem. It is a term that has in the last few 
decades attained what Hood33 refers to as ‘quasi-religious significance in the debate 
over governance’. He argues that transparency figured in numerous twentieth 
century doctrines of governance, well before the word itself came into current 
prominence in the last three decades. He further states that it is possible to identify 
at least three strains of pre-20th century ideas as partial forerunners for modern 
ideas about transparency – the notions of rule-governed administration, candid and 
open social communication, and ways of making organisation and society knowable.  
 
With respect to the notions of rule-governed administrations, he traces this to 
Chinese doctrines of Shen Puhai, and classical Greek ideas that laws should be stable 
or documented, the idea of a government of laws and not men (contained in Article 
XXX of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780), the notions of Rechstsstat in 19th 
Century Germany, and Adam Smith’s argument in Wealth of Nations in 1776 that 
‘taxes ought to be certain and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of 
payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear to the contributor and to every 
other person’. Hood argues that these early conceptions of a rule governed 
administration were intellectual and theoretical forerunners for the modern-day 
conception of transparency which we see today. This notion of rule-governed 
administration as highlighted by Hood is also evident in the thought process and 
words of one of the framers of the American Constitution, James Madison, who 
 
33 Christopher Hood, ‘Transparency in Historical Perspective’ in Christopher Hood and David Heald (eds), Transparency: The 
Key to Better Governance? (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
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wrote compellingly on the importance of information in a democracy, he argued that  
‘a popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is 
but prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern 
ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves 
with the power which knowledge gives.’34  
 
Concerning the notion that that social affairs more generally should be conducted 
with a high degree of frankness, openness, and candour, Hood draws references to 
views espoused by Immanuel Kant when he argues against secret treaties in his 
1795 essay ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’35, and ideas put forward by the philosopher 
Jean-Jacques Rosseau in his treatise - ‘Social Contract’36  where he argues that public 
servants should operate in the eyes of the public . Hood then traces the final strain 
to views that the social world should be made knowable by methods analogous to 
those used in the natural sciences, as espoused by Nicolas de La Mare in Traite de la 
Police37.  Hood believes that all three strains of thought coalesced in the ideas of 
Jeremy Bentham when in the 1790s he declared ‘I do really take it for an indisputable 
truth and a truth that is one of the corner stones of political science – the more strictly 
we are watched, the better we behave’38, and in his famous essay ‘On Publicity’39, 
Bentham boldly declared that ‘secrecy being an instrument of conspiracy, ought never 
to be the system of regular government.’ Therefore, Hood seems to be suggesting that 
Bentham is one of the founding thought leaders and proponents of the modern-day 
concept of transparency. 
 
Meijer40 also believes that Bentham’s ideas on transparency being the key to 
prevention of abuse of power41 have had a strong influence on the development of 
the modern public sector. Transparency measures have potentially altered the 
 
34 Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (August 4, 1822), in Philip R. Fendall, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 
Published by Order of Congress (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1865), III:276, available at <www.jmu.edu/ 
madison/center/main_pages/madison_archives/quotes/great/issues.htm.> accessed 31 October 2019. 
35 Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace (first published 1795, Cambridge University Press 1996) 
36 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, (first published 1762, Penguin 1950) 
37 Nicolas Delamare, Traité de la police, où l'on trouvera l'histoire de son etablissement, les fonctions et les prerogatives de ses 
magistrats; toutes les loix et tous les reglemens qui la concernent... (Paris: J. et P. Cot, 4 vols., 1705-38). 
38 Writing on the Poor Laws’ – a collection of initially unpublished manuscripts from the 1790s 
39 The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 1: 1752–76 T. L. S. Sprigge (ed.) 
(Athlone Press 1968) 
40 Albert Meijer, ‘Transparency’ in Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Public Accountability (Oxford University Press 2014) 
41 Ibid. 
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accountability landscape in a fundamental manner by rearranging access to official 
information, and that the availability of relevant information is one of the pre-
requisites for the information phase of any accountability process, he argues that 
transparency essentially facilitates accountability. 
 
Transparency can mean different things in different contexts, a point which Heald 
makes when discussing the ‘varieties of transparency’42, he sketches out an anatomy 
of transparency, exploring directions and varieties of transparency and how they 
interact with their habitat and with each other. He does this with the aim of 
identifying different directions and varieties of transparency in relatively neutral 
terms. Heald’s approach identifies four directions of transparency – transparency 
upwards where the hierarchical superior/principal can observe the conduct, 
behaviour, and/or results of the hierarchical subordinate/agent; transparency 
downwards where the ruled can observe the conduct., behaviour and/or results of 
their rulers; transparency outwards when the hierarchical subordinate or agent can 
observe what is happening outside the organisation; transparency inwards where 
those outside can observe what is going on inside the organisation. This approach 
taken by Heald is beneficial for this thesis, as it makes the point very clearly that not 
all transparency is the same, and each transparency mechanism might be set up 
specifically to achieve one of the varieties of transparency. This is quite instructive 
for our discussion on managing conflict of interest within the public procurement 
process and the role of access to information in achieving that outcome.  
 
The relationship between all the above understandings and explanations of the 
word transparency lies in the fact that they all are at their core espousing the same 
things - allowing people outside of governance to see and know how things work (or 
should work) on the inside.   
 
In Nigeria, notions of transparency have long since existed, and been a cornerstone 
of traditional Nigerian societies. Ayo Obe discusses Peter-Okoye’s description of the 
village of Enugwu-Uku in precolonial Igboland in Nigeria where whenever anything 
 
42 Heald (n 30) 
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important was to be done, the ekwe43 would be beaten by the designated person in 
order to alert the village people that something was to be done, and they should 
come to the village square for information and so they may be involved in the 
decision making process44. The transparency in traditional Nigerian societies 
therefore seemed to be of the variety that pushed for transparency inwards. 
 
This thesis takes the position that the current regulatory model within the public 
procurement sector in Nigeria allows for both transparency upwards – a process 
which is adopted within the vertical accountability system, and transparency 
inwards – a process which exists within the horizontal accountability framework. 
During the course of this thesis, the argument that will be made is for the 
strengthening of this transparency inwards model, by improving access to 
information to allow more stakeholders the ability to monitor the operations of the 
public officials and therefore lead to a state of affairs, where there is a higher 
possibility for conflict of interest to be identified and the public official held 
accountable within a horizontal accountability system because of the improved 
transparency inwards framework. 
 
1.4.3.2 Accountability  
The term accountability has its historic origins in the word ‘accounting45’. According 
to Dubnick46, it can be traced to the 11th Century in England, when King William I 
required that all property holders render a count of what they possessed, the 
possessions were then assessed and listed in the so-called Domesday Books. The 
Domesday Books listed what was in the King’s realm, and it was done both for 
taxation purposes and to establish the foundations of royal governance as the 
landowners were made to swear fealty to the King, and by the early 12th century, 
this practice had evolved into a highly centralised administrative kingship that was 
ruled through centralised auditing and semi-annual account giving. This literal 
notion of ‘giving a count’, points to a more traditional concept of accountability, a 
 
43 This is an Igbo traditional musical instrument. It is a type of drum with rectangular cavity slits in the hollowed out wooden 
interior, made out of wood and most commonly a tree trunk. 
44 Ayo Obe, ‘The Challenging Case of Nigeria’ in  Ann Florini (ed), The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World (Columbia 
University Press 2007) 
45 Also, the old French word - acontable 
46 Melvin J. Dubnick, ‘Seeking Salvation for Accountability’, (Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 
2002), pp. 7–9. < http://mjdubnick.dubnick.net/papersrw/2002/salv2002.pdf> accessed 31 October 2019 
  
20 
 
notion in which the relation between sovereign and subjects, principal and agents, 
forum and actor, is the defining element47.  In the hundreds of years since the time 
of King William I however, accountability has shifted from a system of subjects being 
held to account by their sovereign, to the authorities being held to account by the 
citizens48.  However, the core concept has remained the same, the concept that 
accountability involves a process wherein an agent is obliged to provide information 
to their masters/principals – accountability has a relational core to it, it refers to the 
obligation to provide an account to, usually, a superior or at least someone with a 
legitimate stake49. 
 
1.4.3.2.1 Accountability as a Virtue and Accountability as a Mechanism 
As a virtue, accountability is used as a set of standards for the evaluation of the 
behaviour of public actors, it is seen as a positive quality to maintain or to aspire to. 
This is the adjectival meaning of the word, and it is connotative of a desire or 
willingness to act in a transparent, fair, and equitable way. Bovens50 believes that 
accountability in this context bears a close confluence with the concept of morality 
– a concept which has long been a highly debated and disputed area as a yardstick 
for setting standards51, as people’s understandings and expectations of morality 
tend to differ based on culture, society and context.  
 
On the other side of the argument, some have explained accountability as a 
mechanism, here accountability is used in a more analytical sense, it is viewed as an 
institutional obligation where an individual or institution is held to account by a 
‘forum’. The focus here not being in the way the individual or institution acts, but the 
methods in which the relationship between the forum and individual/institution 
operates, specifically the institutional mechanism within which the 
 
47  Mark Bovens, ‘Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a Mechanism’, (2010) 33:5 West European 
Politics, 946-967 < https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402382.2010.486119> accessed 31 October 2019 
48 Mark Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability. A Conceptual Framework’, (2006) European Governance 
Papers (EUROGOV) No. C-06-01, http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-06-01.pdf. Accessed 31 
October 2019 
49 Mark Bovens, Thomas Schillemans & Robert E. Goodin, ‘Public Accountability’ in Mark Bovens, Thomas Schillemans & 
Robert E. Goodin (eds), Oxford Handbook on Accountability,  (OUP 2014) 
50 Bovens (n46) 
51 See Fuller v Hart debate - The Hart-Fuller debate demonstrates the divide that exists between the positivist and the natural 
philosophy of law regarding the role of morality in law. Hart argued that law and morality are separate from each other and 
they can be termed as mutually exclusive. Fuller was of the view that there exists a deep connection between law and morality 
and the authority of law is derived from its consistency with morality. Read both views – H.L.A Hart, ("Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals", (1958) Harvard Law Review. 71 (4): 593–629;  Lon Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law — 
A Reply to Professor Hart". (1958) Harvard Law Review. 71 (4): 630–672. 
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individual/institution can be held accountable to the forum. The issue is not 
whether or not the individual/institution have acted in an accountable way, but 
whether based on the institutional arrangements, they can be held accountable after 
the fact by the forum. Bovens52 believes that accountability as a mechanism implies 
a relationship between an actor and a forum, he suggests that before a relation can 
be qualified as an accountability relation, it is important that the actor is, or feels, 
obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct, through various means. Also, 
there needs to be a possibility for the forum to interrogate the actor and to question 
the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct; and finally, the 
forum may pass judgement on the conduct of the actor. From the above therefore, 
the critical constituent elements of accountability as a mechanism are – the (actor’s) 
obligation to report, the (forum’s) capacity to interrogate, and, the forum’s 
sanction/control power. In fact, Bovens, Mulgan53 and Strom54 believe that the 
possibility of sanctions of some kind forms a critical constitutive element of 
accountability as a mechanism. The possibility of sanctions makes the difference 
between the non-committal provision of information and being held to account.  
 
Both concepts of accountability – as a virtue and as a mechanism are important, 
however for the purposes of this thesis in order to interrogate the potential for 
accountability to be used as  a check on conflict of interest, we will focus on 
accountability as a mechanism, because the goal is to identify mechanisms that can 
be put in place to manage conflict of interest, and therefore this is from an 
institutional arrangement point of view.  If we were to adopt the conceptualisation 
of accountability as a virtue, then the result would be the introduction of umbrella 
concepts (as characterized by Bovens) to a discussion when trying to understand an 
already nebulous term – accountability, this would only serve to further obscure the 
understanding of the word and make it very difficult to establish empirically 
whether an official or organisation is subject to accountability55. Further, in 
accepting this nexus between morality and the understanding of accountability as a 
virtue, it becomes quite difficult to determine with some level of exactness whether 
 
52 Bovens (n.46)  
53 Richard Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies (Pelgrave, 2003). 
54 Kaare Strøm, ‘Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation’ in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds), 
Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 55–106. 
55 Koppell (n.51) 
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a public official/institution has lived up to this virtue. Using such an understanding 
which is fraught with so much uncertainty is therefore not ideal as it would mean 
that there will be varying standards and yardsticks for measuring the accountability 
or lack thereof of a public official/institution. across a range of individuals and 
public organisations. The use of accountability as a virtue, is basically an evaluative, 
not an analytical, concept. It is used to qualify positively a state of affairs or the 
performance of an individual/organisation.  
 
For those reasons therefore this thesis will be adopting an understanding of 
accountability as a mechanism and will be using that conceptualisation in the 
discussion on how accountability can be used to manage the conflict of interest 
problem in public procurement. Flowing from that therefore is this concise 
description of accountability as: ‘the obligation of one party to explain and justify its 
conduct to another party, under the threat of sanction by that other party’. This 
implies a relationship between an actor - the accountor, and a forum - the 
accountholder or accountee. In the context of this thesis, accountability therefore 
presupposes the existence of a mechanism in place to check occurrences of conflict 
of interest by empowering a party to request justification for the other party’s 
conduct under the threat of some sanction. Sanction in this sense is used broadly to 
refer to legal liability but is also broad enough to include reporting malfeasance to 
an authority with the power to enforce some kind of legal liability or sanction. 
 
1.4.3.2.2 Vertical and Horizontal Accountability  
In this thesis, the understanding of vertical accountability will be limited to a 
hierarchical situation wherein the agent purporting to exercise said accountability 
possesses all three critical constituent elements of accountability– the (actor’s) 
obligation to report to that agent/forum, agent/forum’s capacity to interrogate, and, 
the agent/forum’s ability to sanction or make a binding decision.  For example, within 
the public procurement process in Nigeria, when a procuring entity grants a 
contract award which does not follow the laid down procedure, the procuring entity 
has the obligation to report on its awards to the Bureau of Public Procurement 
(BPP), the BPP in turn has the capacity to interrogate the information provided and 
seek clarification when necessary, and if the BPP determines that the proper process 
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has not been followed, it has the power to sanction the entity and reverse the award 
decision. As can be seen the BPP has all three constituent accountability elements, 
and therefore there is vertical accountability.  
 
On the other hand, horizontal accountability in this thesis will refer to a system 
wherein one agent on its own is unable to exercise all three constituent elements, 
and in order to exercise accountability, would need to introduce one or more other 
agents into the accountability transaction. As an illustration, if a contractor wants to 
challenge a bid award decision by a procuring entity, it will have to call upon the 
BPP or the courts in order to enforce accountability. In this case the contractor has 
the right to information (as a bidder in the process it is entitled to request for a 
debrief), it has the right to interrogate the information in the debrief, but it cannot 
unilaterally sanction the procuring entity, to do this, it needs the involvement of the 
courts. As can be seen the accountability journey for a contractor will be lacking one 
of the three elements, and therefore the need to involve another agent of 
accountability moves it from vertical accountability to horizontal accountability.  
 
1.4.4 Access to Information 
When we refer to data in relation to governance, we are speaking about public 
information which is in control of the government or its agencies. Data as a concept 
can be viewed as the lowest level of abstraction from which information and, then, 
knowledge are derived. In general terms, data is a set of values of qualitative or 
quantitative variables56. Collection and dissemination of information and data are 
key tools of government administration, as a regular course of governance 
governments gather large amounts of data and hold significant national datasets, 
this include information like population numbers, birth registrations, marriages etc. 
Hood and Margetts offer a functional model of government as operating through two 
sets of tools: detectors and effectors. Detectors gather information (and data) from 
society, and effectors seek to influence individuals and society57 , therefore the 
gathering of data falls under the detector tool of government as put forward by the 
authors. From the moment a child is born until he/she dies there is one long 
 
56 Bridgette Wessels, Rachel L. Finn, Kush Wadhwa, Thordis Sveinsdottir,Lorenzo Bigagli, Stefano Nativi and Merel Noorman 
(eds), Open Data and the Knowledge Society, (Amsterdam University Press 2017) pp. 45-46 
57 Christopher Hood and Helen Margetts, The Tools of Government in the Digital Age, (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 
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continuum of giving data to the government. From registration of birth and being 
issued with a birth certificate, to immunization for vaccines, to registration in 
schools, to obtaining means of identification (e.g. international passport), to paying 
taxes, the list is endless. All this information is gathered by the government and is 
stored by the government. The government in effect is the largest repository of data 
in a country and gathers large amounts of data and hold significant national 
datasets.58  
 
Open government data is therefore a system of the government making available to 
the public the data which it has gathered. It is publicly available data that can be 
universally and readily accessed, used and redistributed free of charge. It is 
structured for usability and computability. The proponents of open government 
data therefore advocate that these datasets held by the government should be made 
openly available to members of the public through technology. A report published 
by the Open Data for Development Network suggests that open data is central to the 
goals of “enabling widespread economic value, fostering greater civic engagement 
and enhancing government transparency and accountability to citizens59”. The term 
- open government data became widely used after 2008, it emerged in the United 
States of America, from the work of a group of open data advocates who met in 2007 
to develop some open data principles and discuss how they could mobilise people 
who were interested in developing citizen training and data management, curation 
and use. They developed eight principles that underpin the main elements of open 
government data, arguing that government data can only be considered open if it is 
made public by complying with those principles. The principles are that all public 
data should be made available, the data made available should be data that is 
collected at source with the highest possible level of granularity, in other words, 
with as much detail as possible. and should be made available as quickly as 
necessary to preserve the value of the data. Further, the principles state that the data 
should be accessible and available to the widest range of users for the widest range 
of purposes with no requirement for registration and be reasonably structured to 
 
58 Tim Davies, ‘Open data, democracy and public sector reform’ (MSc Dissertation, University of Oxford 2010) < 
https://www.academia.edu/988533/Open_Data_Democracy_and_Public_Sector_Reform> accessed 31 October 2019  
59 Open Data for Development Network, Open Data for Development: Building an inclusive data revolution, (Annual Report, 
2015) <http://od4d.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/OD4D_annual_report_2015.pdf.> 
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allow automated processing. Finally, that the data should be available in a non-
proprietary format over which no entity has exclusive control and not be subject to 
any copyright, patent, trademark or trade secret regulation. The eight principles are 
not a rigid list and in fact have since then be further developed60. While the open 
government data movement initially started as a mainly UK and US driven initiative, 
it has increasingly gathered attention in many other countries around the world. 
Open government data is an important part of the Open Government Partnership, 
an international initiative launched by eight founding governments61 and currently 
including seventy-nine participating countries and twenty subnational 
governments62.  To become a member of Open Government Partnership, 
participating countries must endorse a high-level Open Government Declaration, 
deliver a country action plan developed with public consultation, and commit to 
independent reporting on their progress going forward.   
 
At the core of open government data is the Right-To-Information which promotes 
access to government information as a fundamental right, Birkinshaw63 argues that 
access to government information deserves to be listed as a human right as it is 
instrumental to realizing other human rights such as freedom of speech, access to 
justice etc. The right to information also encompasses the right of the public to 
access government information, often also referred to as freedom of information in 
national legislation. The right to information was first recognised in national 
legislation in Sweden in 176664 when the Freedom of the Press Act was passed. This 
Act created a right of the Swedish citizen to access official documents in order to 
encourage the free exchange of opinion and the availability of comprehensive 
information. Fast-forward almost two hundred and fifty years later and there are 
currently around ninety countries around the world that have adopted freedom of 
information legislation in one form of the other, and fifty more countries have 
legislation pending65. In addition, freedom of information has been recognised as a 
 
60 In 2011 by the US Federal Chief Information Officer Vivek Kundra and by the UK’s Public Sector Transparency Board in 
2012. These have extended the eight principles but are based on the recommendations made in the original Sebastopol List. 
61 Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States 
62 OGP Members - https://www.opengovpartnership.org/our-members/ accessed 31 October 2019 
63 Patrick Birkinshaw, ‘Transparency as a Human Right’, in Christopher Hood and David A. Heald (eds.), Transparency: The Key 
to Better Governance? Proceedings of the British Academy  (Oxford University Press 2006) 
64 The Freedom of the Press Act is one of the four fundamental laws that make up the Constitution of Sweden - the Instrument 
of Government, the Act of Succession, the Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression 
65 Access to Information Laws” Overview and Statutory Goals <https://www.right2info.org/access-to-information-
laws/access-to-information-laws#_ftnref7>accessed 31 October 2019 
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constitutional right in more than thirty countries, and it is increasingly considered 
as a human right66. There has been research which talks about the potential of open 
data to increase trust, enhance civic engagement, counter corruption and increase 
accountability67. Open government data is considered vital for transparency and 
accountability, the rationale being that in order to hold government accountable for 
its acts, the public needs to be well informed/know what the government is doing 
on a continuous basis. Therefore, one way this can be provided in an unbiased and 
non-watered-down way is for there to be open government data. In other words, the 
data must be truly transparent in order for the public to be able to hold the 
government to account. Open government data focuses on the ways that seamless 
access to data can improve relationships between citizens and their governments, 
advocates of open government data aspire towards attaining more open and 
transparent government and facilitating citizens to use public data to improve their 
knowledge and engage with public issues in a more informed way. 
 
Right to information proponents argue that the right is indispensable in a 
democracy, and that access to government information is a key component of any 
transparency and accountability process for government activities and processes68. 
In addition to that, Peled and Rabin69 introduce a ‘proprietary justification’ 
dimension into the conversation in that, since the information held by public 
authorities is the property of the state’s citizens and residents, then as owners of the 
information, they should clearly have access to it irrespective of whether or not they 
are the ones who actually gathered the data. This thesis will argue that improved 
access to information through functioning freedom of information laws and open 
government data can be the catalyst for improved horizontal accountability in the 
procurement process.  
 
 
66 Birkinshaw (n. 64) 
67 Marijn Janssen, Yannis Charalabidis and Anneke Zuiderwijk, ‘Benefits, Adoption Barriers and Myths of open data and Open 
Government’, (2012) Information Systems Management 29(4) 258–268. 
68  Mark Bovens, ‘Information Rights: Citizenship in the Information Society’ (2002) The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 10(3), 317-341. 
69 Roy Peled and Yoram Rabin, ‘The Constitutional Right to Information, (2011) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
42, 357-401. 
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1.5 Key Contribution of this Thesis 
This thesis tackles one of the most critical sectors in the Nigeria public sector – 
public procurement, specifically because of the effect that this sector has on the 
general development of a country. The focus of the thesis is on determining how to 
ensure the procurement sector is achieving its goals and objectives, the biggest 
obstacle to this being the rampancy of corruption within the sector. The thesis 
argues that in order to reduce corruption, the focus needs to be placed on ensuring 
accountability in the stage before corruption – conflict of interest. It argues that in 
order to ensure accountability at the conflict of interest stage, horizontal 
accountability can be extremely beneficial, but in order to enjoy the benefits of 
horizontal accountability, it is important to understand how horizontal 
accountability works within the Nigerian public procurement process.  The key 
contributions of this thesis are the creation of the TAM – a theory backed model as 
a horizontal accountability measurement tool; and a very thorough analysis on the 
accountability framework of the Nigerian public procurement process with  a focus 
on the surrounding access to information legislations, which has been a hitherto 
unexplored gap in the research on Nigerian public procurement. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has set out the aim of this thesis and the methodology that 
has been adopted for this research. It has provided foundational knowledge across 
the three thematic areas which the thesis straddles – conflict of interest, 
transparency and accountability, and access to information; and ultimately what 
contribution this thesis will make to the body of knowledge.  Over the next five 
chapters this thesis will argue for the enhancement of horizontal accountability in 
the public procurement process in Nigeria, and it will do so by firstly identifying the 
current problems and loopholes faced within the public procurement process 
currently based on the public procurement legislation and other related legislation, 
the next step will be to introduce the TAM and explain its theoretically 
underpinnings and potential usefulness of the model to solving the horizontal 
accountability effectiveness problem. Finally, in the later chapters of this thesis, the 
TAM will be put to practical use to address some of the loopholes which have been 
identified as existing in the public procurement process. The TAM will highlight 
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where the structural and legislative shortcomings exist in the process, and using the 
TAM, this thesis will be able to provide suggestions and recommendations for 
improvement of the system, and ultimately the enhancement of horizontal 
accountability. 
  
29 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 - The Conflict of Interest Loopholes in Public 
Procurement Regulation in Nigeria 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In this Chapter we will discuss the current public procurement regulations in 
Nigeria and analyse the effect and effectiveness of these laws, regulations and codes 
vis-à-vis managing conflict of interest in the system. The laws created in Nigeria 
have several sections which deal with controlling and managing conflict of interest 
either frontally or tangentially, and it will be the aim of this chapter to identify and 
analyse structural deficiencies and loopholes within the system as it currently exists 
which militate against the goal of transparency and accountability, and further 
precipitates the problem of conflict of interest within the procurement process in 
Nigeria. Ultimately, this thesis argues that these loopholes are representative of the 
broader problem of the shortcomings and limitations of the current hierarchical 
accountability mechanism – vertical accountability, towards ensuring transparency 
and accountability within the public procurement process. It is only in adopting 
more tools to solve the problems, specifically by broadening the scope and efficacy 
of horizontal accountability that lasting solutions can be created for the 
improvement of the procurement process in Nigeria.  This Chapter therefore serves 
to lay the groundwork on this discussion by either highlighting loopholes where 
vertical accountability is failing and would benefit from the introduction of 
horizontal accountability; or where horizontal accountability has been introduced 
but there are loopholes which limit its efficacy. 
 
It is important to set out here, that this thesis will be analysing public procurement 
in Nigeria from the Federal level, and will not be looking at the various State 
processes that govern the procurement process, this is because of the sheer number 
of States in Nigeria – thirty-six, and the impracticality of being able to sufficiently 
analyse each one within the confines of this thesis. Therefore, any references made 
to State laws, regulations and procedures for public procurement will be made in 
passing and will not be subject to any in-depth analysis. 
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2.2 Brief History of the Nigerian Public Procurement System 
 
As was briefly discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the foundation of 
the current public procurement process in Nigeria is the Public Procurement Act 
2007 (PPA). The PPA was created as a result of the Country Procurement 
Assessment Report (CPAR) carried out on the Nigerian procurement system which 
was done in 1999. The issues it discovered included lack of an agency specifically 
charged with regulating the procurement process, lack of an oversight body to 
control public procurement, lack of clarity and transparency in the use of Financial 
Regulations (FR)1, proliferation and ineffectiveness of Tender Boards, lack of 
professionalism in procurement, lack of an effective piece of legislation regarding 
public procurement, and many more shortcomings in the process. The legal system 
for procurement operated through FRs, and it was one which was fraught with 
weaknesses and shortcomings, the CPAR identified numerous issues with the 
procurement process. Firstly, regarding the use of the FRs, it was outlined that the 
FRs had no details on the application of the tendering methods to be used, and this 
was largely left to the discretion of the purchasing public entity, there was no 
requirement in the FR for using standard bidding documents and different models 
of standard contracts were constantly used. The entire bid and contract process also 
had very little information or direction on guidance for things like bid opening in 
 
1 The Ministry of Finance was vested with the authority to issue ‘Financial Regulations’ (FR), which were essentially an internal 
set of rules for financial/economic control of the Federal administration and the activities of Tender Boards (TB), and 
regulations concerning the procurement process. On a State level, the process mirrored the Federal level, with the 
procurement regulations in the States consisting mainly of local Financial Regulations based on the Federal FRs, supplemented 
with circulars and guidelines from within the administration in the State governments. Each State had the authority to issues 
its own regulations concerning procurement, and while most State regulations were identical or similar to the Federal FR, this 
did not change the fact that the States could implement their own regulations independently of the Federal FR. Circulars and 
Guidelines regarding procurement issued by administrative bodies were used to supplement the FRs on procurement, this 
therefore meant a proliferation of circulars at different levels of government by different public bodies with the purpose of 
clarifying elements of the FR. The initial stage of the procurement process was the use of registration lists. In order to be 
eligible to bid for procurement contracts, it was a precondition to be registered at the Tender Board/Registration Board. This 
registration system was decentralised, with States having their own registration list and process, and even larger agencies 
having theirs as well. When deciding what procurement method to use, the general practice was to use three different 
variations of tendering methods – direct placement, selective tendering, and open tendering. The decision on what method to 
use was generally determined by individuals rather than as a result of criteria or fixed principles. There were also no clear 
rules for determining when advertisements should be used, FR No. 3406 provided a general clause on advertising of tenders, 
a Circular from the Ministry of Finance stressed the importance of advertising, but however left the decision of when and how 
to advertise up to the implementing units. There were no specific instructions on how bid evaluation should be organised and 
carried out. The process for bid opening was not regulated, bid opening in many cases was done in closed sessions. Also, the 
bid evaluation and award criteria were not usually described in detail in bidding documents, therefore there was a lack of 
transparency, parties entered negotiations of the contractual conditions on price bids, timeframes for performing the work, 
amount of advance payment etc.  This procurement process was fraught with so many inefficiencies and loopholes for conflict 
of interest and corruption, and these inefficiencies were exploited at will by public servants involved in the procurement 
process. 
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terms of timing, location and participation, conditions of payment (advance 
payment and guarantee for advance payment, penalty for late payments etc.)2 There 
were no provisions to guard against conflict of interest in the bid evaluation process, 
and therefore there was always the risk that a member of the evaluation committee 
on a tenders board could have very close connections with a bidder, with the ability 
to influence the committee member in the discharge of his/her functions.3  
 
The CPAR determined that there was no centralised process for controlling the 
procurement process, each ministry or department was often a siloed procurement 
centre, with little or no oversight from an overarching agency, thus leading to a lack 
of transparency4. Another critical issue was the volatility and unstable nature of the 
process, because the FRs were merely administrative documents and not a Law or 
an Act of the legislature, they could be amended by the Minister of Finance 
unilaterally, sometimes to the detriment of suppliers/contractors, this process 
cultivated a climate of uncertainty about government contracts5. The process of 
using FR was also criticised because there was no central policy making entity in the 
area of public procurement and this was left to ad-hoc circulars issued by the 
Ministry of Finance (and in some cases the Presidency), and these FRs and circulars 
frequently did not contain any provisions for the filing of complaints concerning the 
public procurement process, there was no permanent body independent of the 
procuring entity where contractors/suppliers could file complaints regarding the 
procurement process carried out by a purchasing public entity, and the 
supplier/contractor had no alternative than to lodge a complaint with the same 
entity accused of wrongdoing. There was also a duplicity of tender boards, with each 
Department having its own tender board, and therefore there was no scope to take 
advantage of reduction in unit prices for bulk purchases at ministerial rather than 
departmental level. There was also no appropriate delegation of power and 
authority from politicians to the tender boards, as the politicians still effectively and 
operationally controlled the public procurement process6 
 
 
2 World Bank CPAR Vol 2 (2002) p 7 
3 ibid 
4 ibid 
5 ibid 
6 Ibid p 11 
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With all this as a background, the CPAR therefore recommended the introduction of 
a public procurement law, and the establishment of a public procurement regulatory 
body which would be independent of the tender boards with responsibility for the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the procurement function across the public sector 
with tasks including policy making, ensuring compliance with procurement laws by 
public entities, acting as an appeals body to deal with complaints from 
contractors/suppliers7.  It also recommended that the Department Tender Boards 
be abolished and thresholds for approval by Permanent Secretary Department 
Heads revised, and the function be transferred to a Ministerial Tender Board (which 
would also replace the Federal Tender Board). In addition, the CPAR recommended 
that the professional procurement cadre within the civil service needed to be 
strengthened by increasing training resources and introducing a certification 
system, a specific code of conduct/ethics, and developing a comprehensive 
procurement manual based on the new law and regulations. Finally, the CPAR 
recommended that the government explore the potential for electronic 
procurement by implementing a pilot project to gain experience in the field and test 
how electronic procurement could be used to support transparency and 
streamlined procedures8. Pending the introduction of the public procurement law, 
the CPAR recommended some short term measures including the mandatory 
advertisement of tenders over a certain value, certainty for procurement method to 
be used in specific tenders, clear definition of bid evaluation criteria, provisions for 
interest payments to contractors for delayed payments, development of 
procurement plans to determine requirement of funds for various government 
agencies at different quarters during the fiscal year, amongst other 
recommendations9.  
 
It is clear therefore that the state of the procurement framework prior to the year 
2000 was one in which there was high level corruption, extreme conflict of interest, 
and a system that did not have proper checks and balances to prevent these issues. 
With such a state of affairs it is no wonder that the public duty of ensuring 
 
7 ibid p 6 
8 ibid p 23 
9 Ibid p 10 
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transparency and accountability could not possibly be able to survive, let alone 
thrive. 
 
Following the extensive review done by the CPAR and based on some of the 
recommendations, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) issued three 
circulars10. These Circulars were the first concerted steps by the FGN to introduce a 
procurement process at the Federal level in order to plug the loopholes which the 
CPAR had identified. Apart from the issuing of the Circulars, the FGN set up the 
Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU), as an operationally 
independent body headed by a Senior Special Assistant to the President. The BMPIU 
was charged with the responsibility of overseeing the process for award of 
government contracts and procurements of goods and services, and in effect it acted 
as a sort of clearinghouse.11. The BMPIU performed regulatory, monitoring, training 
and certification functions. These included setting standards on harmonised bidding 
and tender documents, undertaking procurement research and survey with a view 
to determining information needs and project costing, enforcing professional ethics 
and sanction of erring officers and professionals. Its certification functions included 
the certification of all federal-wide procurements. The BMPIU also created 
guidelines and procedures for the procurement of capital projects as well as 
associated goods and services, and it operated under a clear mandate, clear goals, 
and objectives. It was charged with harmonising existing government policies and 
practices on public procurement and updating them where necessary. This was to 
move from the duplicity of rules and functions that existed under the previous FR 
process. The BMPIU was also charged with establishing and updating pricing 
standards and benchmarks for all supplies to government across different 
departments and parastatals. The goal was that this would lead to uniformity in 
pricing on purchasing and reduce opportunities for fraudulent practices.  
 
 
10 New Policy Guidelines for Procurement and award of contracts in Government Ministries/Parastatals (Circular F.15775 of 
27th June 2001); Due Process Certification of Contracts (Circular TRY/A5&B5/2001 of October 2001); Guidelines for 
Implementation of Due Process Certification of Contracts (Circular TRY/A4/B4/2002/OAGF/TS/026/168 of 5th July 2002). 
11 The BMPIU was headed by Dr Obiageli Ezekwesili It was in this position that she earned the nickname "Madam Due Process" 
for the work she led a team of professionals to do in attempting to sanitise public procurement at the Federal level in Nigeria. 
She later went on to be Minister of Mines and Steel and then subsequently Minister of Education in Nigeria.  She is  a former 
World Bank Vice President, and ardent campaigner for good governance. She was also a co-founder of Transparency 
International, and one of the pioneer Directors. She was an unsuccessful candidate in the Presidential Elections of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria in 2019. 
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The BMPIU performed procurement audits and undertook the monitoring of capital 
projects where 50% of the contract sums had been expended. It conducted these 
audits to ensure that the project sums expended had been used judiciously before 
authorising the release of further funds. This monitoring function was critical in 
ensuring that government finances were not being spent on phantom projects and 
non-performing contract awards. The BMPIU’s training and advisory functions 
included co-ordinating training programmes in order to build up institutional 
capacity and conducting regular public enlightenment programmes to sensitise 
various stakeholders involved in the public procurement process. However, the 
BMPIU was never set up to be a permanent institution or agency, it was always 
envisaged that it would be a transition agency that would be charged with midwifing 
a more comprehensive procurement regime, and to this end the BMPIU enforced 
due process procedures as precursors to the implementation of a new procurement 
regime.  
 
In 2007, the National Assembly passed the Public Procurement Act, (PPA) 2007, this 
was Nigeria’s first legislation dedicated solely to the procurement process and it 
revolutionised the procurement process in Nigeria. The law, as with many other 
procurement laws in developing and emerging countries around the world was 
modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and 
Services, 1994. The PPA was created as a result of extensive consultation and 
research on the procurement regulations needs of Nigeria, initially led by the CPAR 
and then built upon by the activities of the BMPIU. The PPA amongst other things, 
established the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) as the federal agency in charge 
of managing the public procurement industry in Nigeria. 
 
Regrettably, it appears that since the passage of the PPA in 2007, and its 
implementation in the years after, there has not been much improvement - at least 
in relation to the perception of corruption in the public procurement process in 
Nigeria. A review of the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) over the last 11 years shows that in the years since 2007, Nigeria has not made 
any major gains in improving the perception of corruption in the system. 
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Year Rank Score 
2007 147/179 2.2/10 
2008 121/180 2.7/10 
2009 130/180 2.5/10 
2010 134/178 2.4/10 
2011 143/182 2.4/10 
201212 139/174 27/100 
2013 144/175 25/100 
2014 136/174 27/100 
2015 136/167 26/100 
2016 136/176 28/100 
2017 148/180 27/100 
2018 144/180 27/100 
 
Fig. 2.1 - Source: Transparency International13 
 
While the CPI covers several sectors in a country, and not just public procurement, 
one of the main areas in which corruption manifests is in public procurement, 
therefore this data is still quite relevant and instructive. Corruption in the public 
sector is hugely dependent on the manipulation of the procurement framework and 
public financial management more generally, and the introduction of the PPA does 
not seem to have solved this issue as it is clear that public procurement in Nigeria 
continues to be plagued by corruption, fraud and unethical practices14.  
 
It is therefore suggested that some of the reasons why the application of the PPA 
seems to have been ineffective lies in the loopholes which exist within the process, 
and the potential for exploitation by actors within the system. Therefore, the next 
few sections will analyse some of these loopholes. 
 
 
12 From 2012, Transparency International changed the scoring system from a scale of 1-10, to a scale of 0-100. 
13 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index -< https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview> 
accessed 1 November 2019 
14 Sope Williams-Elegbe, ‘Systemic corruption and public procurement in developing countries: are there any solutions?’ 
(2018) Journal of Public Procurement. 18 pp. 131-147 
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2.3 Conflict of Interest Loopholes in the Nigerian Public 
Procurement 
In Nigeria, public officials are precluded from engaging or participating in any 
commercial transaction involving the federal government, its ministries, extra-
ministerial departments, corporations where his/her capacity as a public officer is 
likely to confer any unfair advantage - pecuniary or otherwise on him/her15.  
 
2.3.1 Personal Interest 
The oft-cited illustration of a conflict of interest situation in public procurement is 
when the official has a potential personal financial gain in a procurement 
transaction. For example, the official has a proprietary interest in a company bidding 
for a contract, and therefore this is in conflict with the public duty of the official. The 
personal interest can be a financial or a non-financial benefit which the official 
stands to gain from the procurement transaction.  
 
In understanding what a private interest might be in a conflict of interest situation, 
it should be noted that the issues which can lead to a conflict are not limited to 
pecuniary interests. Sometimes, the public official might have a private interest 
which benefits him/her in a personal capacity as a member of a class or group of 
people. For instance, if the public authority is considering separate bids to improve 
public facilities in separate locations. If the public official lives in one of the locations, 
it is possible that his/her decision making might be compromised, and so a conflict 
of interest could be said to exist. Although situations of personal non-financial 
interest are difficult to prove (and therefore difficult to legislate on), the existence 
of such interests must be acknowledged in this discussion. For such a personal 
interest to be classified as one which has the potential to conflict with the public 
duty however, it must be one which can have a direct influence on the public official. 
Instances of individuals who have used their private prejudices to guide their role 
in their official duties though difficult to prove, are not uncommon16, the motivating 
 
15 Public Procurement Act (PPA) 2007 s 57(9) (Nigeria) 
16 For instance, in the UK in the case of Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357 - Ms Ladele, who was a 
registrar for marriages, births, and deaths for the London Borough of Islington objected to being required to officiate at civil 
partnership ceremonies due to her Christian beliefs. This case illustrates how the private interests and public duties of public 
officials may sometimes come into conflict with one another. The courts held that her refusal to officiate the ceremonies was 
in breach of the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007, and the Borough’s decision to compel her to officiate the 
ceremonies or face disciplinary action was valid. 
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factor does not necessarily have to be a personal financial interest, it can be driven 
by other motivations.  
 
2.3.2 Network of Influence  
Apart from personal interests, there are other interests which though not directly 
emanating from the public official could none the less be classed as a private 
interest.  These types of interests are one step removed from personal interests, it 
is those instances in public procurement transactions where a family member, 
friend or acquaintance of the public official is involved either as a bidder/contractor 
or as someone who stands to benefit from the award of the contract. The interest 
here could be that a family member or friend might be involved with one of the 
companies bidding for a contract. Apart from in the obvious case of the immediate 
family members of the public official, there does not seem to be a hard and fast rule 
for deciding what kind of relationships will fall into this category and therefore be a 
private interest. For instance, would it be fair to classify extended family as falling 
under private interests? – uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, family members by 
marriage etc. what about childhood friends who have no blood relationship but have 
such a close relationship as to effectively wield the same influence17? The answer is 
not clear, and that is probably why in the legislation there is no clear-cut guidance 
on it, but it is expected that it will be reviewed on a case by case basis. Unlike 
personal interests which is straightforward to legislate against, legislating against 
family and friends’ interest is a bit more complicated, as most of the laws do not 
explain which types of relationships are covered. For example, the PPA provides that 
a conflict of interest would be one where a person has a ‘direct or indirect… 
relationship with a bidder, supplier, contractor or service provider that is inherently 
unethical or that may be implied or constructed to be, or make possible personal gain 
due to the person's ability to influence dealings’18. The Act however does not go into 
more detail about what a direct or indirect relationship may be, and this idea of a 
direct or indirect relationship is not expanded upon either in the Public 
Procurement Regulations19 or the Public Procurement Manual20.  
 
17 An interesting point to view this problem is from the theory of ‘Three Degrees of Influence’ - Christakis, Nicholas A.; Fowler, 
James H. (2009). Connected:The Surprising Power of Our Social Networks and How They Shape Our Lives. Little, Brown and Co.  
18 PPA 2007 s 57(12) (b) 
19 Public Procurement (Goods and Works) Regulations (PPR) 2007 (Nigeria) 
20 Procurement Procedures Manual for Public Procurement in Nigeria (PPM) 2011 (Nigeria) 
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It is relatively easy to proscribe commercial interests within the immediate family, 
an example of how this has been done is the law in New Jersey, in the USA which 
prevents public officials from knowingly transacting any business with himself, a 
member of his immediate family, or a business organization in which the public 
servant or an immediate family member has an interest while performing his official 
functions on behalf of a governmental entity21. The approach taken by the law here 
has been to specify which family relations are proscribed, rather than leave it 
ambiguous. However, legislating with a certain degree of certainty around what 
relationships outside of the immediate family should be proscribed is more difficult 
and the solution that has been adopted in most cases is to give a broad prohibition, 
and leave the details up to ethics and integrity codes, this is a more pragmatic and 
welcome approach.  
 
2.3.3 Political Conflict of Interest 
Another important type of conflict of interest which we need to discuss is -political 
conflict of interest. This is conflict of interest which arises after an elected candidate 
has accepted finance and funding from private individuals with the implied (or in 
some rare occasions express) understanding that preferential treatment would be 
afforded to the donor/contributor. It is arguably one of the most pervasive types of 
conflict of interest in democratic societies, and this is because awarding of contracts 
is the most effective currency which politicians can use to reward those who backed 
them financially during the election process22. This sort of conflict of interest has its 
ideological roots in the patron-client relationships which began in traditional feudal 
societies23.  
 
21 SNew Jersey Criminal Code  s 2(c) 
22 An example of this was witnessed recently in Nigeria in 2017 where a gubernatorial aspirant a political party in the 
forthcoming election in Anambra State, Hon. Tony Nwoye and his billionaire sponsor, Prince Arthur Eze, allegedly reached an 
agreement on how to share positions after the election. According to the purported agreement, the candidate allegedly agreed 
to allow Prince Eze have 10 commissioners, as well as 30 percent of the state’s internally generated revenue, (IGR), if he won 
the election. Both parties allegedly signed a contract to this effect (drafted by a lawyer) - Yemi Itodo, 'Anambra guber: Alleged 
secret agreement between Tony Nwoye, Arthur Eze exposed' (The Daily Post, 25 August 
2017) <http://dailypost.ng/2017/08/25/anambra-guber-alleged-secret-agreement-tony-nwoye-arthur-eze-
exposed/> accessed 26 March 2018 
23 Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt Louis Roniger L, Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in 
Society (Cambridge University Press 1984) - These relationships historically involved ‘the patron providing clients with access 
to the land and basic means of subsistence and the clients reciprocating with a combination of economic services and social 
acts of deference and loyalty. The patron-client relationship has as its core characteristics - a combination of inequality and 
asymmetry in power with seeming mutual solidarity expressed in terms of personal identity and interpersonal sentiments 
and obligations; a combination of potential coercion and exploitation with voluntary relations and mutual obligations; and a 
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The political conflict of interest, which is a result of election funding, is broadly 
under the term ‘political finance’, which has a wider meaning to include finance to 
be used by political parties for their routine expenses, political education and policy 
research, costs of litigation etc. However, for the purposes of our discussion we will 
limit ourselves to the category which Pinto-Duschinsky24 refers to as an acceptance 
of money in return for an unauthorized favour or the promise of a favour in event of 
election to an office. In his research he was able to learn of significant cases from 
twenty-eight (28) countries25 where these allegations were made ranging from 
developed to developing countries26. Fazekas and Cingolani in explaining what this 
manifestation of conflict of interest is, state that ‘donating to election campaigns in 
return for public procurement contracts is a corrupt exchange which is widely 
considered as one of the most frequently used mechanisms (for corruption), and has 
in turn, received the highest scrutiny’27. Research has been carried out which has 
shown instances where election campaigns and public procurement contracts 
awards have intertwined, have been uncovered in diverse countries such as Czech 
Republic, Brazil, Italy, the USA, Romania, and Russia, however evidence in many of 
the cases are only suggestive28. Research was carried out in 2011 and found that 
firms (in the USA) who made campaign contributions were on average awarded 
more additional contracts29, the researcher was however quick to point out that the 
contractor-politician relationship is not generally a quid pro quo, but what campaign 
contributors get is access and a range of other intangible benefits. In Brazil, 
companies’ campaign contributions translated into additional contracts won worth 
fourteen times more than the contributions30, in Russia, companies with at least 5% 
revenue from procurement contracts increased their illicit political party financing 
 
combination of emphasis on such mutual obligations and solidarity or reciprocity between patrons and clients with the 
somewhat illegal or semi-legal aspect of these relations 
24 Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, ‘Financing Politics: A Global View’, (2002) 13 Journal of Democracy’, 4, pp. 69-86  
25 Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belgium, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Germany, India, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, South Korea, Spain, Suriname, United Kingdom, United States of 
America, and Venezuela.  
26 The point needs to be made however that these were cases of allegations and not necessarily with proven convictions. 
Political campaign is an area rife with true and false allegations. 
27 Mihály Fazekas and Luciana Cingolani, Breaking the cycle?: How (not) to use political finance regulations to counter public 
procurement corruption, (2016) Working Paper series: GTI-WP/2016:01 < http://www.govtransparency.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/GTI_WP2016_1_Fazekas-Cingolani_PolfinPP-corr_draft_160222.pdf> accessed on 1 November 
2019 
28 n 24 
29Christopher Witko, ‘Campaign Contributions, Access, and Government’, (2011) 3 Contracting, J Public Adm Res Theory 
30 Taylor Boas et al, ‘The Spoils of Victory: Campaign Donations and Government Contracts in Brazil’, (2014)  Journal of Politics, 
76(2), 415–429. 
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transfers by about half, a few weeks around elections and gained substantially more 
procurement contracts than their non-donating peers afterwards31. In Latvia, the 
effect of political contributions on public procurement contracts was viewed from a 
loss perspective, where companies whose campaign contributions were given to the 
ruling party which eventually lost the elections in 2002, lost roughly 30% of their 
revenues32.  
 
Politics in Nigeria (and in fact round the world) is an expensive undertaking, and 
because the large majority of individuals may not be able to fund election campaigns 
themselves - as there is no substantial state funding for elections in Nigeria33, they 
have to raise funding from outside sources. These outside sources see election 
funding as an investment (especially in countries where elections are not fought and 
won on ideological issues), and therefore the only reason why private 
citizens/companies would fund an election is to elicit a benefit, the only leverage the 
election candidates have is to grant favours for contract awards or appointment to 
positions if they are elected. Situating this therefore in the picture of public 
procurement, campaign contributors can use their funds as entry fees into the public 
establishment with the hope that they create relationships which facilitate better 
business prospects for the organisations. The private actors are therefore able to 
achieve access and influence over public procurement tenders through their 
political party or campaign contributions34. To combat this, some jurisdictions have 
introduced legislation which prevents executives at financial firms that do business 
with the State from making contributions to politicians or political organizations 
that operate in the jurisdiction35. The rationale behind this rule is therefore to 
prevent a situation where the campaign donor could become a corrupting influence 
on the public agency. 
 
 
31 Maxim Mironov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, ‘Corruption in Procurement and Shadow Campaign Financing: Evidence from 
Russia’ (ISNIE Annual Conference, 2011) 
32 Vyacheslav Dombrovsky, Do Political Connections Matter? Firm-Level Evidence from Latvia (No. 3). (Riga 2008). 
33 Okechukwu Eme and Nkechi Anyadike, ‘Political Financing in Africa: A Comparative Study of Kenya and Nigeria: Proposal 
for Reform’, (2014) 5 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences pp 22-34.  
34 OECD, Financing Democracy. Supporting Better Public Policies and Preventing Policy Capture, (OECD 2014). 
35 In the USA, Federal contractors are completely prohibited from contributing to federal election campaigns – Federal Election 
Campaign Act 1974. In the UK, political campaign funding is governed by the Representation of the People Act 1983 (RPA) 
and the Political Parties Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA). Donations to political parties can only be made by 
‘permissible donors’, there are strict reporting requirements that donations of over £5,000 must be reported to the Electoral 
Commission. 
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In the analysis above this thesis has framed the more prevalent private interests that 
interact with the public duty in the Nigerian context which leads to a conflict of 
interest, next will be to drill down on a few of the specific legislations which have 
loopholes that facilitate conflict of interest. 
 
2.4 Conflict of Interest Loopholes in General Legislations 
While analysing the legislations on public procurement in Nigeria, the focus will be 
heavily on the PPA, however, where relevant, provisions of other related legislations 
will be analysed. Therefore, this section analyses a few provisions of other related 
legislations which have an impact on the public procurement process and the 
conflict of interest scenarios which have the potential to arise there. 
 
2.4.1 Mandatory Asset Declaration  
Under the provisions of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution, public officials are meant to 
complete asset declaration forms mandatorily, the asset declaration process 
involves completing the asset declaration form, swearing a declaration to its 
authenticity before a High Court Judge, and then submitting it to the Code of Conduct 
Bureau (CCB). The Fifth Schedule provides a Code of Conduct for public officers. In 
Section 11(1) it provides as follow: 
11. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, every public officer shall within 
three months after the coming into force of this Code of Conduct or immediately after 
taking office and thereafter - 
(a) at the end of every four years; and 
(b) at the end of his term of office, submit to the Code of Conduct Bureau a written 
declaration of all his properties, assets, and liabilities and those of his unmarried 
children under the age of eighteen years. 
(2) Any statement in such declaration that is found to be false by any authority or 
person authorised in that behalf to verify it shall be deemed to be a breach of this Code. 
 
The above section from the Constitution seeks to ensure transparency in the Assets 
declaration of a public official, this is in line with the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption which calls on State Parties to adopt asset declaration and 
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financial disclosure regimes for their public officials36. By requiring that those 
holding office divulge their assets and interests before, during and upon leaving 
their tenure, any enrichment during that period can be monitored. Based on the 
provision of the 1999 Constitution, the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act 
(CCBTA)37 was passed in order to implement the Constitutional mandate. From a 
public procurement perspective, the requirement for assets declaration would be a 
pointer to a situation where there could be a conflict of interest, this is because it is 
presumed that the reference to assets in the declaration would include shares or 
other holdings which a public officer would have in a company. Mandatory 
declarations on the face of it are quite a useful tool, in a system where it is effectively 
set up, it would require people who want to take advantage of the system to go 
through elaborate means of hiding their interests, and it could also be used as a key 
piece of evidence when prosecuting a public official who has made a false 
declaration. Sadly, declaration alone will not solve the problem, and in fact some 
public officials might seek to avoid being found out by specifically using proxies. 
With respect to the provision in the 1999 Constitution above therefore, there are a 
number of loopholes which could be exploited. 
 
Firstly, there is no requirement that the information be made public once the assets 
have been declared. Research suggests that while it is true that there is a positive 
correlation between public disclosures and government quality (which by definition 
includes lower levels of corruption), this only holds true when these disclosures are 
made accessible to the public and when the scope of the disclosures is 
comprehensive38. In Section 3 of the CCBTA the functions of the Code of Conduct 
Bureau are listed as including receiving, retaining and examining assets declarations 
of public officials, and receiving complaints about non-compliance. There is no 
requirement that this information be made public. Public availability of asset 
information both deters officials from intentionally filing false declarations and 
encourages corrections for unintentional mistakes, moreover, it strengthens and 
facilitates citizens’ involvement in reviewing the declarations for accuracy and 
 
36 United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003, Article 8, paragraph 5; Article 52, paragraph 5 
37 Cap. C 15 LFN, 2004 
38 Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Disclosure by Politicians’, (2010) 2 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 179–209 
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completeness. One study concluded that in some countries up to eighty percent of 
all declaration forms contain critical errors39.  
 
Secondly, in the CCBTA40 , the form for submitting the asset declaration is discussed, 
and crucially it does not include providing information about income, it only covers 
properties, assets and liabilities of public officials and their spouses and unmarried 
children under the age of twenty-one years. It should be pointed out that this section 
is  largely a reproduction of Section 11(1) of the Fifth Schedule to the 1999 
Constitution, however it introduces some discrepancy, in that the age for asset 
declaration for children of a public official is set at eighteen years old in the 
Constitution and is set at twenty-one years old in the CCBTA. It is this sort of 
uncertainty and lack of coherence that creates room for conflict of interest to exist. 
Further, the Constitution has not mandated the disclosure of sources of income. 
Therefore, theoretically a family member of a public official could be earning an 
income from a company, in some kind of capacity, where the company is connected 
to the public official’s employer contractually and therefore a conflict of interest 
situation would arise. The fact that the Constitution only mandates disclosure of 
assets and does not include income is a loophole which unscrupulous public officials 
may look to exploit. The inclusion of income declaration into the requirement of 
declaration by public officials in the 1999 Constitution would be a big step in the 
right direction for compulsory disclosure. The fact that income is not specifically 
covered in the asset disclosure form is a red flag for any proactive disclosure 
process.  
 
Under the Code of Conduct for Public Officers41 the word "assets" is defined as 
including any property, movable and immovable and incomes owned by a person, 
using that definition it would suggest that income should be declared, however a 
reading of the Asset Declaration Form would show that this is not the case. The Asset 
Declaration Form for public officers is contained in the First Schedule of the Code of 
Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, it asks public officers to complete the following 
‘details of assets’ – cash in hand, cash in bank (in and outside Nigeria), landed property 
 
39 ibid 
40 CCBTA s 15 
41 Fifth Schedule 1999 Constitution. 
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(in and outside Nigeria and how acquired), movable property or assets and how 
acquired, government securities and private securities (within and outside Nigeria), 
and finally details of assets/property of wife(ves) and children. It is clear therefore 
that the current Asset Declaration Form does not capture income of the public 
officers, and therefore theoretically a public officer could be drawing an income 
from a source which could create a conflict of interest in his/her daily role, but not 
been obliged to declare this income, as it is not covered in the Asset Declaration 
Form. 
 
In conclusion, the 1999 Constitution and the CCBTA made pursuant to the Fifth 
Schedule of the Constitution lays a good foundation for enshrining transparency by 
creating the rule on mandatory asset declaration, however there are existing issues 
and loopholes which can be easily exploited, and these need to be addressed.  
 
It should be noted that Nigeria is currently a member of the Open Government 
Partnership (OGP)42 and under its current Action Plan43, it has committed to 
establish a Public Central Register of Beneficial Owners of companies44 . If this is 
achieved, this would go a long way to addressing the loopholes identified in this 
section. 
 
2.4.2 Limited Access to Companies’ Register 
The Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 45 is the law that governs 
the registration of business, companies, and organisations in Nigeria. Under the 
Companies Regulations 2012 made pursuant to the CAMA, individuals are allowed 
to undertake a search on the file of the records kept with the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC), to obtain the following information among others – the names 
of shareholders and the number of shares held by each shareholder, names of 
Directors, details of any secured creditors. This information is available but has an 
application process, and frequently there are instances of where the CAC might be 
 
42 The Open Government Partnership is a multilateral initiative founded in 2011 that aims to secure concrete commitments 
from national and subnational governments to promote open government, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness 
new technologies to strengthen governance. It currently has 79 members 
43 Nigeria Action Plan 2019-2021 <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/nigeria-action-plan-2019-2021/> 
44 Commitment 6 Nigeria Action Plan 2019-2021. 
45 Cap. C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 
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‘unable to find the file’ being searched. Currently online public searches can be 
conducted on companies, however the only information which is provided is the 
date of registration, and registered business address. 
 
Therefore, the loophole that exist here is that in cases where there is need to confirm 
the identity of the owners of a company, and to determine whether or not a public 
procurement official (or any related person) is connected to the company, the 
confirmation process comes at a cost, and has a delay of up to a week. Therefore, 
this creates a barrier for confirming the individuals behind a company and creates 
a loophole for conflict of interest as it could deter members of the public who want 
to investigate awards to certain companies, the cost attached to the searches and 
the turnaround time for completion creates a barrier to accessing this information, 
and it is submitted that this barrier is a loophole. 
 
2.4.3 Opacity in Election Campaign Financing 
In Nigeria, under the provisions of the Constitution, political parties are mandated 
to file detailed annual statement and analysis of its sources of funds and other assets 
together with a similar statement of its expenditure with the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) who in turn are to submit to the National Assembly a 
report on the accounts and balance sheet of every political party every year46. 
Subsequent to these provisions, the INEC released the Political Party Financial 
Reporting Manual47 which is applicable to all registered political parties, and which 
they are bound to follow. 
 
However this is not being followed in practice, in fact the most recent Political Party 
Audit Report is from the year 2011, and in that year, of the twenty-three registered 
political parties, only two had properly filed their annual reports48, and there is no 
information about whether annual reports have ever been filed with the National 
Assembly. Also, under the Electoral Act 2010, the INEC is given the power to place 
 
46 1999 Constitution s 225-226 
47 Independent National Electoral Commission: Political Party Financial Reporting Manual 2011 - 
<https://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Political_Party_Finance_Handbook.pdf> accessed 1 
November 2019 
48 Independent National Electoral Commission: Political Party Audit Report - <https://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/EXECUTIVE-SUMMARY-REPORTS-FOR-ALL-POLITICAL-PARTIES-ACCOUNT-FOR-THE-YEAR-
2011.pdf> accessed 1 November 2019 
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limitations on the amount which can be contributed towards an election 
campaign49,  this has been set at N1,000,000 (One Million naira50). The Electoral Act 
further provides51 that election expenses of a political party shall be submitted to 
the INEC in a separate audited return within 6 months after an election and such 
return shall be signed by the political party's auditors and counter-signed by the 
Chairman of the party and be supported by a sworn affidavit by the signatories as to 
the correctness of its contents. As with a lot of regulatory requirements, the 
willingness of the subjects of the regulation to comply is a factor of many things, 
primarily the ease of reporting, the sanctions for non-reporting, and finally the 
willpower of the regulator to enforce the rules and regulations.  
 
The loophole here therefore is that the political parties are using the lack of any 
penalties for non-reporting as an avenue to avoid filing any reports to the INEC. In 
fact, in the case of political party and election campaign financing in Nigeria, 
arguably the most important is the sanctions for non-filing of annual reports, 
crucially the relevant section of the Electoral Act52 does not specify any penalty for 
non-compliance and therefore there is no incentive for the political parties to 
comply with the regulations.  Further, it would appear that there has been a failure 
of the regulator – INEC, to ensure compliance by the political parties to their 
responsibility of filing proper returns. It is this lack of proper penalties for breach, 
and the tepidness of the enforcement, that creates the loopholes within the political 
financing regulations, as without reports there is opacity as to who is funding the 
political parties privately, if that information was made available there would be a 
way to identify if those funding the political parties have any interests in 
government contracts which are awarded by the political party in government. 
 
2.5 Conflict of Interest Loopholes in the Public Procurement Act 
2007 
Under the provisions of the PPA, the procurement process is to be conducted by 
open competitive bidding and is to be done in a manner which is transparent, timely, 
 
49 Section 90 Electoral Act 2010 (Nigeria) 
50 S.91 (9)This is the equivalent of circa £2,000 (Two thousand pounds) 
51 Section 92 
52 Section 89 
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and equitable for ensuring accountability; with the aim of achieving value for money 
and fitness for purpose in a manner which promotes competition, economy and 
efficiency. Contracts must be awarded to the lowest evaluated substantially 
responsive bid53.  
 
Open competitive bidding is the process by which a procuring entity based on 
previously defined criteria effects public procurements by offering to every 
interested bidder, equal simultaneous information and opportunity to offer the 
goods and works needed54. Bidding for procurement in Nigeria is carried out either 
by way of National Competitive bidding or International Competitive Bidding55. The 
PPA also allows for other types of tendering in specific circumstances, these include 
two stage tendering where it is not feasible for the procuring entity to formulate 
detailed specifications for the goods/works/services to be procured, where the 
character of the goods or works to be procured are subject to rapid technological 
advances , or where the procuring entity seeks to enter into a contract for research, 
experiment, study or development56; restricted tendering where the 
goods/works/services to be procured are available only from a limited number of 
suppliers or contractors, or the time and cost required to examine and evaluate a 
large number of tenders is disproportionate to the value of what is to be procured57; 
request for quotations from suppliers/contractors where the subject of procurement 
does not exceed a sum that is set out in the Procurement regulations58.  
 
The PPA was passed in 2007 to address a number of failings that existed in the public 
procurement process in Nigeria, and while theoretically the passage of the law 
would have seemed to have achieved that, the reality is that there are a number of 
loopholes which exist within the laws that have the potential to be exploited and are 
indeed being exploited by bad actors within the public procurement sector. We will 
now move to a discussion of some of the loopholes that exist within the Nigerian 
PPA. 
 
53 PPA 2007 s 16(17) 
54 PPA 2007 s 24(2) 
55 PPA 2007 s 25 
56 PPA 2007 s 39 
57 PPA 2007 s 40 
58 PPA 2007 s 41 
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2.5.1 Insufficient Oversight of Single Source Procurement 
Under the current framework of procurement methods in Nigeria, single, direct and 
emergency procurement is permitted. Jointly, these procurement methods are 
referred to as single source procurement. In the PPA, single source procurements are 
sometimes referred to as "direct" procurement and "emergency" procurement59. It 
can be defined as any procurement contract entered into without a competitive 
process. The PPA allows procuring entities under certain circumstances to engage 
in direct and emergency procurement60, and while the availability of these 
procurement methods is not in and of itself a loophole, the loophole manifests itself 
when these procurement methods exist within a system without the proper 
oversight and safeguards. This creates a transparency and accountability risk, and a 
loophole that may be exploited by unscrupulous actors. The use of single source 
procurement is a potential area where there is the possibility of subverting a 
transparent procurement process. Direct and emergency procurement operate 
under a process that allows the procuring agency to unilaterally decide 
procurement awards to suppliers, within limited thresholds for direct procurement 
and with subsequent ratification for emergency procurement.  
 
These provisions have been abused by actors within the procurement sector in 
Nigeria, and has led to the practice of contract splitting in direct procurement – 
whereby in order to circumvent the thresholds for prior review and approval, some 
procuring authorities split contracts into several lots, to avoid the regulatory review 
mechanism and in order to manipulate the processes for the award of those 
contracts, therefore making it difficult for the regulatory agency to track those 
contracts. Instances of illegal or unethical conduct would then only come to light 
where there is a complaint by a bidder in the procurement process, or during 
procurement audit of the procuring authority in question by its supervising Ministry 
that it reports to, or the BPP. This provides procuring authorities with a lot of 
latitude to manipulate processes for below threshold contracts61. An example of this 
 
59 Sope Williams-Elegbe, ‘The Reform and Regulation of Public Procurement in Nigeria’, (2012) 41 Public Contract Law Journal, 
2 pp. 339–366 
60 PPA 2007 s 41-43 
61 Sope Williams-Elegbe, ‘Systemic Corruption and Public Procurement in Developing Countries: Are There Any Solutions? 
(2018) 18 Journal of Public Procurement, pp. 131-147. 
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is when the Office of the Auditor-General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in its 
2015 Audit Report accused the Ministry of Petroleum Resources of contract-
splitting62 , specifically the report stated that the Ministry, in the award of contract 
for the supply of office supplies, split the contract into smaller packages and 
awarded to four different companies in order to circumvent the Permanent 
Secretary’s approval threshold. 
 
With respect to emergency procurement, in March 2016, the Federal Government 
of Nigeria decided to take steps to cut down weeds around the village of Wachakal 
(in an area thick in the insurgent battle between the Nigerian Government and Boko 
Haram63 terrorists) in order to stop flooding. This was done under a government 
agency established to help coordinate and lead efforts at rebuilding infrastructure 
and rehabilitate millions of victims of the Boko Haram insurgency that was 
devastating many communities in Nigeria’s North East. A Senate Report indicted the 
Secretary to the Federal Government for awarding the contract to a company which 
he was a Director in, and had incorporated, but ceased to be a Director just a few 
weeks before the contract was awarded. He was suspended by the Federal 
Government after the Senate Report indicted him, and thereafter arrested by the 
special procurement fraud unit of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. 
He has been charged and the trial is ongoing64.  
 
To understand the scale of this problem of single source procurement, for the 
purposes of this thesis an analysis was conducted to determine the number of times 
direct and emergency procurement was being used in Nigerian Federal 
Procurement, this analysis was done using published data of Certificates of No 
Objection issued by the BPP in the years 2016 and 201765. In 2016, about 
 
62 Michael Eboh, ‘AuGF accuses Petroleum Ministry of Contract Splitting, Procurement Violation (Vanguard 19 September 
2019) <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/09/augf-accuses-petroleum-ministry-contract-splitting-procurement-
violation/> accessed 1 November 2019 
63 In the local Hausa dialect, Boko Haram means "Western education is forbidden." The Boko Haram militants mainly inhabit 
areas in the northern states of Nigeria, specifically Yobe, Kano, Bauchi, Borno and Kaduna and have been waging an insurgency 
marked by kidnappings, terrorist bombings, and invasion of village and towns since 2003. 
64 Guardian NG Editorial, ‘Babachir Lawal: A Matter Of Honour’ (The Guardian 4 January 2017) 
<https://guardian.ng/opinion/babachir-lawal-a-matter-of-honour/> accessed 1 November 2019;  Alexis Akwagyiram, and 
Paul Carsten, ‘In the weeds: How top official got tangled in Nigerian aid scandal’ (Reuters 14 September 2017) < 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-corruption-aid-insight/in-the-weeds-how-top-official-got-tangled-in-nigerian-
aid-scandal-idUSKCN1BP1GA> accessed 1 November 2019 
65 Bureau of Public Procurement – Certificates of No Objection, <http://www.bpp.gov.ng/all-downloads/> accessed on 1 
November 2019 
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£700million of procurement funds was spent through direct or emergency 
procurement, this represents 25% of all procurement funds spent in that budget 
year. In 2017, the figure was just over £500 million which represented 11% of all 
procurement funds spent in that budget year. Those figures of single source 
procurement only represent the number for procurement awards where post award 
ratification is necessary by the BPP, one can only imagine the actual numbers when 
the figures for awards below threshold are taken into consideration, however there 
are currently no authorised sources where an accurate figure for this can be 
obtained. As can be seen from the statistics of the frequency with which single 
source procurement is being used, there is a real possibility that procurement 
processes like direct or emergency procurement which give seemingly unfettered 
fiat for the decision on which companies are awarded contracts creates loopholes 
for conflict of interest to operate unabated because of the lack of transparency and 
accountability.  
 
The PPA already has a provision that prohibits contract splitting, specifically it 
provides that the splitting of tenders to enable the evasion of monetary thresholds 
set shall be an offence under the Act66, and the PPA provides that when emergency 
procurement is used, this needs to be ratified by the BPP (where above the 
threshold)67. The problem therefore is not one of legislation, but one of monitoring 
and enforcement. There are limited resources and agencies that can monitor the 
affairs of all government agencies, and it is only when information around public 
contracts is made easily accessible, that there can be better monitoring of issues like 
this.  
 
Primarily this burden for monitoring procurement units is based on a hierarchical 
structure, first with the supervising Ministry in charge of the procuring authority, 
and concurrently on the Bureau of Public Procurement68 and the Office of the 
Auditor General of the Federation69 who are legally empowered to review the 
 
66 PPA 2007 s 58(4)(d) 
67 PPA 2007 s 43(4) 
68 Section 5(p) of the PPA 2007 provides that the BPP shall have the function of performing procurement audits and submit 
such report to the National Assembly bi-annually 
69 Section 85(2) of the Constitution of the Federation Republic of Nigeria 1999, provides that the Public Accounts of the 
Federation and of all Offices and Courts of the Federation shall be audited and reported on by the Auditor-General who shall 
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procurement and spending activities of the procuring agency, however, with the 
large number of agencies that are under the monitoring jurisdiction of those 
agencies, it makes it difficult for the monitoring to be as effective as possible. This is 
the critical drawback of a vertical accountability structure, when monitoring and 
enforcement is based on a strict hierarchical line of reporting, and there are too 
many agencies that report to the agency(ies) monitoring, then it becomes almost 
impossible for thorough monitoring, and leads to the use of monitoring techniques 
like random audits70 to ensure probity.  
 
2.5.2 Exclusion of Defence Procurement 
The relationship between defence procurement, national security and attendant 
confidentiality concerns has resulted in a dearth of information on issues connected 
with defence. Information on defence procurement policy in Nigeria is unavailable, 
owing to the culture of secrecy that surrounded the military regimes that governed 
Nigeria until 1999. In addition, Nigeria's defence procurement policy is neither fully 
developed nor formalised71. Defence procurement in Nigeria comprises all the 
purchasing activities of the Ministry of Defence and includes the purchase of military 
hardware such as armoured fighting vehicles, artillery guns, arms and ammunition, 
combat aircraft, ships, missiles and software such as communication equipment, 
spare parts, general stores and military apparel. It also involves construction 
contracts to build artillery fields and accommodation for servicemen, as well as 
military training contracts.72. Therefore, defence procurement in Nigeria operates 
outside of the government civil procurement rules and is the joint responsibility of 
the Ministry of Defence and the  armed services. Specifically, the PPA73 provides that 
procurement of special goods; works and services involving national defence or 
national security are specifically excluded from the operation of its provisions, 
unless the President's express approval has been first sought and obtained.   
 
 
submit his report to the National Assembly; and for that purpose, the Auditor-General or any person authorized by him in that 
regard shall have access to all the books, records, returns and other documents relating to those accounts. 
70 The BPP employs random audits for its monitoring role. 
71 S. Williams, “The Development of Defence Procurement Policy in Nigeria and the Case for Reform” (2005) 14 Public 
Procurement Law Review, 153. 
72 Ibid 
73 PPA 2007 s 15(2) 
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In public procurement systems the world over, the defence sector is generally 
treated as a special entity within government, often appearing exempt from the 
usual rules of scrutiny and oversight, this is often justified with reference to national 
security concerns74. However, there still exist rules on how public procurement 
should be conducted, some countries have their defence procurement sit within the 
same regulations for general public procurement75 or they have specific legislation 
passed for defence procurement76.  Therefore, even though the defence sector is 
viewed as a special sector by most countries, there still exists some sort of 
framework for the procurement process. The issue therefore is not the fact that the 
defence procurement process sits outside of the regular public procurement process 
– as stated by reference to other countries, this is very common, and is done for very 
cogent reasons – the issue is the fact that the process is plagued with a lack of 
transparency. 
 
As stated above, defence procurement in Nigeria operates outside of the 
government civil procurement rules and is the joint responsibility of the Ministry of 
Defence and the  armed services. Williams-Elegbe illustrates77 the non-standardised 
nature of defence procurement in Nigeria, stating that defence procurement as 
conducted by the Ministry of Defence and the individual services differ in practice 
in several respects. Within the Ministry of Defence, requests for procurement are 
sent by the Defence Equipment Evaluation Committee of a particular service to the 
Procurement Standing Committee in the Ministry of Defence, which co-ordinates 
defence procurement and reviews the proposal before award procedures are 
undertaken and the contract is awarded. In addition, if the acquisition exceeds a 
certain limit, the Procurement Standing Committee will submit the request to the 
Minister of Defence, who may bring it before the Federal Executive Council for 
approval.   
 
However, where acquisitions are to be conducted solely within the remit of one of 
the armed services, a different procurement structure is utilised – each armed 
 
74 Mark Pyman, Regina Wilson and Dominic Scott, ‘The Extent Of Single Sourcing In Defence Procurement And Its Relevance 
As A Corruption Risk: A First Look’, (2009) 20 Defence and Peace Economics, 3, pp. 215-232 
75 This is the case for Australia, Italy, and Norway 
76 This is the case for the following countries – India, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Sweden, and the USA. 
77 Ibid p. 5 
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service having their own unique structure. For instance, in the Nigerian army, the 
procurement requests are usually initiated by the user unit through a formal request 
to the Army Headquarters. These procurement requests are received by the army's 
Defence Equipment Evaluation Committee, which tries to ensure the 
standardisation of proposed procurements with existing systems and based on the 
nature of the procurement, determines where the request is forwarded to. 
Procurement of hardware is the responsibility of the Department of Army Policy and 
Plans (DAPP) and therefore requests that fall under this category are passed to the 
Chief of Policy, while the procurement of in-service support items is the 
responsibility of the Department of Army Logistics (DOAL) and therefore requests 
here are passed to the Chief of Logistics. Once the necessity for the proposed 
equipment is established, the Army Procurement Planning Committee takes over 
responsibility by making a call for tenders and issuing guidelines on which the 
contract will eventually be based.  Once the committee has completed its functions, 
the ultimate decision on whether or not to enter into a contract with the chosen 
supplier rests with the Chief of Army Staff. 
 
There is no binding legislation or regulations that cover defence procurement in 
Nigeria, and the procedures discussed above are largely ad-hoc with conflicting 
policy documents and unpublished and frequently classified non-binding 
administrative guidelines. Therefore, defence procurement is largely conducted by 
means of procedures known only to Ministry of Defence officials. It is this secrecy 
and lack of transparency in the defence procurement process that has created a 
loophole which can, and has been, exploited by bad actors in the public procurement 
process in Nigeria.  A report in 2017 by Transparency International78 showed that 
as extra-budgetary spending on counterterrorism in Nigeria has increased in the 
last several years due to the insurgency war against Boko Haram,  this has led to an 
increase in the scale and scope of corrupt opportunities in the defence sector 
resulting in a corrupt war economy that incentivises high ranking officials and 
security personnel to perpetuate conflict for personal gain. In 2015, the Presidency 
set up two temporary audit committees: one investigating spending by the Office of 
 
78 Weaponising Transparency: Defence Procurement Reform as a Counterterrorism Strategy in Nigeria. Transparency 
International (2017) 
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the National Security Adviser and another one investigating defence arms and 
equipment procurement. The reports by the Committees led the Vice President to 
declare that $15 billion had been stolen in arms procurement fraud79  between 2007 
and 2015, the individuals who have been implicated and are currently on trial for 
the allegations of fraud include the former National Security Advisor, the former 
Minister of State for Finance, and the former Chief of Defence Staff80 who was killed 
in an unrelated incident before the completion of the trial against him81. 
 
This area is therefore an area which needs to be strengthened within the 
procurement process in Nigeria, and the loophole needs to be closed. As can be seen 
from how the instances of procurement fraud were discovered within the Nigerian 
defence sector, it is clear that there were no sufficient institutional safeguards for 
the sector. The most practical step to try to plug this loophole would be for 
regulations around defence procurement be created to set standards for the sector. 
However, the underpinning problem is the lack of transparency which has been 
entrenched in the sector, and the conditional accountability mechanisms. These are 
the core issues which need to be addressed, and it is these sorts of issues which 
horizontal accountability, would be able to address. From the example of fraud that 
was discovered in the defence procurement process in Nigeria, it is instructive that 
it was only discovered after an ad-hoc committee was set up, a clear indication of a 
failing within the vertical accountability mechanism. A horizontal accountability 
mechanism if properly put in place could have been able to identify the fraud in the 
system earlier and been more effective in bringing it to light. 
 
2.5.3 Unclear Debrief Procedure 
The PPA provides the mandatory obligation on the procuring entity to debrief losing 
bidders who request a debrief82, in other words a losing bidder may request to be 
 
79 Felix Onuah, Alexis Akwagyiram and Richard Balmforth, ‘Nigeria's Vice President says $15 billion stolen in arms 
procurement fraud’, (Reuters 2 May 2016) < https://in.reuters.com/article/nigeria-corruption/nigerias-vice-president-says-
15-billion-stolen-in-arms-procurement-fraud-idINKCN0XT1UK > accessed on 1 November 2019 
80 Ade Adesomoju, ‘N3.97bn fraud: Badeh’s company pleads guilty to charges, forfeits $1m, Abuja houses to FG’, (The Punch 4 
March 2019)  <https://punchng.com/alex-badeh-loses-six-properties-1m-as-court-terminates-charges/> accessed 1 
November 2019 
81 Fidelis Mbah, ‘Nigeria's former defence chief killed amid growing insecurity’, (AlJazeera 19 December 2018)  
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/nigeria-defence-chief-killed-growing-insecurity-181219070104869.html> 
accessed 1 November 2019 
82 PPA 2007 s 19(e) 
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informed about the reason for the decision that was reached, and the procuring 
entity is obliged to provide this debrief. While this is a very welcome provision, a 
loophole however exists, in that the Act does not specify the manner in which the 
debrief should be carried out. The Act does not specify whether debriefs should be 
done in writing or orally, it also does not state the extent of the information which 
should be included in the debrief. The importance of a debrief is critical especially 
in bids where there may have been irregularities, the information provided in the 
debrief could provide evidence of the irregularity, and thereby give the losing bidder 
the evidence necessary to request for a review of the bid process.  
 
The effect of this lack of clarity around the right to request a debrief is very apparent 
in the procurement process when one analyses the petitions which have been put 
before the BPP - the organisation which has the role of receiving complaints about 
the procurement process. In the most recent information shared by the BPP 
concerning petitions which were filed in 201783, a total of five hundred and 
seventeen (517) petitions were filed and of this number, one hundred and twenty 
five (125) of these petitions were made by contract bidders who had referred their 
complaints to the BPP for various reasons around improper debriefing, ranging 
from non-responsiveness of procuring entities when a debrief request was made84, 
to instances where debriefs were only provided verbally by the procuring entity85. 
Clearly some clarity and guidance is needed on this issue of debriefs if almost 25% 
of the petitions being filed are for complaints around debriefs. This lack of clarity on 
debriefs goes to the heart of the transparency and accountability issue - ideally the 
PPA (or the regulations made pursuant to it) should have gone into some detail 
about what information would be provided and how this would be done, it should 
at a minimum inform the losing bidder about the selection criteria, the score of the 
losing bidder being debriefed, the reasons for the losing bidder’s score, the score of 
the selected bidder, and the name of the selected bidder.  
 
 
83 Bureau of Public Procurement Petition Reports : <http://www.bpp.gov.ng/petition-reports/> accessed 26 February 2019 
84 Petition by MII Justice Advocate on behalf of Rhozeta filed against Federal Government college  Vandeikya (No. 110 BPP 
Petition Reports 2017) 
85 Petition by Samdam Global Construction & Resources Limited and Netview Enviro Com Limited filed against National 
Commission for Refugees Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (Nos. 133 and 134 BPP Petition Reports 2017) 
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Williams-Elegbe86  makes this point about the need for transparency in the debrief 
process when she discusses the need for the introduction of international best 
practice in Nigerian public procurement, stating that one of the hallmarks of this is 
transparency, and one of the requirements for transparency is for there to be 
opportunities for verification within the procurement decision making process, and  
this includes the opportunity for contractors to be given reasons why they were or 
were not selected for a contract award. She argues that the current approach under 
the PPA does not fully meet the requirements of international best practice in two 
ways – firstly the giving of reasons to a losing bidder is of crucial importance in the 
maintenance of a robust procurement dispute resolution system, and in a system 
where bidders are not aware of the reasons why they were unsuccessful, they will 
also be unaware of any irregularities in the procurement process that may 
constitute grounds for review. Secondly, she states that where unsuccessful bidders 
are only notified of the outcome of the procurement process after the successful 
bidder has been notified and possibly after the conclusion of the contract, this denies 
them the possibility of instituting a challenge that could lead to a review of the 
contract award decision. 
 
This loophole where unsuccessful bidders do not have a clearly defined right to a 
debrief goes to the heart of the problems around transparency and accountability, 
and is one of the issues which this thesis will address in the next chapters, 
specifically by advocating for a robust horizontal accountability mechanism which 
should empower the bidders and other stakeholders to hold a procuring authority 
to scrutiny when they exercise their decision making powers when contracts are 
awarded. 
 
2.5.4 Unclear Bid Cancellation Procedure 
The PPA 200787 allows the procuring entity to reject all bids, and to also cancel the 
process at any time in the public interest without incurring any liability to the 
bidders. Williams-Elegbe suggests that this provision essentially gives public 
 
86 Williams-Elegbe S, “A Comparative Analysis of the Nigerian Public Procurement Act Against International Best Practice” 
(2015) 59 Journal of African Law 85, pp. 92-93 
87 PPA 2007 s 28 
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officials carte blanche to cancel the procurement process if the process is not going 
in a way that favours a personal interest88.  
 
Bids can be cancelled because the goods, construction or services are no longer 
required at all; or where there was an irregularity in the original award procedure 
and the procuring entity intends to commence a new procedure, e.g. where the 
procuring entity has received no tenders at all ; or there has been some illegality in 
the award procedure89. It would appear that the PPA subsumes all these instances 
that could lead to cancellations under the omnibus requirement that it must be in 
the public interest. 
 
While this right of the procuring entity to both reject the bids, and to also cancel the 
process is not in issue. This power should not be exercised frivolously, this is 
because of the effect frivolous cancellations may have on suppliers - since they 
would have invested time and resources in the process. Repeated and especially 
frivolous cancellations could serve to undermine the confidence of potential 
contractors and suppliers in the procurement process and discourage future 
participation. Therefore, it is important to cancel a procedure only when there are 
cogent reasons for doing so. Arrowsmith90 suggests that regulatory controls over 
the cancellation process – such as the need for higher approval or a requirement to 
give reasons for a cancellation – may help to ensure this.  
 
The PPA uses the catch all ‘public interest’ for any justification of what a cogent 
reason for cancellation could be.  The discretion to cancel a procurement may also, 
like any other discretion, be abused to favour particular suppliers. For example, a 
procurement could be cancelled, and a new procurement begun because a favoured 
supplier’s tender is not the best tender. In a recent procurement contract in 
Nigeria91, the BPP rejected the plan by the National Pension Commission (PenCom) 
 
88 Williams-Elegbe S, “A Comparative Analysis of the Nigerian Public Procurement Act Against International Best Practice” 
(2015) 59 Journal of African Law 85, p. 92 
89 Arrowsmith S. (ed.), Public Procurement Regulation: An Introduction (EU Asia Inter University Network for Teaching and 
Research in Public Procurement Regulation 2011) p.103 
90 Ibid 
91 Tobi Soniyi, ‘BPP Rejects PenCom’s Move to Cancel PAS Project’, (Thisday 14 March 2018)  
<https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/03/14/bpp-rejects-pencoms-move-to-cancel-pas-project/> accessed 1 
November 2019 
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to cancel the procurement process for the building of a Pension Administration 
System (PAS). PenCom under its previous Director General had awarded the 
contract to a company, and the BPP had issued a certificate of no objection to the 
contract award. However, the new acting Director General of PenCom, appeared 
uncomfortable with the contract and therefore wrote to the BPP seeking to cancel 
the contract citing lack of funds and national interest. The BPP rejected the request 
for cancellation stating that the project was in the national interest and that the 
funds were available as all that is required by the PPA is for the procuring authority 
to be able to pay up to 15% contract mobilisation fee92. In this instance, the BPP was 
able to prevent what could have amounted to an abuse of the discretion to cancel a 
procurement, as no cogent reason could be provided for why the procurement 
should be cancelled. 
 
The example above highlights a situation where the BPP has acted in a proper 
manner and been able to forestall an unnecessary cancellation, however more 
certainty is required around the definition of public interest, in order to enable the 
BPP to be able to validly reject future ill-conceived cancellation requests, or 
cancellation decisions which have been carried out in opaque circumstances to 
obfuscate accountability. Clarification on what constitutes as public interest will 
provide a standard with which stakeholders can get involved in the accountability 
process by providing horizontal accountability, an explanation of the term would 
facilitate adequate monitoring in order to determine if the standard set has been 
met, and where it has not been met, would serve as a foundation of a request for a 
review. 
 
Another important loophole to discuss with respect to the issue of cancellation of 
bids is whether the bidders in a bid that has been cancelled should be given the 
optional right to debrief as they would have if the procurement process was 
completed and they were losing bidders (even though there was no winner). It could 
be argued that the bidder who has spent substantial time, effort and costs in the bid 
process should at least be given the right to know why all the bids were rejected, or 
 
92 It has been suggested in some quarters that the real reason behind the request for cancellation of the award was in order to 
conduct a re-tender process, and to potentially slot in a preferred alternate bidder. 
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why it was cancelled. The provision on debrief93 of losing bids does not make a clear 
distinction between a losing bidder where the award was made, and a losing bidder 
where all the bids were rejected/the contract was cancelled, and therefore there 
seems to be no reason why a losing bidder in a contract award which all the bids 
were rejected/the contract was cancelled should not be entitled to a debrief. This 
lack of clarity has created a loophole where procuring agencies have decided not to 
provide a debrief if the procurement process has been cancelled. A debrief of the 
reason for the bids rejection/ award cancellation would enable the bidder(s) to be 
able to understand whether there were sufficient grounds to support such an action 
and if not, then there should be the opportunity to ask for a review of the decision 
to reject the bids/cancel the contract award.  
 
It would appear however that irrespective of this lack of legislative clarity, in 
practice the BPP tends to uphold the right of a bidder to request a debrief in cases 
where the procurement has been cancelled. In the petition filed by Etudo & Co 
against the Nigerian Maritime Administration And Safety Agency (NIMASA)94, the 
procuring agency – NIMASA, cancelled the procurement process for the provision of 
janitorial services and sundry works at the NIMASA Head office and Annex, the 
contract bidder expressed dissatisfaction with the cancellation of the procurement 
process and filed a petition with the BPP. The BPP directed that NIMASA provide the 
contract bidder with good grounds for the cancellation of the procurement process 
in line with the provision of Section 28(b) of the PPA, which states that the 
cancellation of the procurement process after bids have been received can only be 
done in the public interest.  
 
2.5.5 Denial of Liability towards Bidders 
Under the provisions of the PPA95,  a procuring entity does not have any liability to 
the bidders where all bids are rejected or when the procurement proceedings have 
been cancelled. With respect to the exclusion of liability for rejected bids/cancelled 
procurement, the problem with this provision is that it removes the concept of 
accountability, it does not qualify the exclusion of liability to certain situations. 
 
93 PPA 2007 s 19 
94 No. 225 BPP Petition Reports 2017 
95 PPA 2007, s 28 
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Williams-Elegbe adequately encapsulates this problem stating that the issue is that 
a procuring authority may do this without it being in the public interest and without 
giving a reason, noting that the provision essentially gives the procuring authority 
carte blanche to cancel the procurement process if the process is not going in a way 
that favours a personal interest96. In fact, this actually seems to have been the 
situation that occurred in the Pencom instance discussed above97, so it’s not a 
hypothetical fear. This blanket exclusion from liability when all bids are 
rejected/procurement award is cancelled is not an ideal one.  This is arguably 
unfavourable to the bidders, when companies put in bids for procurement 
works/goods, they do this in some cases at extremely great cost and expense, and 
therefore it can be viewed in some way as an investment. If they are made to lose 
their investment (through no fault of their own), then there should be some form of 
compensation envisaged in cases where the reason for the rejection of the bids or 
cancellation of the award is due to the fault of the procuring entity.  
 
2.5.6 Refusal to grant access to Record of Proceedings 
Under the provisions of the PPA, all procuring entities must maintain file and 
electronic records of all procurement proceedings made within each financial year 
and these records should be kept for a period of at least ten (10) years from the date 
of the award of the contract. However, it should be noted that the PPA specifically 
precludes the possibility of damages being awarded by the procuring entity to 
suppliers, contractors or service providers for damages owing solely to failure to 
maintain a record of the procurement proceedings as mandated. Members of the 
public who request access to the procurement records will be granted said access, 
but only to all unclassified procurement records. The only cost attached to this 
would be the cost of copying and certifying the documents plus an administrative 
charge. The records can only be made available after the procurement contract has 
been awarded or after it has been terminated without an award. However, a 
disclosure of the records prior to the award of the contract may be ordered by a 
competent court.  
 
 
96 Sope Williams-Elegbe  ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Nigerian Public Procurement Act Against International Best Practice’ 
(2015) 59 Journal of African Law 85 pp. 92 
97 n 86 
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Another loophole exists here, in that the PPA provides that a procuring entity may 
refuse to disclose information when lawfully ordered to do so by a court, if its 
disclosure would be contrary to law; impede law enforcement; or prejudice 
legitimate commercial interests of the parties98. The PPA in one fell swoop is giving 
the procuring entity the discretion to disobey a lawful court order where it feels it 
would fall under the exceptions mentioned above. It would seem logical that the 
appropriate forum to argue that a disclosure would be contrary to law; impede law 
enforcement; or prejudice legitimate commercial interests of the parties, is the court 
of law prior to the order for disclosure, and if those arguments have been made and 
rejected by the court, then the procuring entity should not be given the authority to 
still insist on it and refuse the court order. This section of the PPA therefore presents 
a big challenge to the concept of accountability, and in fact is unconstitutional as it 
is inconsistent with the provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria which gives the judiciary the power to adjudicate over matters, and makes 
decisions of the courts binding99. Therefore, this loophole is one which erodes the 
creditability of the courts - one of the government institutions which is integral in 
the horizontal accountability system, and this is something which will need to be 
addressed in order to ensure effective horizontal accountability.  
 
2.5.7 Gaps in the Bid Review Process 
Under the provisions of the PPA100,  a bidder may seek administrative review for any 
omission or breach by a procuring or disposing entity under the provisions of the 
PPA, or any regulations or guidelines made under the PPA or the provisions of 
bidding documents. The only element that a complainant needs to prove to claim 
internal remedy is that the procuring or disposing entity has caused or allowed an 
omission or breach, contrary to the provisions of the PPA, subsidiary legislation 
made pursuant to the PPA, or bidding documents. The PPA does not require 
complainants to prove that they suffered or may suffer loss or injury because of the 
alleged breach or omission. Therefore, such breaches are actionable per se101. 
 
98 PPA 2007 s 38(3) 
99 1999 Constitution s 287(3) -  “ The decisions of the Federal High Court, a High Court and of all other courts established by 
this Constitution shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by other courts of law with 
subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, a High Court and t hose other courts, respectively.”  
100 PPA 2007 s 54 
101 K Udeh, A Comparative Study of the Effectiveness of Bidder Remedies in South Africa and Nigeria, PhD Dissertation (2018) 
< https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/103274>   
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A bidder who seeks a review of a procurement decision must make a request for 
administrative review to the procuring entity within fifteen working days from the 
date the bidder first became aware of the circumstances giving rise to the complaint 
or should have become aware of the circumstances, whichever is earlier. On receipt 
of the complaint, the accounting officer has fifteen (15) working days to review it 
and make a decision in writing.  
 
Where a decision is not taken within that time frame or the bidder is not satisfied 
with the decision of the accounting officer, the bidder may within ten (10) days of 
the decision or lack thereof, make a further complaint to the BPP. Upon receipt of 
the complaint, the BPP must inform the procuring entity and suspend any further 
action by the procuring entity until the BPP has settled the matter. The BPP has the 
power to nullify in whole or part any unlawful act or decision made by the procuring 
entity, revise any improper decision by the procuring entity and substitute its own 
decision for such a decision, or dismiss the complaint. The BPP has twenty-one (21) 
days after receiving the complaint to make a decision and must state the reason for 
its decisions and remedies granted if any. Finally, if the BPP fails to deliver a decision 
within the stipulated time, or the bidder is dissatisfied with the decision of the BPP, 
the bidder may appeal to the Federal High Court within thirty (30) days of the 
receipt of the decision of the BPP or the expiration of the time stipulated for the BPP 
to deliver a decision. This process for bid review has been affirmed in the courts. In 
AC Egbe Nig Ltd v. Director-General of Bureau of Public Procurement102 the Federal 
High Court held that the court will not entertain any suit challenging a procurement 
decision of an entity unless a complaint has first been made to the accounting officer 
concerned and to the BPP as per the procedure contained in the PPA. This decision 
of the court is representative of the manner in which the BPP deals with requests 
for administrative review. For instance, in the Petition filed by Sino Standard Global 
Ltd against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs103, the BPP advised the complainant to 
follow the complaint procedure by complaining to the procuring entity first before 
requesting an administrative review, as this was in line with the provisions of the 
 
102 Suit No. FHC/B/CS/116/2010, Federal High Court, Federal Republic of Nigeria  
103 No. 215 BPP Petition Reports 2017 
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PPA. The grounds for review which a bidder can bring to challenge a procurement 
award include where it is alleged that there has been any omission or breach by a 
procuring or disposing entity under the provisions of the Act, or any regulations or 
guidelines made under the Act or the provisions of the bidding documents.  
 
Now that an overview has been provided of the bid review process, the next sections 
will turn to the specific loopholes that exist within the bid review process. 
 
2.5.7.1 Pre-award exclusion 
One of the loopholes which exists in the bid review process is that it excludes a key 
part of the procurement process - the pre-award stage. There is no provision that 
deals with how complaints can be made with respect to the period before bids have 
been put in/or a selection has been made - Gordon104 defines these sorts of 
complaints as ‘protests’. This is important because the PPA105 provides - a bidder 
may seek administrative review for any omission or breach by a procuring or disposing 
entity under the provisions of this Act, or any regulations or guidelines made under 
this Act or the provisions of bidding documents. What this provision seems to suggest 
is that only a bidder has the right to request administrative review or make a 
complaint, therefore if there are contractors who are unable to bid for a project e.g. 
in a case where selective tendering has been allegedly unfairly used, they would not 
be able to make a complaint as they are not ‘bidders’ in the process. Udeh106 opines 
that since the PPA does not exempt choice of procurement methods from review, it 
is arguable that the legislative intention is for contractors excluded by a wrongful 
use of procurement method to challenge it. 
 
This uncertainty about who can bring an action for administrative review needs to 
be addressed. There is therefore the need to unequivocally broaden the base of who 
can request an administrative review, and to include those who may not necessarily 
have put in a bid. Allowing individuals who may not have put in bids to challenge 
decisions, is a way of improving horizontal accountability. A system that essentially 
 
104 Daniel Gordon, ‘Constructing a Bid Protest Process: The Choices that every Procurement Challenge System must make’ 
(2006) 35 Public Contract Law Journal, 3, pp. 427-445. 
105 PPA 2007 s 54(1) 
106 Ibid 
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creates limitations on who can bring an action or can seek redress for a procurement 
decision is one which limits the participation of stakeholders in the sector and 
hampers horizontal accountability within the procurement process. 
 
An inclusion of contractors, who were unfairly excluded from a selective bidding 
process, giving them the ability to challenge an award and request for 
administrative review would be in line with the recommendations of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law 2011107, wherein it states in the commentary to the implementation of 
Article 64 on the right to challenge and appeal108, that this right should be based on 
a supplier’s or contractor’s claim that it has sustained loss or injury from non-
compliance with the procurement law, and that the right be given only to suppliers 
and contractors (the term including potential suppliers or contractors, such as those 
excluded through prequalification or pre-selection). The Commentary to the 
UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law, however, suggests that only general members 
of the public, and subcontractors should be omitted from the ambit of the right to 
challenge.  
 
2.5.7.2 Judicial Review 
Under the PPA, in order for legal proceedings to be initiated against the BPP, there 
are certain requirements which must be met109. No suit can be commenced against 
the BPP before the expiration of thirty days after written notice of an intention to 
commence the suit shall have been served upon the BPP by the intending plaintiff 
or his agent. The notice of intention to sue should clearly state - the cause of action; 
the particulars of the claim; the name and address of legal practitioner of the 
intending plaintiff; and the relief being sought. This requirement is quite common 
for lawsuits against government agencies in Nigeria, and it is known as a pre-action 
notice. Under Nigerian Law, where a pre-action notice is required before institution 
of a case, it is a condition precedent and if this is not met the jurisdiction of the court 
to entertain the matter cannot be validly invoked. The validity of such pre-action 
 
107 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Public Procurement 2011. It contains 
procedures and principles aimed at achieving value for money and avoiding abuses in the procurement process. The text 
promotes objectivity, fairness, participation and competition and integrity towards these goals. 
108 Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, (United Nations, 2014) 
109 PPA 2007 s 14 
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notices has been upheld in various Supreme Court decisions in Nigeria110. It should 
be noted here however that there might be some uncertainty with respect to the 
exact time frame for when an action for review at the courts can be commenced. 
This is because the PPA states the review of the BPP’s decision must be within thirty 
days of the decision of the BPP, or lack thereof. However, as was discussed above111, 
the PPA mandates that a pre-action notice must be issued to the BPP before any 
challenge, and it is only after the expiration of thirty days that a case can be filed.  
 
This approach presents a potential obstacle to remedies, and a loophole in the 
procurement process. The issue is whether a claimant can be disenfranchised by 
serving a pre-action notice to the BPP, and then upon the expiration of the notice, 
when the case is filed in court, the BPP then brings a motion for dismissal as the suit 
is out of time?  An illustration of this goes thus – BPP issues a decision against 
Contractor A on Day 0, contractor decides to appeal to the courts and serves the BPP 
with a pre-action notice on Day 7, and due to the law on pre-action notice, 
Contractor A has to wait for thirty days to expire before he can bring a suit. On Day 
38 he files a suit against the BPP at the courts, the BPP then raises a preliminary 
motion for dismissal claiming the suit is out of time. The lack of legislative clarity of 
both Sections 14(1) and 54(7) of the PPA has created a loophole which could be 
exploited by bad actors. This is because the ability to bring an action in court against 
the BPP is the ultimate exercise of the power to hold the procuring authority 
accountable and is a process which would emphasise the importance of horizontal 
accountability. A process wherein the path to accountability in court is confusing 
has a discernible impact on transparency and accountability. 
 
Another loophole which exists in the Nigerian procurement process is as regards 
the fact that there is no provision in the PPA that a request for review by the court 
would grant an automatic stop on the execution of the contract by the winning 
bidder. The PPA112 states that when a request for review is put forward by a bidder 
to the BPP, the BPP is to suspend any further action by the procuring entity until it 
 
110 Captain Amadi v. NNPC [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 76; Nigercare Development Co. Ltd. v. Adamawa Water Board & Others 
[2008] 5 M.J.S.C. 118 
111 n 100 
112 PPA 2007 s 54(4)(a) 
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has settled the matter, by doing this the PPA ensures that any decision reached by 
the BPP is not frustrated by the contract already having been executed. It preserves 
the rights of the complaining bidder. The BPP has the power to dismiss the 
complaint; nullify in whole or in part an unlawful act or decision made by the 
procuring entity; revise an improper decision by the procuring or disposing entity 
or substitute its own decision for such a decision113. When a bidder makes a request 
for administrative review and it is established that there was indeed a breach of the 
process, then the procurement process could be nullified, or the contract awarded 
to the bidder114.  
 
The powers of the BPP to essentially provide interlocutory reliefs is quite clearly 
stated, but with respect to when reviews are made to the court there is no such 
specificity. It is suggested that the lack of a mandatory stay on the execution of the 
contract would mean that in a situation where an interlocutory injunction is not 
granted, if the court was to rule that there were defects in the procurement process, 
and the contract has already been executed (if it involves a simple purchase of 
goods), or is being executed (if it involves the award of construction works); the 
system would then be faced with the following choice of options: ordering a re-
opening of the tender or awarding the contract in favour of the other party – which 
could cause substantial disruption to the procurement; alternatively of offering no 
relief, only a declaratory relief – this is based on the principle that the courts will not 
act in vain115; or finally of offering only monetary compensation for bid preparation 
costs and loss of earnings/lost profits. In order to avoid this situation, the appellant 
would have to specifically request that the court grant an interlocutory injunction 
pending the completion of the case. This interlocutory injunction would restrain the 
respondents from further action in the challenged procurement for a definite time 
or pending the final determination of the trial. The process for applying for this relief 
in the Federal High Court is contained in the Federal High Court rules116, and it is 
only granted where evidence shows that any delay in hearing it would entail 
 
113 PPA 2007 s 54(4)(b) 
114 PPA 2007 s 54 
115 The legal principle is that the courts will not make an order which it knows cannot be enforced or will have no effect. 
116 FHC Rules o34 r3(6)(b) 
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irreparable damage or serious mischief to the applicant. In addition, the applicant 
must furnish the court with a satisfactory undertaking as to damages117. 
 
The loophole that exists here therefore is that because there is no specific 
mandatory stay of execution, the appellant would have to apply for one, and as this 
is a discretionary remedy – it could be rejected by the court, and if this happens then 
it could lead to a situation where a contract award could be manifestly unfair, but 
the bidder who takes the matter all the way to court could win the case, but still lose 
out because a stay of execution of the contract was not granted and the contract 
award has been executed by the time the case is concluded. Horizontal 
accountability implies that the system is able to hold the public officials to account, 
and also ensure that there is fairness to the parties involved, and this loophole could 
create a situation where a bidder could be robbed of the most appropriate relief for 
an illegal award by the procuring entity. 
 
A mandatory stay of execution of a contract award pending a judicial review/appeal, 
is in line with international best practice, as evidenced by Article 65 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law 2011, which contains the model provision 
dealing with the effect of a challenge. The article provides: 
 
“1. The procuring entity shall not take any step that would bring into force a 
procurement contract or framework agreement in the procurement proceedings 
concerned… 
 (c) Where it receives notice of an application or of an appeal from the [name of the 
court or courts] 
2. The prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 shall lapse … working days [the enacting 
State specifies the period] after the decision of the procuring entity, the [name of the 
independent body] or the [name of the court or courts] has been communicated to the 
applicant or appellant, as the case may be, to the procuring entity, where applicable, 
and to all other participants in the challenge proceedings. 
 
117 FHC Rules Order 26 r 7(2); Kotoye v CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 98) 419 422-423 SC; Obeya Memorial Hospital v AG Federation 
(1987) 3 NWLR (Pt 60) 325 SC; Olowu v Building Stock Limited [2004] 4 NWLR [Pt 864] 445.   
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3. (a) The procuring entity may at any time request the [name of the independent body] 
or the [name of the court or courts] to authorize it to enter into the procurement 
contract or framework agreement on the ground that urgent public interest 
considerations so justify;” 
 
The Guidelines to the UNCITRAL Model Law118, explains that this is to prevent the 
entry into force of a procurement contract or framework agreement while a 
challenge or an appeal remains pending. Thus ensuring that the challenge or appeal 
cannot be nullified by making an award a fait accompli, and that the procuring entity 
should be prohibited from taking any step to bring a procurement contract (or 
framework agreement) into force where it receives an application for 
reconsideration or is notified of a challenge or an appeal by the independent body 
or courts. This is not the case with the legislation in Nigeria, as there is no express 
stay on execution of the contract when an appeal is made to the courts, and therefore 
this is a loophole within the procurement system. 
 
2.5.8 The Many Shortcomings of the NCPP 
The PPA 2007 established119 the National Council on Public Procurement (NCPP) 
made up of twelve members120, and it gives the President the power to appoint 
members of the Council121.  Essentially the NCPP is a permanent overarching body 
at the Federal level charged with the overall oversight function of the procurement 
process in the country. It is therefore arguably the most important oversight body 
in the procurement process to which everyone is accountable. In this section we will 
discuss some of the many issues which exist around this Council, and how loopholes 
have thrived in the wake of its introduction into the PPA.  
 
 
118 n 99 
119 PPA 2007 s 1 
120 Six full time members - the Minister of Finance, the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice of the Federation, the Secretary 
to the Government of the Federation, the Head of Service of the Federation, the Economic Adviser to the President, and the 
Director General of the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) – who is the Secretary to the Council; and six part-time members 
who represent various interests including the Nigeria Institute of Purchasing and Supply Management; the Nigeria Bar 
Association; the Nigeria Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture; The Nigeria Society of 
Engineers; Civil Society; and the Media.   
121 PPA 2007 s 1(4) 
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2.5.8.1 Delay in Constituting the NCPP 
The first and most important issue that needs to be addressed is the fact that since 
the PPA was enacted in 2007, the NCPP is yet to have been constituted. The duty for 
constituting the NCPP rests with the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
and in the period since the PPA was passed in 2007 no President has exercised this 
duty122.  
 
It would appear that the Presidency has exploited another loophole within the PPA 
- the PPA provides that the Chairman and other members of the Council shall be 
appointed by the President, however the PPA unfortunately does not specify a time 
frame within which the President must appoint the members of the NCPP. From the 
composition of the members it is also clear that the NCPP is an important body for 
introducing some level of horizontal accountability into the procurement process, 
by mandating that citizens (the 6 part-time members) should be members of the 
body, thereby giving them some powers over the process.  
 
In fact, this level of involvement is similar to what Lodge and Stirton123 refer to in 
their characterisation of the worldview – citizen empowerment. This worldview 
places importance of accountability through forum devices and suggests that 
accountability and transparency are about reducing social distance and relying 
strongly on group-based processes, advocating maximising input-oriented 
participation and the placing of maximum scrutiny of anyone with discretionary 
power. Involving the citizens in the NCPP can be regarded as the ultimate level of 
citizen empowerment within the procurement process in Nigeria by essentially 
including them in the vertical accountability system which the NCPP sits in, 
therefore, on the face of it, the creation of an overarching body set up to monitor the 
procurement process and create policy would appear to be a laudable step towards 
managing issues in the procurement process like conflict of interest.   
 
 
122 There have been 3 different Presidents since 2007 - 2019 
123 Martin Lodge and Lindsay Stirton, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and 
Martin Lodge (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press 2010) 
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There have been repeated calls124 for the NCPP to be constituted, and in fact, a recent 
document125 authored by the Bureau of Public Service Reforms126 urged the Federal 
Government to expedite the work to constitute the NCPP in line with the PPA, but 
these calls have gone unheeded. Udeh127 makes the point that the fact that the NCPP 
has not been constituted, does not mean it does not legally exist. He argues that by 
virtue of the fact that the PPA establishes the NCPP, it has a legal existence even 
though it has not been constituted. He points to the opinion of the court in Cupero 
Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources128 which stated that although 
the NCPP is yet to be constituted, it is a misconception to opine that it is non-existent 
or not established. 
 
Since the NCPP has not been constituted as mandated by the PPA, the functions of 
the NCPP are currently being carried out by the Federal Executive Council (FEC)129. 
The question then is what can be done to get the NCPP constituted, and the most 
straightforward and obvious solution would be for the President to constitute it, 
however it is apparent that the President does not have an urgent inclination to 
constitute it130, therefore there needs to be more pressure for this power to be 
exercised. Apart from putting soft pressure on the Presidency to exercise this 
function, another option is to seek legal means to mandate that this is exercised. The 
pertinent question to ask at this juncture therefore is whether the President can 
legally refuse or delay the constitution of the NCPP.  
 
 
124 Jacob Olatunji, 'BPP operating illegally -Reps Give Jonathan 21 days ultimatum' (Procurement Monitor, 30 November 2011) 
<http://www.procurementmonitor.org/blog/page/2/> accessed 2 June 2017; Victor Emejuiwe, 'Set up Public Procurement 
Council, now' (The Nation Newspaper, 16 November 2015) <http://thenationonlineng.net/set-up-public-procurement-
council-now/>accessed 2 June 2017; Martins Olojo, 'Where is Nigeria’s Public Procurement Council?' (The Guardian Nigeria 
Newspaper, 17 September 2016) <https://guardian.ng/opinion/where-is-nigerias-public-procurement-council/> accessed 2 
June 2017; Sani Tukur, 'Buhari joins Jonathan, Yar’Adua to violate Nigerian law on public procurement' (Premium Times 
Newspaper, 27 December 2016)<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/219033-buhari-joins-jonathan-
yaradua-violate-nigerian-law-public-procurement.html> accessed 2 June 2017; Editorial, 'Constitute the Procurement 
Council now' (Vanguard Newspaper, 4 January 2017) <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/01/constitute-the-
procurement-council-now/> accessed 2 June 2017 
125 Joe Abah, 'Nigeria: What is Working and What is Not? ' (Bureau of Public Service Reforms, 7 February 
2017) <http://bpsr.gov.ng/index.php/publications/bpsr-resources/evaluations?download=90:what-is-working-and-not-
working-in-nigeria > accessed 2 June 2017 
126 The Bureau of Public Service Reforms is a body established by the Federal Government to initiate, coordinate and ensure 
full implementation of public service reforms in Nigeria. 
127 Kingsley Tochi Udeh,  Nigerian National Council On Public Procurement: Addressing The Unresolved Legal Issues (2015) 2 
APPLJ 1 
128 FHC/ABJ/CS/867/11. 
129 This is the Cabinet of Ministers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and are political appointees of the President who report 
to the President directly.  
130 There has been no official communication from the Presidency as to the reason for the refusal to constitute the NCPP 
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The answer to that question will depend on the interpretation of the wording of the 
relevant section of the PPA131 which states that the members of the Council shall be 
appointed by the President. In the case of Ugwu v Ararume132, the Nigerian Supreme 
Court held that the word "shall", in its ordinary meaning is a word of command 
which is normally given a compulsory meaning because it is intended to denote 
obligation. Therefore, if that decision is to be applied, then there is an obligation 
created on the President to constitute the NCPP. The challenge therefore exists in 
determining the best course of action to compel the President to so act. A Nigerian 
non-governmental organisation – the Centre for Social Justice stated that it sued the 
President in order to compel the constitution of the NCPP, however the suit was 
struck out by the courts133 
 
This issue of the non-constitution of the NCPP is a wilful action of the Presidency not 
to act, and by so doing prevent proper monitoring and accountability by the NCPP 
as envisaged by the PPA. If horizontal accountability is enhanced in the system, and 
the duty placed on the President is enforced through the proper channels, it would 
not only strengthen the vertical accountability system – as the NCPP as a body, sits 
at the top of that system, but it would also enhance horizontal accountability at a 
certain level, by including the part-time members within the accountability 
framework.  
 
2.5.8.2 Clarification of NCPP Part-Time Members 
Flowing from the point discussed above on the need for the NCPP to be constituted, 
another distinct loophole that exists in the provisions concerning the NCPP, is the 
fact that there is no qualification on how the part-time members of the NCPP can be 
appointed (once the NCPP is finally constituted). The President seems to have the 
power to appoint whomever he/she decides, and the only qualification here is that 
they be a member of the relevant organisation. There is no requirement that they be 
public procurement experts or have any specific relevant experience.  
 
 
131  PPA 2007 s 1 
132 (2007) LPELR-3329(SC) 
133 Centre for Social Justice Blog, < https://csj-ng.org/programmes/public-finance/public-procurement/> accessed on 17 
February 2020 
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It is submitted that one of the goals of the NCPP and the reason why there are diverse 
officers who are to be appointed to the NCPP is to ensure probity and diversity of 
opinions, in fact it is this inclusion of individuals who are outside of government 
which engenders horizontal accountability and provides for citizen empowerment 
as envisaged by Lodge and Stirton134. Therefore, in order for there to be unbiased 
citizen involvement and representation in the NCPP, it is suggested that the 
definition of certain members, the qualification for appointment, and the 
nomination process needs to be reviewed with the goal of enhancing horizontal 
accountability. Below are some thoughts on how the part time members to be 
appointed into the NCPP can be chosen by the President, in a transparent manner, 
and in a manner, which enhances their independence and therefore leads to more 
effective vertical accountability, and more improved horizontal accountability.  
 
• Regulated Members  
Under the provisions of the PPA, one part-time member is to be chosen to represent 
each of the following organisations – the Nigeria Institute of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, the Nigeria Bar Association; Nigeria Association of Chambers of 
Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture; and the Nigeria Society of Engineers135. 
As all these organisations are regulated, a possible solution is that the members be 
nominated by the heads of those bodies. For example, the member representing the 
Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) would be someone who has either been elected 
internally by the NBA to hold that position or been selected by the NBA President 
(in conjunction with the Executive of the NBA) to sit on the Council and represent 
the NBA’s voice.  
 
• Civil Society  
The PPA states that one of the members of the NCPP will be a representative from 
civil society136, it should be pointed out that this term is quite vague. The PPA does 
not define what civil society means, however if we were to use the definition of civil 
society as put forward by the United Nations, as comprising civil society 
 
134 n 112 
135  PPA 2007 s 1 (2)(f)(i-iv) 
136 PPA 2007 s 1 (2)(f)(v) 
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organizations and non-governmental organizations137, then this would fall under 
the definition of organisations which have been validly incorporated under Nigerian 
law as Incorporated Trustees138 established with social goals and missions. 
Unfortunately, as opposed to the other part time members of the Council, civil 
society is not organised within a regulatory framework specified under the Law, 
therefore if there is no synergy between the civil society groups, anyone who runs a 
civil society group could potentially be appointed by the President as a 
representative of the Council.  
 
An effective way to approach this issue would be for it to be a process of nomination 
by civil society organisations which have already been shortlisted by the BPP. The 
BPP in one of its functions, periodically carries out a process of accreditation of Civil 
Society Organisations, the BPP accreditation process requests for information 
including evidence of the organisation’s registration with the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC), and details of the organization's work in public procurement, 
good governance, transparency and accountability.  The accredited civil society 
organisations could then amongst themselves elect or nominate an individual to 
represent its interests on the NCPP. 
 
• Media  
As regards the membership of the Media on the NCPP as provided for in the PPA139, 
same as with civil society, this term is not defined. Historically this would have 
referred to mainstream media like newspapers, radio and television stations. 
However, in this digital age it is arguable that new forms of media can and should be 
included, especially electronic media which would encompass online newspapers, 
blogs, etc. The fact that this area of the media is evolving so rapidly and has done so 
over the last couple of decades or so, necessitates a need for clarity on what the term 
media in the PPA would encompass. There are 2 separate media agencies in Nigeria 
which could arguably lay claim to the right of membership of the NCPP, there is the 
Broadcasting Organisation of Nigeria (BON) which is the organisation for TV and 
 
137United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/resources-different-audiences/civil-society/> accessed 19 February 
2018 
138 Part C Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 
139 PPA 2007 s 1(2)(f)(vi) 
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radio stations, and there is the Newspapers Agency of Nigeria (NAN) which is the 
organisation for newspapers and print media. There is therefore a need for this to 
be clarified. 
 
2.5.8.3 Proceedings of the NCPP 
A final point to make as regards the NCPP is that if/when the NCPP is finally 
constituted, there will be a matter of importance which would need to be addressed, 
either by amending the provisions of the PPA, or by creating internal regulations for 
the conduct of the NCPP as the PPA is silent on exactly what the voting 
process/regulations of the meetings of the Council will be. It does not state whether 
voting is by simple majority or whether a certain percentage of votes is necessary 
for decisions to be passed. Also missing is key information about how many 
members are needed for a quorum to be formed. This information is not only 
important but actually critical as it explains how valid decisions can be made by the 
Council, although it may be argued that since the composition of the board is twelve 
members (six full time and six part time), that a quorum may be achieved when 
there are seven members of the Council present, as it would be the number needed 
if decisions were to be made by simple majority, the fact that the PPA is silent on the 
numbers needed for a decision to be made makes the absence of any direct guidance 
on the number required for a quorum more glaring. It is suggested that this omission 
needs to be addressed quickly.  Udeh140 makes a valid argument when he points out 
that based on the provisions of the Interpretation Act141, in Section 27(1)(a) which 
states that  “where a body established by an enactment comprises three or more 
persons, then any act which the body is authorised or required to do may be done in 
the name of the body by a majority of those persons or of a quorum of them”. Therefore 
as the PPA is silent on the proceedings for meetings, the provision of the 
Interpretation Act will come into play and therefore decisions by the NCPP must be 
taken by simple majority. 
 
In other similar Nigerian legislations that were reviewed for this thesis, where a 
governing board or council was instituted, it was quite common that within the 
 
140 Kingsley Tochi Udeh, Nigerian National Council On Public Procurement: Addressing The Unresolved Legal Issues (2015) 
2 APPLJ 1 
141 CAP I23 LFN 2004.   
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legislation a schedule is annexed to it that sets out the manner in which proceedings 
need to be conducted. For instance, the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory 
Commission (Establishment, Etc.) Act 2005142 sets out in its schedule the proceedings 
of the Governing board, and amongst other things specifies how meetings should be 
held, the notices to be given, the keeping of minutes of its proceedings, the quorum 
of meetings, etc. Similarly, the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) Act 1999143 
establishes a governing council, and sets out in the schedule to the Act, 
supplementary provisions relating to the council including issues like quorum, 
number of meetings per year, manner in which meetings are to be conducted, etc. 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the creation of supplementary rules for governing boards 
or councils within the legislation that has established such councils or boards in 
Nigeria is not a strange occurrence, in fact it would appear that not having 
supplementary rules governing procedure for meetings is the rare occurrence. From 
a review of twenty laws144 which have established governing boards or councils in 
Nigeria, all twenty of them had schedules within the legislation which had 
supplementary rules for the governing boards or councils. 
 
It is important that the modalities for voting and for obtaining quorum in meetings 
of the NCPP be spelt out explicitly, as it is necessary for adequate monitoring by the 
citizens in a horizontal accountability system. Without clarity on the rules it is 
difficult for citizens to monitor whether or not the rules are being followed, and 
therefore is a limitation to effective participation in a horizontal accountability 
system. The lack of supplementary rules for the proceedings of the NCPP is therefore 
 
142 The Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC) was established in 2008 under the Infrastructure Concession 
Regulatory Commission (Establishment, etc) Act, 2005. The ICRC was established to regulate Public Private Partnership 
endeavours of the Federal government aimed at addressing Nigeria’s physical infrastructure deficit which hampers economic 
development. The pioneer Governing Body of ICRC was inaugurated on 27 November 2008 
143 This Act established the NHIS which provides social health insurance in Nigeria where health care services of contributors 
are paid from the common pool of funds contributed by the participants of the Scheme. 
144 The laws reviewed were - Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (Establishment, Etc.) Act 2005; National Health 
Insurance Scheme Act 1999; National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (Establishment, Etc.) Act 2006; National Film and 
Video Censors Board Act 1993; National Hospital For Women And Children, Abuja (Establishment, Etc.) Act 1999; National Human 
Rights Act 1995, as amended in 2010; National Identity Management Commission Act 2007; National Information Technology 
Development Agency Act 2007; National Institute for Cultural Orientation Act 1993; Insurance Act 2006; National Lottery Act 
2005; National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion Act 1992; National Orientation Agency Act 1993; National Steel 
Council Act 1979; Nigeria Export Processing Zones Act 1992; Nigerian Accounting Standards Board Act of 2003; Nigerian Export 
Promotion Council  Act 1976; Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act 1995; Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007; 
Nigerian Shippers' Council Act 1978. 
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a loophole which has a potential to be exploited if/when the NCPP is finally 
constituted. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Through the course of this chapter, it was determined the advent of the PPA has not 
brought with it the promise of reduction in corruption levels that existed pre-PPA 
and pre-CPAR, the corruption levels have largely remained the same, as borne out 
by the data from the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.   
 
This chapter analysed the effect and effectiveness of the PPA vis-à-vis managing 
conflict of interest in the system and identified specific sections of the legislation 
which have created loopholes in the system and have been or could be exploited by 
bad actors in the system. It highlighted instances where these loopholes have been 
exploited and presented hypothetical scenarios where others could be exploited. 
The Chapter consistently pointed out areas where the adoption of horizontal 
accountability would be essential towards properly managing conflict of interest. 
Specifically, this chapter identified issues like the growing reliance of single source 
procurement methods, the opacity of defence procurement, the inherent unfairness 
of the bid redress mechanisms available in the procurement process, absolute 
immunity of procurement officers, and the issues surrounding the NCPP. The net 
effect of all these limiting sections and provisions in the PPA is that the system as 
set up does not adequately support the entrenchment of horizontal accountability 
as a tool to supplement vertical accountability. 
 
This next chapter will identify exactly how horizontal accountability would be able 
to help in managing these loopholes and will narrow in on the specific structures 
which have to be in place for horizontal accountability to be implemented 
effectively. 
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Chapter 3 - A Theoretical Framework for Managing 
Conflict of Interest using Horizontal Accountability 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This Chapter will put forward the position that the current regulatory approach of 
public procurement in Nigeria is one which limits the efficacy of its stated policy 
goals of ensuring transparency and accountability in the procurement system.  It 
identifies the current transparency and accountability framework within the 
procurement process, as one with a dual accountability framework - vertical 
accountability and horizontal accountability, with vertical accountability being the 
dominant system. It posits that in order to achieve the optimal level of transparency 
and accountability and for the procurement system to meet its lofty policy ambitions 
of ensuring transparency and accountability within the procurement process, it 
must change the approach to its regulatory framework. The solution advanced is 
that there is the need for the enhancement of horizontal accountability in the 
process, and this can only be achieved by improving access to information and 
strengthening the legal rights of the actors in the horizontal accountability system. 
Finally, it suggests a framework for assessing the effectiveness of horizontal activity 
within a procurement system. 
 
3.2 Understanding Conflict of Interest in Nigerian Public 
Procurement  
Public procurement is when the government enters contracts for goods/services. 
The public procurement official in that role, exists in order to facilitate these 
transactions which the government enters, therefore in exercising that function the 
public official is meant to keep the public duty as the paramount interest. In the 
introductory chapter to this thesis, the concept of conflict of interest was explained 
as having three elements - a public duty must be in existence; a private interest must 
be in existence; and finally, the private interest must have the capacity to improperly 
influence the public duty. To understand the concept of conflict of interest within 
Nigerian procurement, there needs to be a more nuanced understanding of both 
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concepts of public duty and private interest within the Nigerian context, and this is 
what the next few sections will provide. 
 
3.2.1 The Public Duty in Public Procurement in Nigeria 
Historically, in many societies in the past it was assumed that elected or non-elected 
public officials would take advantage of public office to promote their own personal 
interests, however, as democracy grew, and governments became accountable to 
the people, citizens began to demand that public officials discharge their duties in 
the public interest and with fairness and impartiality1. Weber theorized that officials 
in a bureaucracy should receive a fixed salary, be graded by rank, and that their job 
be their sole occupation, with the understanding that the role is not to be exploited 
for emoluments or rents2,further signalling a departure from earlier periods. In 
modern day governance, public officials have a duty – a public duty, to which they 
must adhere to in performing their functions. In exercising this public duty, they are 
to do so without influence from any private interests. It is where there is an 
interference with this public duty by a private interest, that a conflict of interest is 
said to arise.  
 
To understand the public duty, we must first start with the lowest denominator – 
why does the public procurement official exist? What is his/her job? This is the starting 
point, and to identify this, one must first identify what the policy objectives of the 
procurement system is, in other words, what is the public procurement policy. 
Trepte3 identifies economic efficiency, promotion of social and political objectives 
and trade objective as objectives of a public procurement system4.  Arrowsmith5 
identifies eight objectives of the public procurement system as value for money; 
integrity; accountability; equal opportunities and equal treatment for providers; fair 
treatment of providers; efficient implementation of industrial, social and 
environment objectives; opening public markets to international trade; and 
efficiency in the procurement process. In putting forward this list of objectives of 
 
1 Alexander Seger, ‘Corruption and Democracy: What are the Issues’, Corruption and Democracy, (Council of Europe 2008) 
2 Max Weber, Economy and Society (first published in 1921, University of California Press 2013) Foreword by Guenther Roth 
3 Peter Trepte, Regulating Procurement: Understanding the ends and means of Public Procurement Regulation (OUP 2004) 
4 Trepte explains that these objectives are abstractions, and no system is based on only one of these abstractions. They are not 
mutually exclusive, and any one procurement system is likely to exhibit elements of all three.  
5 Arrowsmith S. (ed.), Public Procurement Regulation: An Introduction (EU Asia Inter University Network for Teaching and 
Research in Public Procurement Regulation 2011) p.4 
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public procurement systems, she makes the very important point that ‘within 
different public procurement systems the existence of different objectives and the 
weight attached to the various objectives differ quite markedly’6. For instance, some 
procurement systems might attach more importance to the use of procurement to 
promote social objectives and therefore the government may be willing to pay 
higher for goods and services in order to implement those values. 
 
While noting the validity of the objectives of a public procurement system as put 
forward by the public procurement scholars above, it is suggested that the lists of 
objectives put forward by them, and other scholars, can never be exhaustive, and 
can only always be illustrative of the ways governments may decide to implement 
the public procurement policies of their countries.   
 
In Nigeria, the Public Procurement Act 2007 (PPA) states that its policy goal is to 
conduct procurement in a manner which is transparent, timely, equitable for ensuring 
accountability with the aim of achieving value for money and fitness for purpose in a 
manner which promotes competition, economy and efficiency7 . These principles 
squarely underline what the procurement policy in Nigeria is ultimately trying to 
achieve. The approach adopted under the PPA seeks to ensure transparency and 
equality, but also puts emphasis on timeliness, achieving value for money and fitness 
for purpose. Therefore, from the provisions of the PPA, one can state the policy 
objectives thus: ensuring timeliness; ensuring transparency and accountability; 
ensuring value for money; ensuring fitness for purpose. Identifying the stated policy 
objectives of Nigeria’s public procurement system is one thing, however evaluating 
whether the policy and legislation meets up with these objectives is another task 
altogether, and in order to determine this, we will identify whether the Nigerian 
procurement system meets its own stated policy objectives, so we can identify what 
the public duty of a procurement officer in Nigeria should be.  
 
In the Nigerian public procurement system, there is a strong theme of protectionism 
for national industrial development, which seems to underpin the entire system. 
 
6 Ibid p.5 
7 PPA 2007 s 16 
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While, this is not expressly mentioned as one of the objectives of the procurement 
system in the PPA, the provisions and policies by the government makes this goal 
apparent. The goal to use procurement as a tool to drive national industrial 
development broadly falls under the classification of horizontal policy objectives8, 
and as highlighted in a recent UNIDO report9, innovation is generally considered an 
essential component of economic growth and development, and it is the foundation 
of long-term economic growth. Therefore, governments seek to develop policies 
they believe will promote innovation. Some of these include the use of tender 
preferences10, providing explicit minimum local content thresholds in contract 
requirements, and for procurement contracts lower than specified thresholds.  
 
Generally in public procurement it is usual for contractors/suppliers from certain 
sectors to be nationals11, however in the case of the Nigerian public procurement 
system, more steps have been taken down this line, for instance, when comparing 
bids from foreign contractors or suppliers with national bidders, procuring entities 
are empowered to grant a margin of preference to domestic contractors, and 
suppliers for goods manufactured in Nigeria, and bid documents may provide a 
domestic preference of 15% of the delivered price for goods and 7.5 % for works12. 
This is similar to the bumiputeras13 system in Malaysia, where Malaysian 
bumiputera companies received a margin of preference over a reference price, and 
all supplies contracts between a stated value, and works contracts up to a stated 
value were reserved for bumiputera suppliers, amongst other incentives to the 
bumiputeras.14 In South Africa, procurement is of particular significance in the 
public sector and has been used as a policy tool to correct past discriminatory and 
unfair practices which occurred during the apartheid era. Due to South Africa’s 
 
8 This is when a procuring authority uses the procurement process to promote social, environmental or other societal 
objectives which are not uniquely associated with any particular contract or do not even necessarily arise from the function 
of the procuring public authority - Client Earth Legal Briefing, Briefing No.2 : Horizontal Objectives in Public Procurement, 
2011 
9 Kamala Dawar and Seung Chul Oh, ‘The Role of Public Procurement Policy in Driving Industrial Development’ (2017), UNIDO 
Working Paper 8/2017. < https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/WP_8_FINAL_0.pdf > accessed 31 October 
2019 
10 which may include requirements in the tender specifications for innovative solutions to the contract requirements, 
designating goods and services that satisfy certain pre-set quality criteria and provide preferences for them in public 
procurement 
11 These are sectors of national importance like Defence contracts including the purchase or sale of firearms etc. 
12  PPA 2007 s 34 
13 This literally translates to ‘sons of the soil’ 
14 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Using public procurement to achieve Social Outcomes’, (2004) 28 Natural Resources Forum 257–
267 
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history of discrimination, unfair practices and marginalisation of people, various 
groups in society were denied the privilege of being economically active within the 
government procurement system. The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework 
Act 2000 gives effect to the South African Government’s priority of empowering 
historically disadvantaged persons by giving them preferential treatment in 
procurement activities. It entrenches the obligation of government to award 
preferential procurement points to enterprises owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons and for certain government priorities. The Act also provides 
for exemptions to preferential procurement in certain sectors and industries. In 
addition to that there is the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act which 
empowers the Minister of Trade and Industry to issue codes of good practice on 
black economic empowerment that may include, inter alia, ‘qualification criteria for 
preferential purposes for procurement and other economic activities’. The B-BBEE Act 
requires every organ of state and public entity, as defined therein, to apply any 
relevant code of good practice issued in terms of the B-BBEE Act in developing and 
implementing a preferential procurement policy. It is these codes that determine 
the B-BBEE status of any procuring entity and, hence, that determine the preference 
points allocated to any bidder in terms of the preferential procurement framework. 
 
When bidders submit their tender proposals they need to submit a certificate that 
has been calculated in accordance with a scorecard prescribed under the Codes of 
Good Practice (which are issued under the BBBEE Act). The certificate indicates 
what level BEE contributor the tenderer is, and, depending on their level, they score 
a certain number of points out of 10 or 20 (depending on the value of the contract) 
in terms of the regulations. These points are then added to the points scored for 
price for purposes of calculating an overall score. 
 
Governments around the world have explored the possibility of using its purchases 
to not only promote redistribution among different segments of the population, but 
also to develop an industrial strategy, to introduce innovation technologies or foster 
environmental protection through products or services that have a reduced 
environmental impact, therefore, using procurement as a legitimate tool to 
stimulate domestic production and consumption.  An example can be seen in the use 
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of public procurement strategies and policies which have been used to support 
industrial development by targeting Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) 
involvement in the procurement system. Some ways this has been done is the 
promotion of set-asides15, mandatory subcontracting to SMEs, bid price 
preferences16, higher advance payments17.    
 
The Nigerian Government seeks to use Public Procurement as one of the tools to 
drive domestic growth of industries, and this is quite evident in the fact that the PPA 
sets domestic preferences for indigenous companies18, it grants a margin of 
preference when comparing tenders from domestic bidders19 and foreign bidders 
and when comparing tenders from domestic suppliers offering goods manufactured 
locally with those offering goods manufactured abroad. However, these margins of 
preference only apply under international competitive bidding. This is quite 
instructive as it can be viewed as a way that the government uses procurement to 
restrict international participation and competition in Nigerian bids. In fact since 
the PPA was passed there have been two Executive Orders – Presidential Executive 
Order on support for Local Content in Public Procurement20,  and the Presidential 
 
15 A quota as a percentage of designated government procurement contracts or total spending is reserved or ‘set aside’ for a 
targeted category of bidders that meet the preferential qualification criteria such as SME status. 
16 Bids from eligible SMEs are a given margin of preference and if the lowest evaluated bidder is a SME, it is awarded the 
contract. 
17 This is when the Government approves the release of a larger percentage of procurement funds upon awarding of contracts 
to contractors who would otherwise not be able to fund the execution of the contract or would not have access to finance 
facilities which would enable them to execute the contracts. 
18 PPA 2007 s 34 
19 It should be noted that a critical oversight in the PPA’s domestic privilege regime is the fact that it does not define ‘domestic 
bidders’ nor explain what it means by ‘goods manufactured locally’. This is not addressed in the PPA or the Procurement 
Procedures Manual for Public Procurement in Nigeria.  
20 The Order mandates that all Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) 
must  grant preference to local manufacturers of goods and service providers in their procurement of goods and services, and 
that any document issued by any MDA of the FGN for the solicitation of offers, bids, proposals or quotations for the supply or 
provision of goods and services shall expressly indicate the preference to be granted to domestic manufacturers, contractors 
and service providers and the information required to establish the eligibility of a bid for such preference. The solicitation 
documents require bidders or potential manufacturers, suppliers, contractors and consultants to provide a verifiable 
statement on the local content of the goods or services to be provided. Furthermore, Made-in-Nigeria products shall be given 
preference in the procurement of certain listed items20 and at least 40% of the procurement expenditure on these items in all 
MDAs of the FGN shall be locally manufactured goods or local service providers.  The Executive Order further mandated that 
within 90 days of the date the Order was issued, heads of all MDAs of the FGN are to assess the monitoring, enforcement, 
implementation, and compliance with the Executive Order and local content stipulations in the Public Procurement Act or any 
other relevant Act within their agencies, and propose policies to ensure that the Federal Government’s procurement of goods 
and services maximises the use of goods manufactured in Nigeria and services provided by Nigerian citizens doing business 
as sole proprietors, firms, or companies held wholly by them or in the majority; and submit such findings to the Honourable 
Minister of Industry, Trade & Investment. Finally, the Executive Order mandates that within 180 days of the date of the order, 
the Minister of Industry, Trade & Investment in consultation with the Director-General of the BPP must submit to the 
President, a report on the Made-in-Nigeria initiative that includes findings from the policies submitted by the MDAs. This 
report was to include specific recommendations to strengthen the implementation of Local Content Laws and local content 
procurement preference policies and programme20. The Executive Order defines “local content” to mean the amount of 
Nigerian or locally produced human and material resources utilised in the manufacture of goods or rendering of services.  
<https://medium.com/@TheAsoVilla/acting-president-osinbajo-signs-executive-order-on-support-for-local-content-in-
public-procurement-c4e7591178a4> accessed 20 February 2018 
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Executive Order (PEO) for Planning and Execution of Projects, Promotion of Nigerian 
Content in Contracts and Science, Engineering and Technology21, which specifically 
give preferences to Nigerian businesses. 
 
It should be noted however that the use of domestic preferences which could be 
classed as protectionist to improve industrial development in a country has its fair 
share of criticisms. One of the biggest criticisms being the fact that there is the risk 
of corruption and super-imposition of vested interests22 in addition to that is the 
fact that preferential regimes may have associated costs like higher consumer 
prices, inefficiency etc.23. However, an analysis of the efficacy or otherwise of these 
protectionist methods to stimulate industrial development is outside of the scope of 
this thesis.  
 
Ultimately this analysis of the objectives of the procurement system in Nigeria is to 
distil the duty of the public procurement official, therefore based on the analysis the 
policy objectives of the Nigerian public procurement system above, the policy in 
Nigeria extends beyond the stated  policy of ensuring a transparent, timely, 
equitable for ensuring accountability with the aim of achieving value for money and 
fitness for purpose in a manner which promotes competition, economy and 
efficiency. Taking into consideration certain sections in the PPA, the stated policy 
objective has been extended to include promotion of domestic and national 
participation and encouragement of industrial development and innovation.  
 
Therefore, the Nigerian procurement policy essentially operates on two planes, the 
first in relation to purely domestic bids seeks to enshrine the following values: 
ensuring equality; ensuring transparency and accountability; ensuring value for 
money; and ensuring fitness for purpose. However, once there is an international 
 
21 The PEO recognised that entrenching Science, Technology and Innovation in everyday life is key to achieving the nation’s 
development goals across all sectors of the economy and the government desires to harness this to drive national 
competitiveness, productivity and economic activity. The PEO gives wide ranging preferences for Nigerian companies, for this 
purpose. For example, the PEO states that government agencies shall adopt local technology to replace foreign ones, where 
they meet set standards. The PEO’s approach is to tackle this problem on multiple fronts including the use of preferences, local 
capacity development, limiting (and in some cases a total prohibition) on the use of foreign experts, the use of tax incentives 
etc. 
22 Lea Kaspar and Andrew Puddephatt, Benefits of Transparency in Public Procurement for SMEs: General Lessons For 
Egypt. (Global Partners and Associates 2012) 
23 Travis K. Taylor, ‘Countertrade Offsets in International Procurement: Theory and Evidence’ in Murat A. Yulek and Travis K. 
Taylor (eds.), Designing Public Procurement Policy in Developing Countries (Springer, 2012). 
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element to the procurement, the second plane is activated and the values of - 
ensuring equality, ensuring value for money, and to a certain extent ensuring fitness 
for purposes give way to the values of promoting domestic participation in 
procurement, and encouraging industrial development and innovation.  
 
Those are the goals of the procurement system, and it is the duty of the public 
procurement official to align their tasks towards those goals. We can see therefore 
that transparency and accountability are a critical aspect of achieving those goals. 
 
3.2.2 The Private Interest in Public Procurement in Nigeria  
The second part of the conflict of interest equation is the private interest. In trying 
to identify the root cause of why certain public officials in Nigeria engage in 
malfeasance, a number of interesting theories have been developed, and we will 
now attempt to analyse these theories. The first of these theories which we will 
analyse is the theory of the two publics as laid out by Ekeh24, who argues that civil 
servants are faced with two publics – the primordial public and the civic public. The 
primordial public is associated with kinship, tribe/ethnic group, while the civic 
public relates to the society either in the public sector or in the private sector where 
individuals work. The thrust of the theory is that the individual in the civic public 
views his duties as moral obligations to benefit and sustain a primordial public of 
which he is a member. There is therefore a conflict of interest between both publics 
and the primordial is the superior interest. Ekeh explains that ‘…a good citizen of the 
primordial public gives out and asks for nothing in return…he will only continue to be 
a good man if he channels part of the largesse from the civic public to the primordial 
public…it is legitimate to rob the civic public in order to strengthen the primordial 
public’25. This characterization by Ekeh was with regards to many first-generation 
Africans in post-colonial societies. This theory has also been cited with approval by 
a few other Nigerian scholars26. However, others have criticised this theory 
 
24 Peter Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement’ (1975) 17 Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 91  
25 Ibid 
26 Ilufoye Ogundiya, ‘Political corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical perspectives and some explanations ’, (2009) 11 
Anthropologist, 281-292.; Ogbewere Ijewereme, Anatomy of Corruption in the Nigerian Public Sector: Theoretical 
Perspectives and Some Empirical Explanations, (2015) Sage Open Journal < 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244015581188> accessed 1 November 2019 
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contending27 that joining the public service in order to further community interests 
is never the goal of the individual, the goal is always personal interest, and once this 
is sated, then the individual may use the communal interest to solidify his/her 
support base as it were.  
 
With due respect to the critics, the suggestion that the communal interest is a status 
protecting mechanism, seems to actually support the position of the theory with 
respect to conflict of interest, which is that the decision making process is driven by 
something which conflicts with the civic public  of the public official.  The theory of 
the two publics explains the approach public officials take when they are faced with 
decisions, and since the decision making is guided by the advancement of the 
primordial public it explains the conflict of interest in the public official. Ekeh’s 
position is that in a society with an extremely strong primordial public, the civic 
public will always be in constant threat of being relegated where there is a clash 
between both interests.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the theory of the two publics was one put forward to explain 
the behaviour of civil servants in a Nigerian society that was transitioning from 
colonialism, however it is suggested that this theory has even acquired more 
relevance in modern day public institutions in Nigeria. This is due to the threat of 
rising ethnic tensions and violence28, the importance of cementing one’s ethnic base 
has become a key requirement of survival within the public space. The increased 
need for security felt by individuals, and the haven which the primordial public 
provides for those who eventually must exit from public service accentuates this. 
These ethnic conflicts have therefore played a role in strengthening tribalism and 
sustaining the importance of the primordial public29. 
 
 
27 Eghosa Osaghae, ‘Colonialism and Civil Society in Africa: The Perspective of Ekeh's Two Publics’, (2006) 17 Voluntas: 
International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 3, pp. 233-245 
28 Haldun Çanci and Opeyemi Odukoya , ‘Ethnic and religious crises in Nigeria: A specific analysis upon identities (1999-2013)’, 
(2016) AJCR available at < http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnic-religious-crises-nigeria/> accessed on January 14 
2017 
29 n 27 p.241 
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Another theory which seeks to explain the peculiar nature of how private interests 
manifest in the public service in Nigeria, was suggested by Joseph30, he referred to 
Nigeria having a unique system called ‘prebendalism’ where public officers feel they 
have a right to a share of government revenues, and use them to benefit their 
supporters and people who share the same religion, and members of their ethnic 
group. In this system, public offices are regarded as prebends31 used by public 
officers to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin 
groups. The prebendalism theory is a theory which gives a theoretical angle to a 
colloquial and well-worn concept which is familiar to Nigerians, the concept of 
sharing the national cake32, the concept essentially is that the wealth of the country 
belongs to everyone and no one, and therefore anyone in a position of power has a 
right to take his/her share of the wealth of the country. In the context of public 
procurement therefore this is normally extended to the right to award contracts to 
oneself or those with close relations. Both the theory of the two publics and 
prebendalism share certain similar parallels with the concept of guanxi33 in China, 
and the wantok system in Papua New Guinea34. The affinity for kinship over public 
duty is one which seemingly exists across other cultures. 
 
It should be noted that the theory of two publics and the prebendalism theory are 
somewhat similar, a similarity that was discussed and acknowledged by Ogundiya35. 
However they are separate in the core driver of the motives of the public official - in 
the theory of two publics, what drives the action of the public official to act against 
the civic public is to maintain his/her status and provide protection from a fractured 
ethnic society, while what drives the actions of a public official in prebendalism is 
 
30 Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic, (Cambridge University 
Press, 1987) 
31 This is a historical term which refers to a portion of the revenues of a cathedral or collegiate church granted to a canon or 
member of the chapter as his stipend – Oxford Dictionary 
32 George Nche, ‘The concept of national cake in Nigerian political system: Implications for national development’, (2011) 
Bassey Andah Journal of Cultural Studies. 4. 79-94. 
33 The overall concept of guanxi involves building a relationship and trust between business partners. Guanxi involves long-
term personal relationships with some element of interpersonal commitment and affect, the term basically expresses a 
relationship where one party has an obligation to another which has been built over time by reciprocal exchange of favours. 
The core idea of guanxi is the relationship between or among individuals that creates obligations for a continual exchange of 
favours. In a more simplistic way it means one party does something for another party now, with the expectation that in future 
when he/she has a need and the other party is in a position to assist in that need, then the other party will reciprocate. It is a 
system based not only on the expectation of one party, but on the correspondent obligation of the other party 
34 In Tok Pisin, wantok means “one talk” – meaning the language of the tribe or clan that a person belongs to and wantokism is 
the traditional welfare system that evolved around that tribe. The system is often associated with nepotism and the use of 
one’s personal connections to secure public service jobs 
35 Ilufoye Ogundiya, ‘Political corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical perspectives and some explanations’, (2009) Anthropologist, 
11, 281-292. 
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an innate belief that the prebend is one which should be accessed as of right, and 
therefore there is no moral wrongdoing. The similarity however is that both seem 
to suggest a strong moral justification for the actions of the public official, even 
though they would clearly be classed as illegal. Studies36 have provided evidence of 
a culture in the Nigerian public service which promotes nepotism and patronage - a 
key manifestation of the theory of the two publics and prebendalism.  
 
It is important to state that the above analysis is not meant to suggest that all actors 
in the public space are driven by their primordial public or prebendal motivations. 
The fact is that there also exists, those who are not likely to succumb to any private 
interests and will in fact follow the regulatory process without the need for a system 
in place to watch their actions. In fact, Lankester  suggests that there will always be 
‘altruists’ in any system who dedicate themselves unreservedly to the interests of 
the public, and are incapable of having competing interests, let alone acting on those 
interests which compete with the public good; but that there will always be those 
‘self-interested’ who need countervailing mechanisms in place in order to ensure 
that competing interests do not interfere with their public duties. James Madison37 
once famously said ‘…If men were angels, no government would be necessary…’38.  
 
Therefore, it is important to ensure that a framework of countervailing mechanisms 
exists. It cannot be left solely to the discretion of the public official to ensure that 
they will follow the rules. While there are people who do not need these 
countervailing mechanisms in order to abide by the rules, there will always be 
people within the system who seek to subvert the rules. Whether their desire is 
borne out of an affinity to the primordial public or a prebendalist leaning, is 
immaterial. Those who would seek to subvert the rules must be kept in check, and 
this thesis argues that this countervailing mechanisms which are currently heavily 
focused on vertical accountability measures, would be more effective if horizontal 
accountability was enhanced. 
 
36 Dele Owulu, ‘The Nature of Bureaucratic Corruption in Nigeria’ (1983) International Review of Administration Science 
49:29; Clay Wescott, ‘Guiding Principles on Civil Service Reform in Africa’, (1999) 12 International Journal of Public Sector 
Management 2, 145-170; Sola Aina, ‘Bureaucratic Corruption in Nigeria: The Continuing Search for Causes and Cures’, 48 
(1982) International Review of Administrative Science, pp.70-76. 
37 One of the founding fathers and the fourth President of the United States of America (1809–17) 
38 The Federalist No. 51, 1788 
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3.3 Accountability Framework for Managing Conflict of Interest in 
Nigerian Public Procurement 
The first step to determining the accountability framework within the Nigerian 
public procurement system lies firstly in identifying the actors that exist in the 
sector and determining how they interact with each other from an accountability 
perspective. 
 
A. Procuring entity – Under the PPA, the procuring entity means any public 
body engaged in procurement and this includes a Ministry, Extra-Ministerial 
office, government agency, parastatal and corporation39, further for the 
purposes of identifying the actors in the procurement sector, this term is 
extended to include entities outside the foregoing description which derive 
at least 35% of the funds appropriated or proposed to be appropriated for 
any type of procurement described in the PPA from the Federation share of 
Consolidated Revenue Fund40. In the context of this research this means the 
entity that makes decisions on the award of contracts, and therefore would 
include the tangential bodies that are involved in that contract decision 
making process, including – procurement planning committees41 and 
tenders boards. They are the protagonists in the procurement equation, their 
actions affect all other actors, and therefore our understanding of the actor 
landscape would be from the perspective of the procuring entity in the 
decision-making process for the award of a contract. 
 
B. Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) – The BPP is an autonomous agency 
charged with overseeing the public procurement sector in Nigeria. They have 
oversight over all procuring entities and can review award decisions, and 
sanction authorities that have breached the provisions of the PPA.  
 
 
39 PPA 2007 s 60 
40 PPA 2007 s 15(1)(b) 
41 PPA 2007 s 21(1) 
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C. National Council on Public Procurement (NCPP) - The NCPP is also an 
oversight body, but its oversight spans the entire procurement sector, it sits 
above the BPP and apart from oversight functions it is also charged with 
setting procurement policy within Nigeria. It is charged with recommending 
the appointment of the Director General of the BPP to the President42, 
approving the appointments of Directors of the BPP43, approving the audited 
accounts of the BPP44, approving general policies and guidelines relating to 
public procurement as formulated by the BPP45, and other oversight 
functions over the BPP. 
 
D. Contractors – In any procurement bid, the contractors or suppliers are the 
entities who make bids to provide the goods or services in question to the 
procuring entity, and therefore when they put forward bids to the procuring 
authority, they are directly affected by the decision of the procuring entity, 
whether the bid is rejected or the bid is awarded. 
 
E. National Assembly – Under the Nigerian legal system, the National Assembly 
is the federal legislative arm46, primarily charged with the function of making 
laws. However, they also have the power of oversight over the Executive arm 
of government. By virtue of the PPA47, the BPP must perform procurement 
audits, and submit the reports of the audits bi-annually to the National 
Assembly. 
 
F. President – The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has the power 
to appoint all the members of the NCPP48 and the Director General of the BPP 
on the recommendation of the NCPP49  
 
 
42 PPA 2007 s 7(1) 
43 PPA 2007 s 2(c) 
44 PPA 2007 s 2(d) 
45 PPA 2007 s 5(a) 
46 Chapter V of the 1999 Constitution 
47 PPA 2007 s 5(b) 
48 PPA 2007 s 1(4) 
49 PPA 2007 s 7(1) 
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G. Observers – The PPA mandates50 that a procuring entity shall, in 
implementing its procurement plans invite two credible persons as 
observers in every procurement process one person each representing a 
recognized; private sector professional organization whose expertise is 
relevant to the particular goods or service being procured, and a non-
governmental organisation working in transparency, accountability and 
anti-corruption areas. Observers have the right to submit their observation 
report to any relevant agency or body including their own organizations or 
associations; 
 
H. Courts – The Federal High Court has the power to order the disclosure of 
procurement records51,  and to entertain appeals from the BPP regarding 
procurement decisions52. The Federal High Court is also the court that deals 
with appeals for Freedom of Information request denials from federal 
agencies. The Courts are also charged with trying offences which are in 
breach of the PPA53 
 
As can be seen from above, there are essentially eight key actors within the 
procurement process which are specifically referenced in the PPA. A final actor is 
the ‘society/the citizenry’ as the entire procurement system is created for the benefit 
of society, however for the purposes of this thesis, society/citizenry will be 
represented by the observers as their goal is to ensure probity within the 
procurement process for the benefit of the society at large. A lot of the interactions 
within the actors stems from the actions of the procuring entity when the award of 
the contract is made, and therefore it is from that perspective that we will analyse 
the system. 
 
It should be stated that even though the courts are recognised as an actor in the 
procurement process, for the purposes of determining an accountability model, they 
will not be classified as actors but as enablers. This is because, of all the actors within 
 
50 PPA 2007 s 19(b) 
51 PPA 2007 s 38(3) 
52 PPA 2007 s 54(7) 
53 PPA 2007 s 58 
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the procurement sector, they are the only ones who cannot take any action on their 
own volition, their involvement needs to be triggered by another actor in the system. 
For instance, the courts cannot of their own volition review a procurement decision, 
a case must have firstly been filed by a contractor. Therefore, in developing an 
accountability model, these enablers are important cogs in the accountability wheel, 
however for the reasons given above, they cannot be classed as actors stricto sensu.  
 
3.3.1 Developing an Accountability Model: Vertical and Horizontal 
Accountability 
 Boven, Schillemans and Goodin54 suggest that accountability is a relational concept, 
linking those who owe an account and those to whom it is owed, they state that the 
minimal conceptual consensus of accountability entails, first of all, that 
accountability is about providing answers; is about answerability towards others 
with a legitimate claim to demand an account. 
 
Schillemans55 states that accountability requires an actor with a duty to render an 
account to a second actor with the authorisation to judge the actions of the first actor 
and usually impose sanctions. Therefore, accountability in this sense, refers to 
answerability to someone for appropriate conduct and expected performance. This 
interaction between the accountor and accountee therefore presupposes a formal 
relationship, and it is this relationship that distinguishes accountability from the 
many other communicative relations of public agents with other parties. He 
suggests that from an analytical perspective, processes of accountability normally 
involve three phases – the information phase where the accountor renders an 
account on his conduct and performance to the accountee, the debate phase where 
the accountor and accountee engage in a debate on the account that has been given, 
and the sanction phase where the accountee comes to a concluding judgment and 
decides whether and how to make use of available sanctions. This understanding of 
the accountability process is in line with the approach for this thesis and shall 
therefore be adopted.  
 
54 Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans, ‘Public Accountability’ in Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin, and 
Thomas Schillemans (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (Oxford University Press 2014) 
55 Thomas Schillemans, ‘Accountability in the Shadow of Hierarchy: The Horizontal Accountability of Agencies’, (2008) Public 
Organ Rev 8: 175 
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In the introduction to this thesis, we briefly discussed the concepts of vertical and 
horizontal accountability, as representing the two types of accountability 
mechanisms which are present within the Nigerian public procurement process. 
The concepts of vertical and horizontal accountability stem from the research of 
O’Donnell in his discussion on delegative democracy. He argues that in 
institutionalized democracies, accountability runs both vertically and horizontally. 
He explains vertical accountability as a system which makes elected officials 
answerable to the ballot box, and horizontal accountability making elected officials 
answerable to a network of relatively autonomous powers/institutions which have 
the ability to question and eventually punish elected officials who have improperly 
discharged their responsibilities. He argues that horizontal accountability is 
relatively weak and, in some cases, non-existent in delegative democracies, and the 
institutions which carry out this horizontal accountability are viewed by elected 
officials as unnecessary encumbrances that hamper their mission and they 
therefore make efforts to hamper the development of those institutions56.  
O’Donnell’s conceptualisation of vertical accountability is of accountability within a 
political/democratic framework. He argues that elections, social demands that 
usually can be articulated without suffering state coercion, and regular coverage by 
the media of at least the more visible of these demands and of apparently wrongful 
acts of the public authorities are all dimensions of vertical accountability. All these 
actions are performed individually or by means of some kind of organised/collective 
action with reference to those who occupy positions in state institutions57. Further, 
he conceptualises horizontal accountability as the existence of state agencies that 
are legally enabled and empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions 
that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation 
to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified 
as unlawful. He asserts that horizontal accountability applies to non-hierarchical 
accountability, and he focuses on whether the legislature and courts, as accountees, 
are in a position to hold the executive, the accountor, to account.  
 
 
56 Guillermo O'Donell, ‘Delegative Democracy’, (1994) 5 Journal of Democracy, 1, pp. 55-69 
57 Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies’ in Marc F. Plattner, Larry Diamond, and Andreas 
Schedler (eds), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 
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Therefore in his conceptualisation of vertical accountability, it is a hierarchical 
network characterised by the ultimate power of electoral accountability, and 
horizontal accountability is a relationship between equals within the democratic 
operation – the executive, legislature, and judiciary, all constraining and holding 
each other accountable within the framework of separation of powers and checks 
and balances.  
 
This conceptualisation by O’Donnell would have very limited application to the 
context of this thesis, which focuses on accountability, not within the broad 
democratic or electoral mandate of public officials, but of the decisions of unelected 
officials with regards to contract awards. In fact, there has been some debate about 
O’Donnell’s definition of the concepts and the application thereof, some scholars 
have questioned his limitation of agents of horizontal accountability to state agents 
like the courts, and some argue that this definition should be broadened to include 
other non-state actors such as civil society organizations58. Schillemans59 adopts 
O’Donnells’ core argument of horizontal accountability applying to non-hierarchical 
systems, but adapts it to address peers, equals, stakeholders or concerns outside of 
the hierarchal relationship between central government and executive agency. In 
explaining horizontal accountability, he states that the adjective, horizontal, 
indicates an important distinction from traditional forms of accountability, where a 
subordinate usually reports to a superior (hence these can be coined vertical forms 
of accountability). Horizontal accountability arrangements address peers, equals, 
stakeholders or concerns outside of the hierarchal relationship between central 
government and executive agency. Schilleman’s approach broadens the agents of 
horizontal accountability from the limitations placed by O’Donnell, and this 
broadening of the agents of accountability is critical to the understanding and 
approach of this thesis as it comes to the issue of horizontal accountability. By 
viewing the accountability model of the public procurement system in Nigeria from 
the perspective of vertical accountability and horizontal accountability, it is clear 
that both accountability mechanisms exist within the system, however while the 
 
58 Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘The Limits of Horizontal Accountability’, in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, 
(eds.), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (Lynne Rienner,1999), 59–63.; Richard L. 
Sklar, ‘Democracy and Constitutionalism’, in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, (eds.), The Self-
Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (Lynne Rienner,1999) 
59 n 54 
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hierarchical structure that supports the vertical accountability mechanism seems to 
be well set up, the horizontal accountability opportunities are dependent on other 
institutions, and when one takes into consideration the fact that many of the 
loopholes which were discussed in the previous chapter, directly affect the ability of 
these actors to exercise the horizontal accountability then it is clear that there needs 
to be a strengthening of horizontal accountability in order to address the loopholes 
that exist.  
 
3.3.1.1 Vertical Accountability  
 
The diagram below will illustrate the relationship between all the actors in a vertical 
accountability relationship, with the action of the procuring entity being the starting 
point. It is a diagrammatic representation of the provisions of the PPA. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Vertical Accountability in Nigerian Public Procurement  
 
From the above diagram, it is quite clear that the procuring entity is accountable to 
other actors higher up on the hierarchical chain, the procuring entity sends records 
of proceedings to the BPP, the BPP reports to the NCPP on annual basis and also 
sends bi-annual reports to the National Assembly. The NCPP is in charge of creating 
policy for the entire procurement system and is in charge of appointing the principal 
officers of the BPP and approving its budget, therefore it sits above the BPP in the 
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hierarchy. The members of the NCPP are appointed by the President, and so they 
therefore sit below the below the Presidency in the hierarchy.  
 
In order to properly develop this vertical accountability system within the Nigerian 
public procurement context, it is important to situate this within a theoretical model 
which can help explain it better - the principal/agent theory or the agency theory.  
 
The agency theory has its roots in law60 and economics61. However, it is the 
economic theory of agency that has been applied theoretically in research and 
academic discourse. The economic theory of agency is the study of the agency 
relationship and the issues that arise from it, particularly the dilemma that the 
principal and agent, while nominally working toward the same goal, may not always 
share the same interests. Mitnick62 formulated an institutional or regulatory 
principal agent model, he examined the relationship between agents in the 
regulatory bureaucracy and their political principals noting that agents could be 
motivated by the public interest or by their own narrow self-interest. Agency theory 
in institutional or regulatory bureaucracy therefore posits a process whereby, 
bureaucrats (agents) are assumed to have distinct informational and expertise 
advantages over politicians (principals). The agents better understand the policy 
and the organizational procedures that are required to implement it, and therefore 
have the opportunity to act for their own gain63.  
 
This theory seems ideal for our research with respect to creating a model for vertical 
accountability, in fact, certain scholars advocate for an approach of using the 
principal-agent model in researching public procurement64.  Within the principal-
agent paradigm the public official is classed as the agent, and the goal is to control 
the actions of the agent by surmounting the issues of information asymmetry, 
adequate monitoring, and effective control. If these issues are adequately addressed, 
 
60 Samuel J. Stoljar, The Law of Agency: Its History and Present Principles, (Sweet & Maxwell 1961) 
61 Stephen Ross, ‘The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem’, (1973) 63 American Economic Review, 2, pp. 134-
39 
62 Barry Mitnick, “Fiduciary Rationality and Public Policy: The Theory agency and some consequences” (Annual meeting of the 
Political Science Association, New Orleans 1973) 
63 Richard Waterman and Kenneth Meier, ‘Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?’, (1998) 8 Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 2 pp. 173-202 
64 Christopher Yukins, ‘A Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent model’, (2010) 40 Public 
Contract Law Journal, 1, pp. 63-86 
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there is less opportunity for the public duty to be improperly influenced.  The 
essence therefore of the principal agent model is to make the agent accountable to 
the principal.   
 
The principal-agent relationship is ideal for understanding the relationship that 
exists between the relevant actors in the Nigerian procurement process as indicated 
in the diagram above. However, there are certain actors within the procurement 
process who do not fall under this vertical accountability mechanism, but who 
otherwise play an important role in holding the procuring entity accountable – the 
observers, the contractors and the courts. They cannot be classed as either agents or 
principals of any other actors within the accountability framework, and therefore in 
order to understand the role they play and the relationship they have with the other 
actors within the system, we will look to the concept of horizontal accountability for 
enlightenment.   
 
3.3.1.2 Horizontal Accountability  
The diagram below illustrates the relationship between all the actors in a horizontal 
accountability relationship, with the action of the procuring entity being the centre. 
It is a diagrammatic representation of the provisions of the PPA. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Horizontal Accountability in Nigerian Public Procurement 
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From the above diagram, we can determine the following interactions between the 
actors in the process. The contractors/bidders make bids for contract awards to the 
procuring entity. The procuring entity sends records of proceedings to the BPP and 
must also allow the observers the right to observe bid processes. The observers are 
then able to send their own observation report to the BPP. Where the NCPP is 
properly set up, certain members of the observers can be appointed as part time 
members of the NCPP. If the contractors/bidders are unhappy with the outcome of 
a procurement award, they may request for an administrative review from the 
procuring entity, if the outcome of the review by the procuring entity is 
unsatisfactory, the contractors/bidders can make an appeal to the BPP, and if they 
are dissatisfied with the decision of the BPP, they can appeal to the courts. The 
Federal High Court sits outside the structure somewhat, because based on the 
provisions of the PPA, they can only be involved when approached by the 
contractors/bidders. 
 
It is clear from the discussion on the interaction between the actors here that some 
measure of accountability exists, in that some of the actors have the right to hold the 
procuring entity to account for its conduct, however the right to hold to account in 
this context is not one borne out of a hierarchical relationship with the entity. In 
actual fact it is one created out of the fact that these actors have an active stake in 
the integrity of the decision-making process of the procuring entity. The 
contractors/bidders need to ensure that the process is fair as that affects their 
ability to be awarded contracts, the observers are civic organisations or non-
governmental organisations with stated aims of improving procurement and 
ensuring best practice in the grant of contract awards, and so they desire a system 
which has integrity, and when the process has been incorrectly followed, they have 
a duty to ensure probity. Finally, the courts have a stake in the process, because as 
custodians of the law, they are constitutionally mandated to ensure that the laws of 
the land are being followed. In this accountability mechanism, no actor on its own is 
able to exercise all three accountability constituent elements i.e. obligation to report 
to that actor, the capacity to interrogate, and, the ability to sanction or make a binding 
decision, and so in order to exercise accountability, the actor would need the 
involvement of one or more other agents into the accountability transaction. For 
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instance, while the procuring entity might have an obligation to report to the 
contractor (via record of proceedings/debrief), and the contractor/bidder has the 
capacity to interrogate the report provided (via an appeal), it cannot sanction or 
make a binding decision – this element is in the hands of the BPP or the courts, as 
the case may be.  
 
Therefore, it is clear that there is some accountability system that exists, the task 
therefore is to identify a theoretical foundation for the right of these actors to hold 
the procuring entity accountable, outside of the principal agent theory, and for this 
the stakeholder theory will be adopted. The stakeholder theory65 is a theory of 
organisational management and ethics which addresses morals and values explicitly 
as a central feature of managing organisations66. The stakeholder theory was 
developed by Freeman67 as a way to ‘revitalise the concept of managerial capitalism 
by replacing the notion that managers have a duty to stockholders with the concept 
that managers bear a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders’68. The theory argues that 
corporations have stakeholders, the term meaning ‘groups and individuals who 
benefit from or are harmed by, and whose rights are violated or respected by corporate 
actions’69, and these stakeholders have a right to make claims.  
 
Applying stakeholder theory to public organisations (such as public procurement 
agencies/authorities) is not universally accepted. In fact, certain scholars70 doubt 
the value and appropriateness of such an undertaking, the position taken by them is 
that the theory is a private sector one governed by fundamentally different 
principles from public sector organisations. Another group of scholars71 are on the 
other side of the divide and argue that the insights from the application of 
stakeholder theory to the private sector can be applied in part to the public-sector 
setting. Mostly arguing that the application of the theory is appropriate because 
 
65 R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Pitman, 1984). 
66 Robert Phillips, R. Edward Freeman and Andrew C. Wicks, What Stakeholder Theory Is Not, (2003) 13 Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 4, pp. 479-502 
67 R. Edward Freeman, ‘A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation’, in T. L. Beauchamp, and N. E. Bowie (eds.), Ethical 
Theory and Business (Prentice Hall, 2001), pp. 56–65. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid.  
70  Thomas Donaldson and Lee E. Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation - Concepts, Evidence, and Implications,’ 
(1995) 20 Academy of Management Review, 1, pp. 65-91. 
71 Hans J. Scholl, ‘Applying Stakeholder Theory to e-Government: Benefits and Limits’, (Proceedings of the 1st IFIP Conference 
on E-Commerce, E-Business, and E-Government Zurich, 2001) 
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government can be conceptualised as the management of relationships and 
interests of societal stakeholders, and all democratic political models involve 
balancing legitimate competing interests in society72. The stakeholder theory posits 
that there exists more than one individual who benefits or is harmed by the actions 
of the individual/organisation carrying out certain actions. 
 
The arguments made in support of the use of the stakeholder theory in research on 
public sector organisations has a lot of merits. If the assertion in this context that 
the primary function of the procuring entity is to ensure transparency and 
accountability in the procurement process is accepted, then this lends itself to the 
conclusion that the procuring entity should exercise this towards the groups and 
individuals who benefit or are harmed by its actions, and as explained above these 
individuals/groups would be the actors within the horizontal accountability system. 
The stakeholder theory is therefore a useful tool in understanding the accountability 
mechanism within a horizontal accountability system.  
 
As can be seen from the discussion so far, it is clear that Nigeria’s public 
procurement process operates both a vertical accountability and horizontal 
accountability model, with the former being the more dominant model. It is 
suggested therefore that a system that allows for dual accountability mechanisms, 
as the Nigerian public procurement process does, has the right foundation for 
accountability, however in order for it to be effective, both accountability 
mechanisms will need to be strengthened, and in the Nigerian context from our 
analysis so far, it is clear that the accountability mechanism which needs to be 
strengthened more is the horizontal accountability system as the loopholes which 
have been identified to exist, exist in the context of the actors in the horizontal 
accountability system exercising their rights.  
 
Now that the different accountability systems that exist within the public 
procurement process in Nigeria have been identified, next will be an analysis of the 
available tools that exist for the actual exercise of accountability. 
 
72 Leif Skiftenes Flak and Jeremy Rose, ‘Stakeholder Governance: Adapting Stakeholder Theory to E-Government’ (2005) 16 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 31. 
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3.3.2 Current Tools for Accountability in Nigerian Public Procurement 
There are different tools of accountability which are applied in different public 
sectors in different countries. This thesis will analyse some of these tools to 
determine whether they exist in the Nigerian public procurement sector, if they do 
– how they are being used, and their suitability or lack thereof for the Nigerian public 
procurement sector; if they do not – then whether or not they should be introduced. 
There have been a number of approaches on identifying the tools/instruments of 
accountability, and as will be shown, some approaches advanced by the scholars 
below will have similarities and overlaps, and to varying degrees will have potential 
application to a discussion on the Nigerian procurement process, however this 
thesis posits that a more appropriate toolbox is needed to approach the issue of 
conflict of interest in Nigeria, and a merger of some of the tools and ideas will be 
necessary to achieve this.   
 
Hood73 suggests the following tools for accountability – hierarchy, mutuality, 
competition, and contrived randomness. He defines hierarchy as the dominant 
mechanism for addressing issues of accountability, and the approach of this tool is 
based on the assumption that civil servants within the public organisation are 
accountable to their superiors within the organisation. Hierarchy is the most 
commonly known and long-standing mechanism of accountability, here those at the 
top of the hierarchical chain of command delegate authority to those subordinate to 
them while at the same time holding these subordinate actors accountable for their 
decisions, behaviour and performance in exercising this delegated authority74. 
Mutuality depends on civil servants and public organisations watching each other; 
while competition is more market based with organisations competing against each 
other (and the private sector) to be the best. Finally, contrived randomness is random 
assessment and intervention by some external actor.  
 
 
73 Christopher Hood, Oliver James, B. Guy Peters, and Colin Scott, Controlling Modern Government: Variety, Commonality and 
Change. (Edward Elgar 2004) 
74 Mark D. Jarvis, ‘Hierarchy’ in Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public 
Accountability (Oxford University Press 2014) 
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Taking into consideration the actors within the public procurement sector in Nigeria 
and the accountability interaction with the procuring entities, hierarchy as a tool is 
the dominant tool, with the procuring entity hierarchically accountable to the BPP, 
NCPP, National Assembly, and the Presidency when you apply the hierarchical chain. 
Mutuality as a tool in the pure sense as suggested by Hood does not seem to feature 
prominently in the public procurement accountability framework in Nigeria, it could 
be argued that it is present within the procurement entity, when procurement 
decisions need to be made, and the procurement planning committee or tenders 
board, as the case may be, has the job of ensuring the relevant agents within the 
entity are acting within the set guidelines. However, as we are classifying the entire 
procuring entity as one actor, then it stands to reason that the PPA does not make 
any provisions for this tool to be present.  
 
Competition as a tool is also not one which is used within the Nigerian public 
procurement process, as the service provided when procuring is not one which 
organisations can compete with each other to provide the services to the public, 
therefore it is unsuited for this discussion on public procurement.  Contrived 
randomness is a potent tool frequently adopted within the Nigerian procurement 
process, with the BPP essentially conducting spot checks on the procuring decisions 
of certain agencies, however because it is done by the BPP and it is expected that an 
audit could be done, this sits more within the hierarchical tool. Also relevant here is 
the power to request for procurement proceedings, this could be characterised as a 
use of this tool, however the potency of this tool is hampered, as one of the loopholes 
which we identified in the procurement process in Nigeria in the previous chapter 
is the fact that the procuring entity can decide not to provide the information on the 
proceedings, and cannot be compelled to do so by the courts. 
 
Therefore from an analysis of the tools suggested by Hood, there are two tools which 
are relevant to the Nigerian public procurement process – hierarchy which is quite 
dominant already and therefore arguably doesn’t need any expansion, and contrived 
randomness which exists within the Nigerian public procurement process 
framework but which is quite limited in its applicability and could benefit from an 
expansion of its application.  
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Lodge and Stirton75 put forward four worldviews on accountability in the regulatory 
state that underline any understanding of what needs to be held to account, by how 
much, and what sorts of motivations are said to underline actors’ behaviours: 
fiduciary trusteeship, consumer sovereignty, citizen empowerment, and surprise and 
distrust. Fiduciary Trusteeship is stated as a ‘technocratic’ doctrine where emphasis 
is placed on legal and political forms of accountability that make public officials 
responsible for their actions, either through legal means or electoral punishment. 
Here, oversight and review are to be conducted by authoritative and responsible 
experts with a mandate to provide for accountability. In consumer sovereignty the 
citizens are regarded as the best judges of their own needs, who should be allowed 
to take their own decisions. Individuals are regarded as capable of taking informed 
decisions and therefore the significance of choice or competition is emphasised, 
with regulation playing a role as facilitator of choice or competition. The citizen 
empowerment approach emphasises the reduction of social distance and relies 
strongly on group-based processes, advocating maximising input-oriented 
participation and the placing of maximum scrutiny of anyone with discretionary 
power.  Surprise and Distrust posits that those in positions of authority need to be 
treated with distrust and subjected to constant surprise. The underlying rationale is 
that good behaviour will ensue as those who are supposed to be accountable do not 
know when they are being watched, or when the lights will go on. 
 
Viewing these tools from the perspective of the public procurement process in 
Nigeria and the actors in the process, we can see the fiduciary trusteeship seems to 
have a number of similarities with Hood’s hierarchy tool. The focus on legal and 
political forms of accountability belies a leaning towards the hierarchical or vertical 
form of accountability. Therefore, as with Hood’s hierarchy, it can be stated that this 
is the tool, which a number of the other actors in the procurement process use to 
ensure the accountability of the procuring entity. In fact, the fiduciary trusteeship 
tool seems more relevant within the Nigerian procurement system than Hood’s 
hierarchy as it permits the inclusion of the contractor as an actor who can use legal 
 
75 Martin Lodge and Lindsay  Stirton, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’, in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and 
Martin Lodge (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press 2010) 
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means to enforce accountability. Therefore, this tool can be said to be even more 
representative of the accountability process in Nigerian public procurement. 
 
Consumer sovereignty as a tool while being an applicable tool for analysing the public 
procurement sector, is limited in its efficacy as the crux of the tool is the fact that the 
ultimate end users are able to make choices to prove their acceptance and 
displeasure. The ability to make a choice is dependent on there being a sufficient 
alternative, however in public works it is more often than not the case that there is 
only one choice, for instance only one public bridge leading to a particular 
community. While the end users might be dissatisfied with the public goods 
purchased, the ability to exercise consumer sovereignty in its true form is limited as 
they cannot make a choice to swap with another provider. On the other hand, the 
citizen empowerment tool is one which makes an appearance within the context of 
the Nigerian public procurement process. The emphasis of this tool is on ‘voice’ in 
the sense of direct input by the citizens, ‘information’ in the sense of being closely 
involved in each of the five dimensions of a regulatory regime76, and also 
representation in the sense that it emphasises close control over delegated 
authority. It could be argued that the introduction of observers as actors in Nigerian 
public procurement can be viewed as a manifestation of this tool in that context, 
however its effectiveness as a tool is severely hampered in that the observers in the 
process are victims of a number of the loopholes which have been highlighted as 
existing in the procurement process, a key loophole which would mitigate against 
the efficacy of this tool is the fact that the emphasis on direct input is limited where 
the observers can only share observation reports about what they have witnessed 
in a bidding process. This is a form of horizontal accountability which is limited 
within the Nigerian public procurement process and needs to be enhanced to make 
it effective. 
 
Finally, Surprise and distrust bears a lot of similarity with contrived randomness as 
discussed by Hood, and as was mentioned in the analysis of contrived randomness, 
 
76 They identify five crucial dimensions in any discussion of accountability: the decision-making process that leads to the 
creation of a regulatory standard in the first place; the existence of a regulatory standard for affected participants within the 
regulated policy domain; the process through which information about the regulated activities is being gathered and how this 
information is ‘fed back’ into standard setting and behaviour modification; the process through which regulatory standards 
are being enforced; and the activities of the regulated parties themselves 
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it would appear that the beginnings of using this tool exist in the Nigerian public 
procurement process for instance, the process of allowing members of the public 
request the record of procurement proceedings, however this is hampered by the 
loophole which allows the procuring entity to refuse to release the information, and 
the PPA states that they cannot be compelled by the courts. 
 
From the above analysis of  Hood and Lodge/Stirton’s accountability tools, it is clear 
that the current procurement process in Nigeria has certain tools which support 
different accountability regimes, for instance hierarchy/fiduciary duty help to 
solidify a vertical accountability structure, and contrived randomness, citizen 
empowerment, and surprise and distrust seem to bring horizontal accountability 
more to the fore. The effectiveness of these different tools is limited, especially with 
the backdrop of the loopholes which exist within the Nigerian public procurement 
process. Therefore, in order to make the process of enforcing the public duty more 
robust using some of these tools, there is a need to improve the understanding of 
the framework within which these tools work in order to achieve that goal. 
 
3.3.3 The Transparency and Accountability Matrix (TAM) 
This section introduces a framework for determining how effective the 
accountability mechanism in a public procurement system is, and then applies this 
to the vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms within the Nigerian public 
procurement system. This framework will give us clarity for determining the 
presence of accountability, as opposed to systems that merely appear to be 
accountable.  This thesis has identified from the analysis in the previous section, that 
the tools of contrived randomness, citizen empowerment, and surprise and distrust 
are tools which can be used to effect horizontal accountability. However, in order to 
make these tools available, there are certain critical elements that have to exist.  
 
As discussed previously, the constituent elements of accountability within a 
procurement process are – the (actor’s) obligation to report, the (forum’s) capacity 
to interrogate, and, the forum’s sanction/control power. Within this framework, these 
elements will be viewed from the point of view of the accountee i.e. the actor in the 
procurement process who exercises the accountability power vis-à-vis the actions 
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of the procuring entity. Therefore, the procuring entity’s obligation to report will be 
replaced by the overarching concept of access to information, essentially whenever 
the procuring entity has an obligation to report to the actor, the actor essentially has 
access to information to be provided by the accountor. The second element is the 
actor’s ability to interrogate the information which has been provided, this element 
is therefore not a mere right to make comments or observations about the 
information reported, it is a right to demand that the procuring entity explains any 
decisions it has made, or any discrepancies in the information it has provided. 
Inexorably linked to the ability to demand explanation/capacity to interrogate is the 
ability to sanction the entity and the requisite legal structure for those sanctions to 
be exercised, if there are no sanctions attached to a demand for 
explanation/interrogation, then the interrogation is not really one in the real sense 
of the word, as it can be ignored, therefore both elements are intrinsically linked and 
therefore both will be represented by the term legal empowerment. 
 
Access to Information and Legal empowerment are therefore the two most critical 
elements of any accountability structure within a public procurement process. With 
regards to access to information, in the vertical accountability model with its 
hierarchical approach, the accountor is legally bound to provide information to the 
accountee, and therefore the flow of information is constant and stable, and upon 
the receipt of that information, the accountee can interrogate it, and if there are 
discrepancies or instances of malfeasance, the accountee can sanction the 
accountor. For instance, in the Nigerian procurement structure, the procuring entity 
must submit record of proceedings to the BPP, and the BPP reviews these records 
of proceedings, if there are issues with certain contract awards, the BPP can sanction 
the procuring entity by reversing the contract award decisions.  
 
Access to information essentially embodies the principles of transparency as 
discussed in the introductory chapter, and the system can either be transparent by 
default or transparent by request. Transparency by default means that in order for 
the accountee to have access to information, there is nothing it needs to do, there is 
a legal imposition on the accountor to always make the information available at 
certain prescribed times. On the other hand, transparency by request means that in 
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order for the accountee to have access to information, there needs to be a request 
for that information, and in certain instances, this request for the information can 
be declined by the accountor. Therefore, transparency by default is an accountability 
system wherein the access to information can be exercised by the accountee as of 
right and without the need to justify the need for the information. Whereas 
transparency by request is an accountability system within which the accountee 
needs to request for the information, and in some cases justify the reason for the 
request, and the accountor possesses some measure of discretion on whether or not 
to grant the request.  If we apply those concepts to the Nigerian public procurement 
process, we are able to determine that the vertical accountability system is one 
which has transparency by default, while the horizontal accountability system is one 
which operates transparency by request, because the actors who sit outside of the 
hierarchical structure can only get access to information by requesting it.  
 
With regard to legal empowerment which is the second critical foundation of the 
accountability system, it is important that there is a legal basis upon which the 
accountee can challenge/review the actions of the accountee, and critically that 
there is the ability to sanction or take some kind of enforceable action when there 
has been malfeasance. Within the Nigerian procurement process this legal right to 
review accountee’s actions and where appropriate make some sort of sanction 
without recourse to a third party only exists in the actors within the vertical 
accountability system - the BPP, the NCPP, the National Assembly etc can all review 
the actions of the accountor and in some cases unilaterally reverse their decisions 
or impose sanctions. Therefore, these actors have high legal empowerment. It is high 
legal empowerment because the hierarchical framework essentially means that the 
accountor unconditionally answers to the accountee. 
 
However, for actors who sit within the horizontal accountability system, they can 
only exercise this legal empowerment right by engaging another actor within the 
system- the courts, and the nature of the sanctions which can be meted out varies. 
The degree of legal empowerment within such a relationship therefore is based on 
the availability of the right to request for sanctions, the enabling environment for 
the sanctions to be accessed, and the nature of the remedy which can be obtained. 
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Therefore, in a system that has access to information, and high legal empowerment, 
the accountability framework for both vertical and horizontal accountability is 
enhanced. However, we have seen in the Nigerian procurement process, while 
highlighting the loopholes that exist within the system, that issues like unclear 
debrief procedure, unclear bid cancellation procedure and gaps in bid review 
process, all mean that there are roadblocks created by the procurement process 
which affect the effectiveness of this legal empowerment and as a result lead to a 
reduction in the efficacy of horizontal accountability particularly. 
 
This thesis therefore argues that in order to unleash the powers of an effective dual 
accountability system, both vertical accountability and horizontal accountability 
systems need to be strong, and the model for strengthening these systems is what 
the Transparency and Accountability Matrix (TAM) seeks to achieve. The TAM when 
applied to the Nigerian public procurement process will identify which interactions 
need strengthening and this thesis will then make suggestions on how those 
interactions can be strengthened. In developing a framework for identifying the 
relative strength or weakness of an accountability system, this thesis argues that 
there are three differing outcomes that the system may result in – declaratory 
accountability, conditional accountability, and full accountability. This can be 
represented with the below diagram, which we will refer to as the Transparency and 
Accountability Matrix (TAM). 
 
 
 Low Legal empowerment High Legal empowerment 
 
Transparency 
by Default 
 
 
Conditional Accountability 
 
Full Accountability 
Transparency 
by request 
 
Declaratory Accountability 
 
 
Conditional Accountability 
 
Figure 3.3 
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Essentially what the TAM is proposing is that the goal of every accountability system 
should be to achieve full accountability. The term full accountability is a system 
where the accountee has unfettered ability to hold the accountor to account for their 
actions. The accountee has unfettered access to information, and full authority to 
interrogate and sanction the accountor. Full accountability exists by default in a 
well-structured vertical accountability system, which has no loopholes, and also 
exists within a horizontal accountability system that has transparency by default 
and high legal empowerment without any loopholes or impediments. 
 
Conditional accountability presupposes a horizontal accountability  system where 
there are either impediments to the ability to access information, for instance where 
there is a system of transparency by request - the accountees are able to request for 
access to information about the activities of the accountor, however the accountor 
may refuse the request for information if the request falls within one of the stated 
exceptions which allows it to be able to refuse access to the requested information; 
or a system where there is unfettered access’s to information, but the accountee 
attempting to hold the accountor accountable is one which has low legal 
empowerment because the enforcement framework is non-existent or limited.  
 
Declaratory accountability is a system wherein the accountees believe they have 
some measure of oversight over the actions of the public officer, whereas in reality 
they have nothing enforceable, they can make demands for information but only 
have the power to protest, because the requisite legal structure for the enforcement 
of the rights is so weak as to in effect make it non-existent. In theory, it can be said 
that this type of accountability system does not exist within the Nigerian public 
procurement process as there exists a legal framework for the enforcement of rights 
and the actors within the accountability framework all have a right to access this 
legal framework.  
 
Full, limited, and declaratory accountability can all be achieved by an interplay of 
four different inputs – transparency by request (TReq), transparency by default 
(TDef), Low Legal empowerment (LLE), and High Legal empowerment (HLE). The 
twin concepts of transparency by default and transparency by request have been 
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discussed above, however in addition to the above, it is important to note that 
transparency by default is synonymous with a system that has open government 
data laws wherein the information is legally mandated to be shared proactively and 
at specified times in a specified format, and with transparency by request it should 
also be further noted that this is synonymous with a system where the basis of 
access to information is freedom of information laws. One of the key arguments of 
this thesis is that in order to improve horizontal accountability in the procurement 
process, there needs to be a shift from transparency by request to transparency by 
default and embracing open government data is the route to achieving that. 
Transparency by request makes it difficult for individuals and organisations, who 
sit outside of the vertical accountability system, to identify or notice conflicts of 
interest and other indications of corruption; as these instances only come to light 
when individuals or groups already have suspicions around specific transactions or 
where there has been a whistle-blower involved. Open government data therefore 
represents a graduation up the transparency scale, as a move from transparency by 
request, to transparency by default. Below is an illustration of the outcomes that are 
possible when the various elements come into contact within the Nigerian public 
procurement process. 
 
Transparency by Request + Low Legal empowerment = Declaratory accountability.  
Transparency by Request + High Legal empowerment = Conditional accountability. 
Transparency by Default + Low Legal empowerment = Conditional accountability.  
Transparency by Default + High Legal empowerment = Full Accountability.  
 
The TAM needs the following information to work – an assessment of the level of 
transparency that exists in the system; and an assessment of the level of legal 
empowerment in the system. This information is readily available in most systems 
as it can be determined by analysing the legal framework in those systems, as has 
been done regarding the Nigerian system. The goal of any system that wants to 
achieve true accountability therefore is to result in full accountability. After an 
analysis of the procurement process in Nigeria, it is clear that only the vertical 
accountability process currently supports a full accountability process i.e. 
transparency by default + high legal empowerment, and the best outcome for 
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horizontal accountability within the current framework in Nigerian public 
procurement as it is set up is conditional accountability, which is achieved by the 
interplay of transparency by request + high legal empowerment or transparency by 
default + low legal empowerment. However, as a result of the many loopholes that 
exist within the public procurement process in Nigeria, more often than not the 
reality is in fact declaratory accountability within the horizontal accountability 
process.  
 
As a first step therefore, in order to improve the horizontal accountability process 
from a declaratory one, to one with conditional accountability, the current loopholes 
in the process which water down the transparency by request tools, and reduce the 
level of legal empowerment, must be addressed and those loopholes, closed. In 
order to move to a state of full accountability, the system must move from 
transparency by request to transparency by default, and the legal empowerment 
tools must be increased to ensure high legal empowerment.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter put forward the position that the current dual accountability approach 
of vertical accountability and horizontal accountability in the Nigerian public 
procurement system needs to be improved. Specifically, this Chapter argued that 
horizontal accountability mechanisms that exist within the system need to be 
adequately strengthened.  It explained the concept of the private interest in conflict 
of interest within the Nigerian context, and the theories of the two publics and 
prebendalism, which have helped to shed some light of why public officials might 
act in a manner which is in conflict with their public duty.  
 
It introduced the concepts of vertical and horizontal accountability and discussed 
the importance of a dual accountability system in managing the issues of conflict of 
interest that arise in public procurement in Nigeria. Finally, the Chapter concluded 
by introducing the Transparency and Accountability Matrix and arguing that 
unleashing the potential for full accountability within the accountability process can 
be achieved in systems that have transparency by default, and where citizens have 
high legal empowerment within a structured system, and that in order to ensure 
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that the current system, which is set up as having conditional accountability, holds 
public officials accountable, then the loopholes which exist in the system need to be 
addressed, or else the system will be one of declaratory accountability. 
 
The next chapter of this thesis will analyse some ways in which a system can achieve 
full accountability or conditional accountability – primarily by instituting open 
government data, thus creating a system of transparency by default, and by 
equipping citizens with higher legal empowerment. These and other tangential 
issues will be discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4 - Improving Access to Information  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter put forward the position that the accountability structure 
within Nigerian public procurement is currently a dual structure wherein there are 
both vertical accountability and horizontal accountability systems in place, and 
argued that while the vertical accountability system has a well-structured and 
understood hierarchical system in place which facilitates full accountability to the 
actors within the hierarchical structure, the horizontal accountability system needs 
to be improved upon. Specifically, that in order to achieve the state of full 
accountability in horizontal accountability, there needs to be an improvement of the 
access to information for the actors within the horizontal accountability system, the 
current method of transparency by request in most accountability interactions, 
needs to move to one of transparency by default. The Chapter also argued that access 
to information is just one side of the equation, the other dependence, is that the 
actors within the horizontal accountability system must be able to use the 
information to achieve a meaningful legal solution, therefore they must be 
adequately legally empowered.  
 
This chapter argues that in situations with transparency by request, the system 
structure must be improved to protect the right of the horizontal accountability 
actors in the system to get access to that information, and ensure that in most 
request instances, the requests are granted, and only in the rare justifiable cases 
should exceptions be allowed to deny a request. Ultimately however, the goal should 
be to move to a system of transparency by default, as the best outcome of 
transparency by request in the context of the Transparency and Accountability 
Matrix (TAM) is conditional accountability, whereas the best outcome with 
transparency by default is full accountability.   
 
References will be made to some of the loopholes identified in chapter two that 
existed within the public procurement process in Nigeria, and where appropriate, 
the loopholes which enhanced access to information can solve from the perspective 
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of the Transparency and Accountability Matrix (TAM) will be discussed. The TAM will 
be applied to the loopholes identified in the public procurement process in Nigeria, 
in order to determine the current level of accountability and actual steps which can 
be taken to improve the accountability surrounding the specific loophole being 
discussed.  
 
Finally, the Chapter analyses the implications of improved access to information, 
specifically as it concerns privacy rights and confidentiality and further analyses the 
potentially negative impact which implementing full horizontal accountability 
through improved access to information may lead to.  
 
4.2 Improving Transparency by Request  
Although certain sector specific legislation like the Public Procurement Act 2007 
(PPA) provide the conduit through which actors within the horizontal 
accountability framework can obtain access to information, the bedrock of any 
access to information regime has to be freedom of information legislation, as it is a 
catch-all that allows access to information which is in the custody of all government 
actors, and therefore this would include procuring entities. 
 
The Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) in Nigeria was passed in 2011 after a long 
and challenging process. Obe1 gives a vivid account of the creation of Nigeria’s FoIA 
dating back from 1992 till it was passed in 2011. Ironically the movement for the 
passage of the FoIA started, not as a pure good governance initiative, but as a way 
to scale government secrecy with respect to human rights violations of prisoners. In 
the early 1990s in Nigeria, there was a curtain of secrecy concerning the numbers 
of prisoners who were in prisons and detention, and who were allegedly being 
starved and killed indiscriminately. The Civil Society organisations at the time – 
championed by the Civil Liberties Organisation2, felt that mandatory access to 
government records would give them accurate data to fight these human rights 
injustices, hence their desire for the FoIA. The shift from using the request for the 
FoIA as a human rights tool to an anti-corruption mechanism happened in 1998/99 
 
1 Ayo Obe, ‘The Challenging Case of Nigeria’ in Ann Florini (ed), The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World (Columbia 
University Press 2007) 
2 Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) is a non-governmental organisation involved in the promotion of human rights in Nigeria. 
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during the midwifing of the new democratic government and in the immediate years 
of the new democracy3. The FoIA had its first reading in the House of 
Representatives4 on February 22, 2000: it was the first civil society bill to be 
presented to the National Assembly, and even though it had a number of setbacks, it 
was finally passed into law and signed by the President in 2011, almost 20 years 
later after the initial agitation for its creation in 1992. The FoIA is arguably one of 
the biggest tools for enthroning transparency in the Nigerian public governance 
space. It was passed to ‘make public records and information more freely available, 
provide for public access to public records and information, protect public records and 
information to the extent consistent with the public interest and the protection of 
personal privacy, protect serving public officers from adverse consequences of 
disclosing certain kinds of official information without authorization and establish 
procedures for the achievement of those purposes and; for related matters.’ 
 
4.2.1 Requests for Information 
Section 1 of the FoIA it crystallises the right of any person ‘to access or request 
information, whether or not contained in any written form, which is in the custody 
or possession of any public official, agency or institution howsoever described’. In 
the next section, it mandates public institutions to ensure the proper organisation 
and maintenance of all information in its custody in a manner that facilitates public 
access to such information5. The FoIA goes further by providing that persons who 
have a right of access under it shall have the right to institute proceedings in court 
to compel any public institution to comply with the provisions of the FoIA. The Act 
further details the process for application, timelines, potential outcomes and 
penalties for non-compliance of the public official or agency6.  
 
While the FoIA is a laudable step in the transparency system in Nigeria public 
governance as a form of transparency by request, it should be noted that the FoIA 
provides that in certain instances, requests for information may be denied if they 
 
3 Prior to 1999, Nigeria had witnessed only 10 years of civilian government in its almost 40 years existence since independence 
from the British in 1960. The remaining 30 odd years, Nigeria had been governed by Military rule. 
4 Nigeria has a bicameral legislature with a Federal Senate and Federal House of Representatives. For a Bill to be passed into 
law the Bill must be passed in both Houses of the National Assembly. 
5 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2011 s 2(2). 
6 FOIA 2011 s 4-8 
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fall within the listed exceptions. The global standard for freedom of information 
laws has been championed by Article 197, in its Principles on Right to Information 
Legislation8, the Principles were originally developed in 1999 and updated in 2015. 
They have been endorsed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, in his report to the 2000 Session of the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights9 , and referred to by the Commission in its 2000 Resolution on 
freedom of expression, as well as by his successor in 2013 in his report to the UN 
General Assembly in 201310. The Principles proposed that all individual requests for 
information from public bodies should be met unless the public body can show that 
the information falls within the scope of a limited regime of exceptions, and that a 
refusal to disclose information is not justified unless the public authority can show 
that the information meets a strict three-part test. The three-part test being that the 
information must relate to a legitimate aim as provided for in international law; 
disclosure must threaten to cause substantial harm to that aim; and the harm to the 
aim must be greater than the public interest in having the information.  
 
With respect to the first part of the test, the Principles state that  a complete list of 
the legitimate aims which may justify non-disclosure should be provided in the law, 
and this list should include only interests which constitute legitimate grounds for 
refusing to disclose documents and should be limited to matters recognized under 
international law such as law enforcement, privacy, national security, commercial 
and other confidentiality, public or individual safety, and the effectiveness and 
integrity of government decision-making processes. The second part of the test 
states that the public body must show that the disclosure of the information would 
cause substantial harm to that legitimate aim. It is not sufficient to justify an 
exception simply on the grounds that the information requested falls within the 
scope of the legitimate aim listed. The final part of the test states that even if 
substantial harm to the legitimate aim can be shown, the information should still be 
disclosed if the benefits of the disclosure outweigh the harm, in other words if there 
 
7 Article 19 is a British human rights organization with a specific mandate and focus on the defense and promotion of freedom 
of expression and freedom of information worldwide founded in 1987. The organization takes its name from Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
8 The Public’s Right to Know: Principles of Right to Information  
<https://www.article19.org/data/files/RTI_Principles_Updated_EN.pdf> accessed 4 November 2019 
9 E/CN.4/2000/63 
10 A/68/362, 4 September 2013 
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is a public interest to the information being disclosed, this overrides the substantial 
harm to the legitimate aim. 
 
Contrasting the international best practice as advocated by the Principles11, the 
Nigerian FoIA has a number of exceptions which may be used as grounds for refusal 
of a freedom of information request. These exceptions include international affairs 
and national defence12, administrative enforcement proceedings of law 
enforcement or correctional agencies13, personal information14, commercial 
confidentiality15, privileged information16, research and academic information17. In 
most of the sections dealing with exceptions, the test that is used in determining 
whether or not a disclosure would fall under an exception is the public interest test. 
The provisions state that an application for information shall not be denied where 
 
11 n 7 
12 FoIA 2011 s 11- A public institution may deny an application for any information the disclosure of which may be injurious to 
the conduct of international Affair and the defence of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
13 FoIA 2011 s 12 - A public institution may deny an application for any information which contains- 
(a) Records compiled by any public institution for administrative enforcement proceedings and by any law enforcement or 
correctional agency for law enforcement purposes or for internal matters of a public institution, but only to the extent that 
disclosure would- 
(i) interfere with pending or actual and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law 
enforcement or correctional agency, (ii) interfere with pending administrative enforcement proceedings conducted by any public 
institution,(iii) deprive a person of a fair trial or an impartial hearing,(iv) unavoidably disclose the identity of a confidential 
source,(v) constitute an invasion of personal privacy under Section 15 of this Act, except, where the interest of the public would 
be better served by having such record being made available, this exemption to disclosure shall not apply, and (vi) obstruct an 
ongoing criminal investigation; (b) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the security 
of penal institutions. 
14 FoIA 2011 s 14 - a public institution must deny an application for information that contains personal information and 
information exempted under this subsection includes – (a) files and personal information maintained with respect to clients, 
patients, residents, students, or other individuals receiving social, medical, educational, vocation, financial, supervisory or 
custodial care or services directly or indirectly from public institutions; (b) personnel files and personal information maintained 
with respect to employees, appointees or elected officials of any public institution or applicants for such positions; (c) files and 
personal information maintained with respect to any applicant, registrant or licensee by any government or public institution 
cooperating with or engaged in professional or occupational registration, licensure or discipline; (d) information required of any 
tax payer in connection with the assessment or collection of any tax unless disclosure is otherwise requested by the statute; and 
(e) information revealing the identity of persons who file complaints with or provide information to administrative, investigative, 
law enforcement or penal agencies on the commission of any crime. 
(2) A public institution shall disclose any information that contains personal information if-(a) the individual to whom it relates 
consents to the disclosure; or (b) the information is publicly available 
15 FoIA 2011 s 15 - A public institution shall deny an application for information that contains- (a) trade secrets and commercial 
or financial information obtained from a person or business where such trade secrets or information are proprietary, privileged 
or confidential, or where disclosure of such trade secrets or information may cause harm to the interests of the third party 
provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed as preventing a person or business from consenting to 
disclosure; (b) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to interfere with the contractual or other 
negotiations of a third party; and (c) proposal and bids for any contract, grants, or agreement, including information which if it 
were disclosed would frustrate procurement or give an advantage to any person. 
16 FoIA 2011 s 16 - A public institution may deny an application for information that is subject to the following privileges – (a) 
legal practitioner-client privilege, (b) health workers- client privilege; (c) journalism confidently privilege; (d) any other 
professional privileges confidently by an Act 
17 FoIA 2011 s 17 - A public institution may deny an application for information which contains course or research materials 
prepared by faculty members; FoIA 2011 s 19 - A public institution may deny an application for information that contains 
information pertaining to – (a) test questions, scoring keys and other examination data used to administer an academic 
examination or determine the qualifications of an application for a license or employment; (b) architects' and engineers' plans 
for buildings not constructed in whole or in part with public funds and for buildings constructed with public funds, to the 
extent that disclosure would compromise security; and (c) library circulation and other records identifying library users with 
specific materials: 
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the public interest in disclosing the information outweighs whatever injury that 
disclosure would cause. In Legal Defence & Assistance Project(Gte) Ltd v Clerk of the 
National Assembly of Nigeria18 the court held that the provisions of the FoIA clearly 
places the public interest above all else including the personal interest of the 
individuals, and that where the interest of the public is in clash with the individual 
interest, in deserving cases, the collective interest must be held paramount. In this 
case the decision of the court was that it was in the public interest for the defendants 
to release the details of the salary, emolument and the allowances paid to all 
Honourable Members and Distinguished Senators of the National Assembly. 
 
The only two sections of the FoIA which do not have the public interest test are the 
sections dealing with disclosure of privileged information by professionals – 
lawyers, journalists, doctors etc., and disclosure of research information. In Boniface 
Okezie v Central Bank of Nigeria19 the plaintiff requested (amongst other things) 
information on the amount of legal fees and other fees paid and to be paid to certain 
lawyers by the defendant, and one of the grounds which the Defendant used to deny 
the freedom of information request was the fact that this information would breach 
legal practitioner and client privilege which was an exception allowed under the 
FoIA. The court held that the defendant was not obliged to release the information 
about payments made to the lawyers as the plaintiff had not shown an overriding 
public interest for that information to be released. Therefore, in the case of 
disclosure of privileged information the courts still applied the public interest test 
to the decision even though it was not specifically required to do so. 
 
When comparing the provisions of the FoIA with the principles as espoused by 
Article 19 with its three-part test, the Nigerian process has a two-part test, the first 
part is where each section lists the legitimate aim which the exception is seeking to 
protect, and the second part is the public interest test. The substantial harm element 
is not included in the Nigerian FoIA legislation, and so there is no requirement that 
the authority which denies a request need prove that the reason for the denial is 
 
18 FHC/ABJ/CS/805/2011 
19 FHC/L/CS/494/2012 
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because there will be substantial harm to the aim protected, all that it needs to do is 
prove that the information falls under the aim listed in that exception.  In 
Incorporated Trustees of the Citizens Assistance Centre v Hon Adeyemi Ikuforiji & 
Lagos State House of Assembly20,  the approach which the court adopted on the issue 
of the disclosure of personal information was only analysed on the basis of whether 
or not it was in the public interest. The court did not go into the issue of whether or 
not substantial harm would be visited upon the subjects of the personal information, 
if the freedom of information request was complied with.  
 
This non-inclusion of the substantial harm element to exception, although not fatal, 
severely limits the efficacy of the FoIA as it gives authorities a convenient cover for 
the denial of certain requests. This means that the requester will always need to 
provide overriding public interest in cases of requests where the information is 
listed as an exception. Therefore in the broader conversation on horizontal 
accountability, a system that provides les hurdles for the authority to scale when 
they want to refuse a request for information, is a system that limits access to 
information, and by implication weakens the efficacy of horizontal accountability, 
as access to information is an essential ingredient within the TAM for the exercise 
of horizontal accountability by the actors within that system. 
 
4.2.2 Appeals 
Apart from the issues of obtaining access to the information and the legislation 
which governs how this access is managed. It is also important that there is a 
structure in place to address denials of access. The Article 19 principles state that 
there should be a process for deciding upon requests for information, and this 
should be spread across three different levels: within the public body; appeals to an 
independent administrative body; and appeals to the courts. With respect to the first 
stage of the appeal process, there should be provision for an internal appeal to a 
designated higher authority within the public authority who can review the original 
decision. With respect to the independent administrative body, the principles 
suggest that this may be either an existing body, such as an Ombudsman or a 
 
20 ID/211/2009 
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specialised administrative body established for this purpose, and that in either case, 
the independence of the body should be guaranteed, and that best practice should 
be to create an independent Information Commission. The procedure by which the 
administrative body processes appeals over requests for information which have 
been refused should be designed to operate rapidly and cost as little as is reasonably 
possible. In order to ensure that all members of the public can access this procedure 
and that excessive delays do not undermine the whole purpose of requesting 
information in the first place.  
 
The administrative body should be granted full powers to investigate any appeal, 
including the ability to compel witnesses and, importantly, to require the public 
body to provide it with any information or record for its consideration, in camera 
where necessary and justified. Upon the conclusion of an investigation, the 
administrative body should have the power to dismiss the appeal, to require the 
public body to disclose the information, to sanction public bodies for obstructive 
behaviour where warranted and/or to impose costs on public bodies in relation to 
the appeal21. Finally, the person requesting the information should be able to appeal 
to the courts against decisions of the body. The court should have the full power to 
review the case on its merits and not be limited to the question of whether the body 
has acted reasonably. This will ensure that due attention is given to resolving 
difficult questions and that a consistent approach to right to information issues is 
promoted. A process for deciding upon requests for information should be specified 
at three different levels: within the public body; appeals to an independent 
administrative body; and appeals to the courts. 
 
In contrast, the relevant provisions of the PPA on access to record of proceedings, 
and the provisions of the FoIA on access to information do not provide for a three-
stage appeal process. Both laws only provide for a one stage appeal process, which 
is that when requests for information are denied, the only option is to take the 
appeal to the courts. This one stage appeal process therefore is an impediment to 
effective transparency by request, which reduces the efficacy of horizontal 
 
21 Principle 5, Article 19: The Public’s Right to Know: Principles of Right to Information 
<https://www.article19.org/data/files/RTI_Principles_Updated_EN.pdf> accessed 4 November 2019 
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accountability. A recent survey carried out by the Hague Institute for Innovation in 
Law22 showed that only 8% of Nigerians who have serious legal issues ever 
approach the courts, therefore there is a high mistrust/lack of faith in the judicial 
institutions in Nigeria, if citizens are not going to court when they have a serious 
personal legal issue, it is stands to reason that it is unlikely they will then decide to 
go to court over an access to information issue. In a country with such a pronounced 
lack of faith in the judicial system, it is very likely that a large number of individuals 
will give up their quest for judicial review of an access to information request denial. 
 
Apart from the issue of systemic mistrust of the judicial system in Nigeria, there is 
also the issue of the cost of legal fees as a barrier to access. Specifically, the costs, 
time and effort which is required to file an action at the Federal High Court23 are 
extremely prohibitive for individuals who want to enforce the provisions of the 
FoIA. If a requester were to be successful in court for an appeal to a denied request, 
there is no specified redress process which states that the person be reimbursed the 
cost of bringing the litigation, the only redress is provided in the FoIA24 which is that 
in the case of wrongful denial of access, the defaulting officer or institution is liable 
on conviction to a fine. The relevant provisions of the PPA on access to record of 
proceedings has no such provision either, therefore the requester is faced with 
having to bear the costs of the appeal with no possibility of reimbursement. With 
such a cumbersome process, this could deter individuals without adequate funding 
from appealing decisions where access to information has been denied by the 
relevant authority.  
 
For the Nigerian FoIA (and indeed, other sector-specific laws that deal with access 
to information) to serve the primary purpose of transparency, the system must have 
very few barriers to access, it should be as frictionless as possible. A frictionless 
system is one where the individual can make the request relatively cheaply and 
quickly. This is evident in the provision of Section 8 of the FoIA which provides that 
fees shall be limited to standard charges for document duplication and transcription 
 
22 HiiL Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey - Nigeria 2018 <https://www.hiil.org/projects/justice-needs-and-satisfaction-
in-nigeria/> 
23 The Federal High Court of Nigeria has jurisdiction over FOIA refusal appeals. 
24 FoIA 2011 s 7(5) 
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where necessary, this is indicative of the fact that the FoIA intentionally does not set 
out a burden of high cost that could potentially prevent people from requesting 
information. There are no access fees, and the only fees available are justifiable and 
linked to document duplication costs and transcription costs. The introduction of 
the timeline for responding to applications25 is a further indication of the fact that 
the FoIA seeks to prioritise promptness and predictability in the response process. 
Therefore, it is clear that cheap and quick access to information are principles 
embedded in the FoIA, it is however disconcerting that the application of the FoIA 
does not fit within that reality, and in fact there are a number of impediments to its 
efficacy which has a follow on effect on the efficacy of horizontal accountability by 
the actors involved in the system. 
 
The three stage appeal principle as suggested by Article 19 would greatly address 
the issues associated with a one stage appeal process as discussed above, however 
while the first stage and the third stage of the process can be implemented relatively 
seamlessly (if the relevant changes to the laws are made), there is the issue of the 
second stage in the appeal process – an appeal to an independent authority, as no 
such authority exists in Nigeria. In the context of the public procurement process 
and access to record of proceedings, this second stage could theoretically be handled 
by the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), or by the office of the Attorney General 
of the Federation (OAGF). As the BPP is a sector-specific organisation with a limited 
scope, it is suggested that the OAGF would be better placed as the second stage of 
the appeal process for all requests for information across all public authorities, as a 
more holistic solution. In fact, the FoIA has already given the OAGF certain powers 
which, if improved upon, can serve as a foundation for exercising this power as a 
second stage in the appeal process.  
 
Under the Nigerian FOIA26, the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) is given 
certain responsibilities to enhance the implementation and efficacy of the FOIA. 
These responsibilities include receiving yearly reports on or before February 1 of 
each year from public institutions regarding the following information: 
 
25 FOIA 2011 s 4 
26 FoIA 2011 s 29 
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the number of determinations made by the public institution not to comply with 
applications for information made to such public institution and the reasons for such 
determinations;  
 
the number of appeals made by persons under this Act, and the reason for the action 
upon each appeal that results in a denial of information;  
 
a description of whether the Court has upheld the decision of the public institution to 
withhold information under such circumstances and a concise description of the scope 
of any information withheld;  
 
the number of applications for information pending before the public institution as of 
October 31 of the preceding year and the median number of days that such application 
had been pending before the public institution as of that date;  
 
the number or applications for information received by the public institution and the 
number of applications; which the public institution processed;  
 
the median number of days taken by the public institution to process different types of 
applications for information;  
 
the total amount of fees collected by the public institution to process such applications; 
and the number of full-time staff of the public institution devoted to processing 
applications for information, and the total amount expended by the public institution 
for processing such applications.27 
 
Ostensibly the responsibility given to the OAGF is to ensure that it exercises 
oversight over all the public authorities with a view to ensuring compliance. The 
OAGF is to submit to the National Assembly28 an annual report on or before April 1 
of each calendar year which shall include for the prior calendar year a listing of the 
number of cases arising under the FoIA subsequent to a FOI denial, the exemption 
involved in each case, the disposition of such cases, and the cost, fees, and penalties 
assessed. The report is also to include a detailed description of the efforts taken by 
the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Ministry which the AGF heads, to encourage all 
government or public institutions to comply with the FOIA. 
 
The OAGF is therefore an integral institution in ensuring the proper implementation 
of the FOIA, and even though the FOIA gives wide powers to the OAGF, this does not 
go far enough. The powers of the OAGF need to be widened in order to further the 
 
27 FoIA 2011 s 29(1)(a-f) 
28 This is both levels of the Nigerian Legislature – Senate and the House of Representatives. 
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goals of the FOIA. The powers need to be widened specifically in 2 respects – firstly, 
the OAGF needs to be given the power to conduct administrative reviews of appeals 
against refusals, and secondly the OAGF needs to be given the powers to either 
sanction erring public officials/agencies, or to recommend to the appropriate 
supervising Ministry that sanctions, or reprimands be passed on erring public 
officials/agencies. 
 
This expansion of the power of the OAGF would not only ensure that more people 
would be able to appeal refusals – as there will be no legal costs incurred, and the 
timeline for reviews would relatively be shorter than court cases; but additionally it 
would give the OAGF real-time information about the level of compliance of the 
different public institutions, allowing it to perform its oversight and implementation 
powers more effectively, rather than the current process where it has to wait for 
annual reports from all the public institutions before getting the information 
necessary to carry out its oversight duties. Such an administrative review role being 
carried out by a different government Ministry/agency is not entirely novel to the 
Nigerian government process, this process is similar to the administrative review 
role which is played by the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), when reviewing 
procurement decisions29 of procuring agencies. The role of the OAGF in reviewing 
FOIA refusal decisions can therefore be modelled on the BPP administrative review 
process, specifically requests for review would have to be made to the OAGF within 
a specified number of days, the request for review would contain the original FOI 
request and the letter from the public institution denying the request in full or 
partially, and on receipt of the request for review, the OAGF would notify the FOI 
officer in the public institution concerned informing them of the request for review. 
The AGF would then have a specified number of days within which to conduct the 
review and make a decision in writing, the office of the AGF would have the power 
to nullify in whole or part the decision to refuse the FOI request, and order that the 
information be disclosed to the requester either in full or in part.  
 
Finally, if the office of the AGF fails to deliver a decision within the stipulated time, 
or the requester is dissatisfied with the decision of the office of the AGF, the 
 
29 PPA 2007 s 54 
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requester may appeal to the Federal High Court within a specified number of days 
of the receipt of the decision of the office of the AGF or the expiration of the time 
stipulated for the office of the AGF to deliver a decision.  It is suggested that this 
recommendation if adopted would significantly reduce the barriers to access which 
currently exist within the FOI process, apart from improving access and bringing the 
Nigerian access to information process more in line with the three stage appeal 
process as advocated in the Principles, these changes would also ensure that there 
is better monitoring of the process by the OAGF, allowing the OAGF to carry out its 
statutory functions more effectively. Giving these powers to the OAGF would serve 
as a lever for ensuring accountability in the process and provide a bulwark for 
protecting privacy rights within the access to information process, and also provide 
a transparent process for how issues of access denial reviews are handled. 
Therefore, enhancing the powers of the OAGF within the procurement process, will 
guarantee transparency by request, and therefore improve horizontal 
accountability as a tool to supplement vertical accountability, and will serve to 
empower the citizens more to get involved in the accountability process. 
 
Finally, it is important to ensure that the third stage in the appeal process is an 
effective stage. In other words, that the courts are properly empowered to be able 
to review appeals either within a one stage process or within a three-stage process. 
With respect to the provisions of the PPA which deal with access to record of 
proceedings, the PPA provides that where there is a refusal to disclose records of 
proceedings by a procuring entity, and the issue is taken before the courts, the 
procuring entity may refuse to disclose information when lawfully ordered to do so 
by a court, if its disclosure would be contrary to law; impede law enforcement; or 
prejudice legitimate commercial interests of the parties30. This provision is a serious 
limitation on transparency by request, and as a consequence – effective horizontal 
accountability. The relevant section states that 31: 
 
 (3) A disclosure of procurement proceeding records, prior to award of contract may 
be ordered by a court, provided that when ordered to do so by a court. The 
 
30 PPA 2007 s 38(3) 
31 Ibid. 
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procurement entity shall not disclose such information, if its disclosure would (a) be 
contrary to law; (b) impede law enforcement; or (c) prejudice legitimate commercial 
interests of the parties. 
 
As can be seen from the provisions above, there is access to information on the 
record of proceedings for a procurement process after it has ended, however (3) of 
the section states that this refusal to grant access to information also extends to 
instances where a court has ordered that the information be disclosed. This section 
raises several issues. Firstly, the section provides that a procuring entity can refuse 
to obey a court order, this is unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the provisions 
of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which gives the judiciary 
the power to adjudicate over matters, and makes decisions of the courts binding32. 
Further, it is also against the principles of right to information legislation in that the 
legislation should have processes in place to facilitate access, and this includes an 
unfettered appeal process which gives access to courts who can overturn decisions 
that restrict access. Secondly, and also very important is the fact that the legislation 
has only one test – that the information relates to a legitimate aim. All three 
exceptions (contrary to law, impede law enforcement, and prejudice legitimate 
commercial interests) are legitimate aims, however the fact that there is no 
subsequent test on the application of the exception means that access to information 
is practically nullified. It does not imbibe the two-part test of the FoIA, which is that 
there must be a legitimate aim which has no overriding public interest, and it also 
does not have the three-part test of Article 19, which is that there must be a 
legitimate interest, and the disclosure of the information would cause substantial 
harm to that legitimate aim, and there is no overriding public interest which 
compels the release of the information. Therefore, when one compares the 
provisions on access to record of proceedings against the standards of the FoIA, and 
the principles of Article 19, it is clear that access to record of proceedings hinders 
transparency by request.  
 
 
32 1999 Constitution s 287(3)  -  “ The decisions of the Federal High Court, a High Court and of all other courts established by 
this Constitution shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by other courts of law with 
subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, a High Court and t hose other courts, respectively.”  
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Ordinarily one would think that when there is disparity between the FoIA and 
another law with respect to access to information, that the provisions of the FoIA 
would take precedence, unfortunately this is not the case. The FoIA states33 that the 
provisions of the FoIA are intended to complement and not replace the existing 
procedures for access to public records and information, therefore the implication 
of this is that the two-part test of the FoIA cannot be imputed into the provisions of 
the PPA.  
 
It should be noted that although the decision-making process for the authority when 
determining whether to grant access to information under the FoIA is the two-part 
test – legitimate aim and public interest, and the sector-specific test for the PPA is 
only the legitimate aim test. The process which the courts is required to follow when 
an appeal comes before it is a three-part test. The FoIA provides34 that where a 
public institution denies an application for information, or a part thereof on the 
basis of a provision of this Act, the Court shall order the institution to disclose the 
information or part thereof to the applicant - if the Court determines that the 
institution is not authorized to deny the application for information; where the 
institution is so authorized, but the Court nevertheless determines that the 
institution does not have reasonable grounds on which to deny the application; or 
where the Court makes a finding that the interest of the public in having the record 
being made available is greater and more vital than the interest being served if the 
application is denied, in whatever circumstance. 
 
This test to be applied by the court means that where the denial is of a matter that 
is not stated as a legitimate aim under the FoIA, the denial will be overturned, and 
further if it is stated as a legitimate aim, then the court will determine whether there 
were reasonable grounds to deny the request. The reasonable grounds test replaces 
the substantial harm test (which exists in the Article 19 principles), however there 
is no guidance in the FoIA as to what would constitute reasonable grounds, and 
therefore this would be at the discretion of the courts. Finally the FoIA states that 
the courts are to apply the overriding public interest test, and that if the interests of 
 
33 FoIA 2011 s 30 
34 FoIA 2011 s 15 
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the public in making the information available is greater and more vital than the 
interest being served if the application is denied, then the appeal would be allowed 
and the information should be disclosed. 
 
In conclusion therefore, the transparency by request process contained in the PPA 
is quite restrictive on three levels. Firstly when assessing a request, the procuring 
entity need only determine whether it is a legitimate aim – it does not meet the 
three-part test standard as suggested by the Article 19 principles; secondly when a 
request is denied, the appeal process is a one stage appeal process directly to the 
courts, this also does not measure up to the Article 19 principles which suggests a 
three stage appeal process. Finally, the powers of the courts to order a release of 
information is curtailed by the PPA as it provides that procuring entities can disobey 
court orders. The PPA provisions therefore hamper transparency by request vis-à-
vis access to record of proceedings. The provisions of the FoIA, which ordinarily 
would have stepped in to replace the deficient access to information provisions in 
the PPA, also suffers from its own shortcomings. Firstly, the FoIA provides that its 
provisions are complementary, and not meant to replace any stated procedures on 
access to information, and so one might not necessarily be able to plead the 
provisions of the FoIA to replace the deficient PPA provisions. Secondly, while the 
FoIA provisions on how an authority can assess an access to information request are 
an improvement on the provisions of the PPA, in that it provides for a two-part test 
– legitimate aim and public interest, it does not go far enough, as it neglects to 
introduce the concept of substantial harm. Thirdly, the appeal process for denial 
requests is also a one stage process, mirroring the PPA appeal process, it does 
however improve on the PPA process by including the three-stage test for 
determining whether an appeal should be allowed, and it also emphasizes the 
powers of the court to grant enforceable reliefs e.g. order release of information 
which must be followed, however the provisions still do not match up to the Article 
19 principles which have been widely endorsed by relevant international agencies.  
 
It is suggested therefore that in order to ensure true transparency by request, these 
issues within the PPA and the FoIA process need to be addressed urgently, and the 
suggested solutions for this are an introduction of a three part test of legitimate aim, 
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substantial harm, and public interest when faced with a request for access to 
information; and further, that there should be a three stage appeal process which 
incorporates an initial appeal to a senior figure in the authority which initially 
denies the request, then a second stage appeal to an independent third party (it is 
suggested that the OAGF is presently best placed to take on this role), and then 
finally an appeal to the court with no limitation on the court’s powers to order a 
release of the information where the requirements in the three part process have 
been met. For there to be true transparency by request, there must be no 
unnecessary impediments to access to information, and therefore any access to 
information legislation which creates these impediments to the process diminishes 
the effectiveness of horizontal accountability. In the context of the Transparency 
and Accountability Matrix therefore, a situation which should ordinary lead to 
conditional accountability for actors, is hampered as there is no true transparency 
by request.  
 
4.2.3 Potential Effect of Improved Transparency by Request 
If a strong transparency by request process as discussed above is achieved in the 
public procurement process in Nigeria, then this would solve some of the loopholes 
which have been identified in the process. For example, in chapter two, an analysis 
of the current situation in the Nigerian public procurement process was done where 
procurement of special goods; works and services involving national defence or 
national security are specifically excluded from the operation of the provisions of 
the public procurement Act35 , unless the President's express approval has been first 
sought and obtained. The loophole identified is that since the PPA in Nigeria does 
not apply to defence procurement, bad actors could operate outside of it and take 
advantage of the system. Applying the TAM to the loophole in defence procurement 
shows a system that has transparency by request, this is because citizens are able to 
request for information concerning spending in the defence procurement sector, in 
fact in December 2018, the Nigerian Military granted a request for information by 
non-governmental organisations regarding military spending36 on defence 
 
35 PPA 2007 s 15(2) 
36 Bertram Nwannekanma and Emeka Nwachukwu, ‘Buratai replies SERAP, others over military spending’, (The Guardian 14 
January 2019) <https://guardian.ng/news/buratai-replies-serap-others-over-military-spending/> accessed 4 November 
2019 
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procurement contracts. However, the response to that request by the Nigerian 
Military cannot be taken to be a full representation of the actual state of 
transparency by request in Nigeria. 
 
In order to determine the true state of transparency by request in Nigeria, we will 
review the results of the Annual Reports submitted by the Office of the Attorney 
General (OAGF) to the National Assembly for the years 2015-2019 on the 
implementation of the Freedom of Information Act 201137, and the annual FoIA 
Compliance Report ranking for those same years, published by the Public and 
Private Development Centre (PPDC)38 a Nigerian non-governmental organisation 
focused on accountability in public procurement39. 
       
  Institutions Reviewed FOI Requests Refusals/No Response 
  OAGF PPDC OAGF PPDC OAGF PPDC 
2015 44 116 217 116 36 82 
2016 54 131 405 131 7 46 
2017 73 166 498 166 7 103 
2018 70 187 1173 187 35 109 
 
Figure 4.1: Analysis of annual OAGF and PPDC FoIA Compliance Reports 
 
The OAGF Annual reports are compiled by the Federal Ministry of Justice (MoJ) by 
requesting that all public institutions send to the MoJ the total number of FoI 
requests they receive, and a breakdown of the responses sent to those requests, 
including the time period spent to respond to each request. The OAGF does not state 
if and how it verifies the accuracy of the information which is sent by the public 
institutions. On the other hand, the PPDC FoI compliance report is obtained by the 
PPDC sending FoI requests annually to all the listed public institutions, the FoI 
requests are sent at or around the start of each calendar year, and the PPDC 
publishes the acknowledgement copy of the FoI request sent to the public 
 
37 Federal Ministry of Justice Freedom of Information Act Annual Report 2017 <https://www.justice.gov.ng/index.php/fmoj-
downloads/reports/fmoj-foia-annual-report> accessed 4 November 2019 
38 The PPDC was established in 2003. Its major activities are in the area of governance, public finance expenditure and 
advocacy, corruption prevention, and monitoring, promotion of popular participation in governance and development. 
39 Public and Private Development Centre Freedom of Information Act Compliance Reports 
<http://procurementmonitor.org/foi-ranking/home/ranking> accessed 4 November 2019 
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institutions, it then bases its reports on the responses or lack thereof from the 
concerned public institutions.  
 
For the years 2015-2019, the OAGF report stated that for the institutions that filed 
their submissions in the time mandated by the FoIA there was a high level of 
compliance in responding to requests; for 2015 the number of requests which were 
refused constituted 17% of the requests, for 2016 the percentage was 2%, for 2017 
the percentage was only 1%, and for 2018 the percentage was 3%. These figures as 
contained in the report would therefore seem to paint a picture of very high 
compliance and would suggest a system of a healthy transparency by request 
process. However, the PPDC annual compliance reports for that same period paint 
an entirely different picture, for the year 2015 the PPDC reported that 71% of 
requests were either refused or were not responded to, for 2016 the percentage for 
refusals/no responses was 35%, in 2017 the percentage was 62%, and in 2018 the 
percentage was 58%. 
 
Both the reports of the OAGF and the PPDC therefore seem to be contradicting 
themselves. As the OAGF report is an official government document which is 
presented to the National Assembly, there is the temptation to give extra weight and 
credibility to that report over the PPDC which is essentially a report by a private 
organisation, however the OAGF report itself states40 that the OAGF had numerous 
challenges in getting the annual report together, including failure of public 
institutions to send in reports in time. When one adds that to the fact that the OAGF 
report also does not state whether any fact checking was carried out to confirm 
whether the information provided by the public institutions were indeed accurate, 
it diminishes the credibility of the report. However, in contrast the PPDC report is 
quite thorough and provides evidence of freedom of information requests which 
were sent to the public institutions concerned – with actual scans of the documents 
to prove that they were stamped and acknowledged by the public institutions 
involved, and so they were definitely received. It would seem that the PPDC report 
is more credible. In light of the discrepancy between both the OAGF report and the 
PPDC report, it is more likely that the PPDC report is more representative of the true 
 
40 n 34 (p.6) 
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state of transparency by request in Nigeria, and if this is the case then there is much 
work that needs to be done to improve transparency by request, as a system where 
there is such a high level of requests for information which are either refused or go 
un-replied, is indeed cause for alarm, as it is a danger to transparency by request, 
and by implication, a danger to the efficacy of horizontal accountability. 
 
4.3 Improving Transparency by Default  
This section submits that the use of open government data will facilitate a better 
horizontal accountability process, essentially by creating a system which is 
transparent by default, without the need for requests for information to be made to 
procuring entities as all the information necessary for the accountability process has 
already been made available.  
 
In 2013, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) of the United Nations 
commissioned a study on the policy, legal and technical requirements for open 
government in Africa – Unlocking the Potential for Open Government in Africa41. The 
aim of this study was to determine how best ECA can assist African countries to 
improve transparency and unlock social and economic value, given the vast 
developmental, social and economic gains that have been realized in countries that 
have moved towards open government, in particular through open government data 
(OGD) platforms at national and subnational levels. This project focused on the use 
of open government and OGD to enhance governance initiatives and improve the 
social and economic conditions of African citizens. One of the outputs of the report 
was the development of guidelines, a step-by-step guide for countries wishing to 
follow best practices for the implementation of open government within a suitable 
contextual and technological framework. The report also highlighted the 
importance of the existence of laws and policies on the use of information including 
freedom of information laws, data protection laws, open data laws and copyright 
laws. The reporting identifies certain technical requirements that must exist for 
OGD and hence for efficient open government, which determine the manner in 
which open data may be obtained and used. They include the development of a data 
 
41 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, (2017), Unlocking the Potential for Open Government in Africa: Legal and 
technical requirements for Open Government Implementation in Africa 
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portal with machine readable data, existence of data centres to manage and store 
this data, development of information infrastructure, and interoperability of data, 
high data quality and validation, and security and data protection. These are the core 
issues that need to be addressed when approaching the issue of transparency by 
default. 
 
In Nigeria, the FoIA provides that42 public institutions are to ensure that they keep 
records and information of all its activities, operations and businesses, and ensure 
the proper organisation and maintenance of all information in its custody in a 
manner that facilitates public access to such information, and shall cause to be 
published (amongst other things) information relating to the receipt or expenditure 
of public or other funds of the institution; the names, salaries, titles and dates of 
employment of all employees and officers of the institution; a list of files containing 
applications for any contract, permit, grants, licenses or agreements; a list of all  
materials containing information relating to any grant or contract made by or 
between the institution and another public institution or private organization etc. 
The effect of this section of the FoIA is that it mandates open government data for 
the itemised information by all public institutions. In order for open government 
data to work effectively however, there has to be a legal/regulatory system in place 
for it to be effectively implemented. Further, for it to be effective, the following key 
concerns need to be addressed - data access, data reliability and data protection.  
 
4.3.1 Data Access 
Data access presupposes that certain key legislations must be created or amended 
in order to ensure easy access of information that is critical in order for actors to be 
able to properly exercise their accountability duties within the horizontal 
accountability process. Without the legislation in place the information cannot be 
released, Article 19 advocates for this in its principles on access to information, 
which states that public bodies should be under an obligation to proactively publish 
and disseminate widely information of significant public interest, subject only to 
reasonable limits based on resources and capacity, and that the law should establish 
 
42 FoIA 2011 s 2 
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both a general obligation to publish and key categories of information that must be 
published including operational information about how the public body functions, 
including objectives, organizational structures, standards, achievements, manuals, 
policies, procedures, rules, and key personnel; information on audited accounts, 
licenses, budgets, revenue, spending, subsidy programmes public procurement, and 
contracts; and that the information should be made available in open and machine 
readable formats when applicable, and without restrictions on its further use and 
publication.  
 
4.3.2 Data Reliability 
Apart from ensuring data access, it is critical that it is accurate and trustworthy data 
– there must be reliability of the data and the data sources. Thurston43 suggests that 
real openness must ultimately build upon a foundation of reliable, high quality 
source records that document government policies, activities and transactions. The 
anticipated benefits are only possible if the records from which the data are derived 
are complete and accurate. Data integrity is an issue in a lot of developing countries, 
and Nigeria is not different. As data is based on official government records, there is 
often scepticism about the quality of the data. In most government departments, 
even basic records management controls are not in place44. In environments where 
these controls are not in place, the records are likely to be incomplete, difficult to 
locate and sometimes impossible to authenticate. In fact, in the OAGF Annual 
Reports on FoI Compliance for the years 2015-2019, the MoJ consistently stated that 
one of the issues facing the implementation of the FoIA is 'lack of record keeping and 
systematic means of record management in a manner that facilitates public access’45.  
 
The potential of open government data within a horizontal accountability system 
can only be realised if there is a structure in place for accurately collecting the data, 
storing it, and accessing it. The relative success of open government data depends 
 
43 Anne Catherine Thurston, ‘Trustworthy Records and Open Data’, (2012) 8 The Journal of Community Informatics 2 
<http://ci-journal.org/index.php/ciej/article/view/951> accessed 4 November 2019  
44 Chinyeaka Justine Igbokwe-Ibeto, ‘Record Management in the Nigerian Public Sector and Freedom of Information Act’, 
(2013) 8 International Journal of Development and Management Review 1 
45 Federal Ministry of Justice (2015) Annual Report On The Implementation Of The Freedom Of Information (FoI) Act 2011 – 
Page 6; Federal Ministry of Justice (2016) Annual Report On The Implementation Of The Freedom Of Information (FoI) Act 
2011 – Page 5; Federal Ministry of Justice (2017) Annual Report On The Implementation Of The Freedom Of Information (FoI) 
Act 2011 – Page 7; Federal Ministry of Justice (2018) Annual Report On The Implementation Of The Freedom Of Information 
(FoI) Act 2011 – Page 5 - https://www.justice.gov.ng/index.php/fmoj-downloads/reports/fmoj-foia-annual-report 
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on governments’ ability to create and maintain reliable, trustworthy and accurate 
information (records and data). It is crucial to the process that there is a verifiable 
method for collating and gathering this data, where the data gathered is incomplete 
or misrepresented there is the chance that the data becomes ineffective and worse, 
misleading. The technical specifications for obtaining and storing data needs to be 
agreed upon at a country-wide/institutional level. An acceptable global standard for 
achieving data integrity and viability is the use of Trusted Digital repositories 
(TDRs)46 - TDRs are an internationally accepted, technology-neutral means of 
ensuring long-term access to digital records and datasets as assets and protecting 
their integrity, completeness, trustworthiness and traceability. They can be created 
to capture and provide access to authentic data and digital records; link active and 
inactive datasets to hard copy or digital records that provide context; etc. If a 
country implementing open government data has a TDR, it builds a level of trust and 
confidence in the records and the data regarding the completeness and the fact that 
they have not been compromised.  
 
Apart from the use of TDRs, what is fast becoming the world-wide standard for data 
standards for public data generally, and for public procurement particularly is the 
Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS). The OCDS enables disclosure of data and 
documents at all stages of the contracting process by defining a common data model. 
It was created by the Open Contracting Partnership47 to support organizations to 
increase contracting transparency and allow deeper analysis of contracting data by 
a wide range of users. In Nigeria, a civil society group - the Public and Private 
Development Centre (PPDC) is actively involved in promoting open contracting 
through its project - ‘Budeshi’48, which means ‘open it’ in the Hausa language, is 
aimed at exposing the processes of public service delivery to public scrutiny. The 
project promotes open contracting by requiring that data from budget to 
procurement are structured and their various stages linked to the intended public 
service delivery. Using the Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS), the PPDC has 
 
46 A trusted digital repository is one whose mission is to provide reliable, long-term access to managed digital resources to its 
designated community, now and in the future. There are different certifications for TDRs, however generally they all tend to 
assess things like organisation, management of the data, infrastructure, security, and audit processes. 
47 An independent not-for-profit created in 2015 and working in over 30 countries. That focuses on a drive for massively 
improved value for money, public integrity and service delivery by shifting public contracting from closed processes and 
masses of paperwork to digital services that are fair, efficient and ‘open-by-design’. 
48 Budeshi < https://www.budeshi.ng/> last accessed 18 February 2020 
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recorded significant success by providing a single platform for obtaining 
information on public contracts across the 36 States of Nigeria. It currently has 
details of about 9,000 contracts, however it appears that the platform has not been 
updated since 2018 as there are no contracts for the entire 2019. 
 
In 2017, the BPP launched the Nigeria Open Contracting Portal (NOCOPO)49. 
NOCOPO is about opening up public procurement in Nigeria through increased 
disclosure of procurement information to all stakeholders with a view to ensuring 
improved transparency and competition, prevent corruption, enhance active citizen 
participation towards achieving better service delivery and improved ease of doing 
business in Nigeria. The portal publishes procurement records and information on 
all stages of the procurement process, from planning through advertisement, 
tendering and award. Through the portal, Ministries, Departments and Agencies 
(MDAs) are able to submit their procurement plans and records to include 
information such as project title, cost, name of vendor, procurement method, project 
location, and implementation status. The two crucial features on the portal are the 
contract administration and citizen feedback. The portal won a global innovation 
award in 2017 organized by the Open Contracting Partnership and Open Data 
Institute. These innovations and projects show that Nigeria is already on the right 
path to ensuring data reliability, however, it is important that these innovations and 
projects are sustained. For instance, the NOCOPO portal is yet to get the requisite 
engagement from most MDAs as the information on the portal is not yet all 
encompassing. 
 
Apart from the issue of accurately collected information, there is also the issue of 
proper storage which prevents data from being easily manipulated, fragmented, or 
lost. The danger in having incorrect data is arguably even worse than not having the 
data at all, as it could lead to inaccurate information upon which decisions and 
policies are made. Thurston argues that once citizens doubt the reliability of the 
data, the goal of openness and trust in government are undermined. Even where the 
record management system is digital, the risk also exists, and in some cases is even 
more pronounced. The risk is that in the digital environment, if records are not 
 
49 Bureau of Public Procurement – NOCOPO < http://nocopo.bpp.gov.ng/> 
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managed professionally, their availability and integrity, as an authoritative source 
for open data initiatives, can be compromised. Issues such as migration to new 
software, storage in multiple electronic locations, inaccurate metadata etc. are all 
issues which arise when the data being stored, and access is digital.  
 
 In Nigeria, the National Archives is responsible for managing government data. The 
National Archives Act50 makes provision for the preservation and management of 
all categories of records – public, private, individual and business. The Act provides 
that every public office shall designate an officer to be the departmental records 
management officer who shall have as his function (among others), the planning, 
development and organisation of records management programme for that office 
and shall apply tested standards, procedures, and techniques, in all 
matters relating to record making and record keeping, records preservation and 
protection etc. Abioye51 in his research on the state of the archives administration 
in Nigeria says it best when he states that the National Archives role in taking the 
lead and setting the standard in proper records management in Nigeria has been 
lacking, and in the light of advances in technology and the important role which 
public data has in the world today, the National Archives needs to play a bigger role 
in setting standards across public offices, and ensuring consistency and uniformity. 
The trustworthiness and integrity of the data gathering and retention process 
currently in Nigeria would need to be addressed in order for open government data 
to effectively be implemented to tackle the transparency issue. A system where the 
data cannot be trusted is not one upon which meaningful transparency and 
accountability solutions can be built. 
 
The Global Open Data Index– an annual global benchmark for publication of open 
government data, which is run by the Open Knowledge Network52, measures the 
openness of government data, and in its most recent report53 it ranked the following 
countries as joint first place in openness of the procurement system – Australia, 
Canada, Colombia, Hong Kong, Mexico, Paraguay, Singapore, Slovakia, Taiwan, and 
 
50 Cap. N6. LFN.2004. 
51 Abiola Abioye, ‘Fifty years of archives administration in Nigeria: lessons for the future’, (2007) 17 Records Management 
Journal, 1, pp.52-62 
52The Open Knowledge Network < https://okfn.org/> accessed 4 November 2019  
53 Global Open Data Index 2016/17  <https://index.okfn.org/dataset/procurement/> accessed 4 November 2019  
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Uruguay. The key features of the open government data procurement platforms of 
all these countries being – the information is openly-licensed, is available in open 
and machine-readable format, is downloadable at once, is up to date, is publicly 
available, and finally is available free of charge.  The Nigerian government could 
therefore use these key features as goals to work towards when implementing open 
government data. It presents a well thought out and structured plan which links 
enabling laws with data and reporting standards, as this is critical for any serious 
open government data implementation to be successful. 
 
4.3.3 Data Protection 
The final critical issue that needs to be discussed as regards open government data 
implementation is the issue of data protection. Data protection is an important 
component of any successful open government data implementation because it is 
the shield that exists to protect individuals whose data has been gathered, from 
being exploited under the guise of open government data. One of the key issues faced 
in trying to implement open government data in Nigeria is the fact that Nigeria does 
not have any overarching privacy legislation, Nigeria sits within the 43% of the 
world which does not have any active legislation on Data Protection54. Therefore, it 
is imperative in a country which wants to implement open government data that the 
appropriate safeguards be in place to protect the privacy and data of individuals. 
The appropriate safeguards would include putting in place measures to protect the 
privacy and personal information of individuals. In Nigeria, comprehensive data 
protection legislation at a Federal level has not yet been enacted — even as several 
government and private organisations routinely collect and process personal data, 
including compulsory biometric information. Instead, the existing regulatory 
frameworks that apply to personal data protection are from the very widely worded 
provisions of the 1999 Constitution. Under the Nigerian 1999 Constitution, the right 
to the privacy of the citizen is enshrined. The Constitution provides that ‘…the 
privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and 
telegraphic communications is hereby guaranteed and protected.’ The provision of 
Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution is the only over-arching piece of legislation 
 
54 ‘Data Protection and Legislation Worldwide’, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
<https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI_and_ICTs/ICT4D-Legislation/eCom-Data-Protection-Laws.aspx > accessed 4 
November 2019 
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which deals with privacy of data.  In addition to the constitutional provision on the 
right to privacy, the National Information Technology Development Agency 
(NITDA) which is statutorily mandated by the NITDA Act 200755 to, inter alia: 
develop regulations for electronic governance and monitor the use of electronic data 
interchange and other forms of electronic communication transactions as an 
alternative to paper-based methods in government, commerce, education, the 
private and public sectors, labour and other fields, where the use of electronic 
communication may improve the exchange of data and information; enacted the 
Nigeria Data Protection Regulations (NDPR) 2019 to safeguard the rights of natural 
persons to data privacy through the safeguards afforded by a just and equitable legal 
regulatory framework on data protection in tune with global best practices. The 
NDPR has certain governing principles including ensuring that personal data is 
collected and processed in accordance with specific, legitimate and lawful purpose 
consented to by the Data Subject. It classifies lawful processing as including 
processing which is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the 
data controller is subject, and also processing which is necessary for the 
performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
public mandate vested in the data controller. Therefore, the activities of public 
procurement officials would be under the purview of the NDPR. 
 
In chapter two, suggestions were made as regards the publication of assets 
disclosures by public officials, and the publication of company ownership 
information. Both suggestions have data privacy implications, and it is therefore 
important that the necessary laws exist to protect the privacy of the individuals 
concerned. A paramount requirement should be that the data subject has the right 
to object to the data being made public, and there should be a process for the review 
of such requests, with preferably an independent and specialised body like an 
Ombudsman that can review these requests. Unfortunately, this is not present in the 
NDPR, as it only gives the right to an NITDA administrative redress panel with the 
power to investigate allegations of any breach of the provisions of the NDPR. It is 
therefore suggested that the OAGF can perform this function as it is the government 
agency which is entrusted with the implementation of the FoIA, and as one of the 
 
55 NITDA Act 2007 s 6 
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goals of the FoIA is ensuring public access to information, the privacy of the 
individuals whose data is made public is a consequence of that goal, and therefore 
under the ambit of the legislation. 
 
In conclusion therefore, if the issues of data access, data reliability, and data 
protection can be addressed, it creates a solid foundation for the introduction of 
open government data into the public procurement process in Nigeria, and thereby 
solving the first half of the equation in trying to improve horizontal accountability. 
 
4.3.4 Potential Effect of Improved Transparency by Default 
If a strong transparency by default process as discussed above is achieved in the 
public procurement process in Nigeria, then this would solve some of the loopholes 
which have been identified in the Nigerian public procurement process.  In chapter 
two while discussing the many loopholes of the public procurement process in 
Nigeria, we discussed that one of the areas which created a loophole was with 
respect to the disclosure of assets of public officials which have to be mandatorily 
declared but are not made public. The publication of the information is critical to 
ensuring transparency in the asset declaration process, since the information is then 
made available by default, without the need for people to make a request for it. 
Making the information transparent by default is an important tool for horizontal 
accountability, as it provides the information necessary for members of the public 
to be able to check if certain public officials have an existing conflict of interest 
during a procurement process. Currently, the Code of Conduct Bureau has the task 
of receiving and verifying all the information provided in asset disclosure forms, it 
cannot be expected to be able to house and verify all this information, even if it has 
a robust verification system in place. Making this information public would serve as 
a sort of pooled investigation and verification effort allowing concerned members 
of the public who are pro-active about conflict of interest and corruption issues to 
be able to verify this information, and also to be able to run conflict of interest checks 
on government contracts awarded. This is a form of transparency by default which 
would enhance horizontal accountability within the public procurement process. 
However, the point should be made here that there are privacy concerns with 
respect to making this information public, and a system that adopted open 
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publication of this information would have to address those concerns, these 
concerns are discussed in some more detail at the end of this chapter.  
 
Also discussed in chapter two was the issue of opacity in the company ownership 
register controlled by the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). Currently, 
in order to access company ownership information there must be an official request 
for the information (at a cost), and this process sometimes takes several days. If this 
system was made transparent by default, members of the public would be able to 
easily crosscheck information on owners of companies making public procurement 
contract bids, with information on the public officials who are in charge of the 
procurement bids, in order to ensure that there is no conflict of interest. As with 
making information on asset disclosure public, this is a proactive method of 
ensuring that there is more compliance with conflict of interest rules and laws, as 
public officials and/or contractors know that they are unable to hide conflicts of 
interest links behind the corporate personality of a company. The information 
currently made available online by the CAC is not sufficient from a transparency 
perspective, and therefore the recommendation would be to make the information 
about ownership of companies’ public and available without restrictions. This 
would be similar to the process in the United Kingdom where online searches can 
be made on the Companies House website56 to get information about the registered 
address and date of incorporation, current and resigned officers, document images, 
mortgage charge data, previous company names, insolvency information etc.  
 
To achieve this, the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act would have to be 
amended to include the provision that companies registers be made public. It is 
critical that this information be made public in order for the recommendation of 
mandatory publication of income and assets declaration to work, because if made 
public, searches can be made against the names of public officials on the companies 
register to identify any companies in which they have an undeclared interest in. The 
open companies register therefore would serve as a complement to the open public 
officials’ assets disclosure register, each portal helping to verify or interrogate the 
information in the other.  
 
56 Companies House <https://www.gov.uk/get-information-about-a-company> accessed 4 November 2019  
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It should be noted that Nigeria is currently a member of the Open Government 
Partnership (OGP)57 and under its current Action Plan58, it has committed to 
establish a Public Central Register of Beneficial Owners of companies59 . If this is 
achieved, this would go a long way to addressing the loopholes identified in this 
section. As with making public officials asset disclosures public, the likely argument 
against this would be the issue of privacy, and this will be discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter.  
 
In applying the TAM to both the issue of publication of asset disclosure information 
and companies registers, we can see that these processes currently have 
transparency by request and low legal empowerment. Therefore, both accountability 
systems are currently of declaratory accountability, and in order to improve 
accountability, we would need to improve the access to information. The suggestion 
therefore is to increase access to information by implementing transparency by 
default, and thereby make both systems – transparent by default and low legal 
empowerment which would then lead to conditional accountability based on the 
TAM.  
 
Another loophole which we analysed was the fact that under the current framework 
of procurement methods in Nigeria, single/sole source procurement was permitted 
in certain circumstances60, and that the lack of sufficient oversight over the single 
source procurement process created transparency and accountability risks and 
therefore a loophole within the system leading to issues like contract splitting  and 
dubious procurement awards. The method of accountability here is primarily 
vertical accountability, with accountability safeguards like the fact that when 
emergency procurement is used, this needs to be ratified by the BPP (where above 
the threshold)61. From a horizontal accountability perspective, the observers and 
the bidders, are completely excluded from the accountability process as they do not 
have any visibility on the contracting process, since bidding is not carried out. In 
 
57 The Open Government Partnership is a multilateral initiative founded in 2011 that aims to secure concrete commitments 
from national and subnational governments to promote open government, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness 
new technologies to strengthen governance. It currently has 79 members 
58 Nigeria Action Plan 2019-2021 <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/nigeria-action-plan-2019-2021/> 
59 Commitment 6 Nigeria Action Plan 2019-2021. 
60 PPA 2007 s 41-43 
61 PPA 2007 s 43(4) 
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applying the TAM, we can see that this process has transparency by request and low 
legal empowerment. Therefore, the single source procurement system is currently 
one of declaratory accountability, and in order to improve accountability, there 
needs to be an improvement in the access to information. The suggestion therefore 
is to increase access to information by implementing transparency by default -  by 
ensuring the list of files containing applications for any contract, permit, grants, 
licenses or agreements and all  materials containing information relating to any 
grant or contract made by or between the institution and another public institution 
or private organization is published as mandated by section 2 of the FoIA. Such a 
move would mean that the accountability system would then be one of conditional 
accountability based on the TAM.  
 
Finally, it was also noted that the PPA did not specify the manner in which debriefs 
should be carried out, and this was therefore identified as one of the loopholes 
which existed in the procurement process in Nigeria. Currently debriefs have to be 
requested by the losing bidders, and so it is a system of transparency by request with 
high legal empowerment therefore, based on the TAM this is a process that has 
conditional accountability. In order to move to a process of full accountability 
therefore, the system would have to operate one where transparency is by default. 
If the record of proceedings of all bids were to be made available through open 
government data, as is mandated in the FoIA62 which mandates the publication of a 
description of documents containing final opinions including concurring and 
dissenting opinions as well as orders made in the adjudication of cases, which can 
be interpreted to include decisions on procurement awards, then this would achieve 
transparency by default, and full accountability. 
 
The next sections will discuss some of the concerns that arise within the access to 
information debate, specifically around transparency by default. Two of the biggest 
concerns which transparency by default in the public procurement process raises 
are – a challenge on privacy rights, and a challenge on commercial confidentiality. 
 
 
62 FoIA 2011 s 2(3)(c) 
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4.4 Privacy Concerns with enhanced Access to Information  
The first, and arguably the most important, issue which arises when attempting to 
implement enhanced access to information is the issue of privacy. When government 
collects data, they collect data about the citizens, and this data often involves 
personal and private information. Scassa63 identifies three broad privacy challenges 
raised by open government - the first is how to balance privacy with transparency 
and accountability in the context of “public” personal information, the second flows 
from the disruption of traditional approaches to privacy based on a collapse of the 
distinctions between public and private sector actors, and the third challenge is that 
of the potential for open government data to contribute to the big data environment 
in which citizens and their activities are increasingly monitored and profiled.   
 
Generally, the legal framework for protecting privacy especially in a commercial 
context tend to be based on “control” models64 that permit individuals some latitude 
in choosing whether and to what extent their personal information will be collected, 
used or disclosed, however, in the public sector context individuals do not have 
these choices, they have fewer choices and can therefore not opt out of providing 
some personal information before accessing government services. It is this personal 
information that is collected that constitute the vast amount of data which the 
government has, and some of which the open government data advocates would like 
the government to make open. Therefore, because the citizens largely have less of a 
say in whether or not their data can be collected, the obligations on government to 
protect this data tends to be more onerous.  Scassa65 refers to this type of 
information as “public personal information” and defines it as information about 
identifiable individuals that is in the hands of government. In this discussion about 
privacy, two specific scenarios will be identified, the first will be privacy of 
information linked to company ownership, and the second will be privacy of 
information disclosed through mandatory asset disclosure by public officers, as 
these are the two specific suggestions on how access to information can improve 
 
63 Teresa Scassa, ‘Privacy and Open Government’ (2014) 6Future Internet, 2, p. 397  
64 Colin Bennett and Charles Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective, (Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology Press 2006)  
65n 53 
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horizontal accountability in the public procurement process in order to address the 
conflict of interest loopholes identified . 
 
4.4.1 Company Ownership Information  
The government through the company’s registry – the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC), is mandated to hold personal information about company 
ownership and shareholders. This information is not made public or open, but there 
is a process in place to make a formal application to access this information. This 
information is key from a transparency perspective in a public procurement context 
because it can give citizens visibility of the shareholders/directors of companies 
who are awarded or bidding for government contracts. In an era of open 
government, it may seem self-evident that such records and information on a public 
register like the Companies Registry should be made digitised and made available 
online as open government data, however, this has significant privacy concerns, 
digitised information can be rapidly copied, mined and matched, and can be used for 
a broad range of purposes which could be considered as invasive of privacy.  A 
recent ruling66 of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) further illustrates this 
complicated relationship between open data, public data, and privacy. In the case, a 
Finnish company Satakunnan Markkinapörssi (‘Markkinapörssi’) had each year 
collected public tax data from Finnish tax authorities for the purposes of publishing 
extracts from that data in regional editions of a newspaper called Veropörssi. The 
information published by the magazine included the full names of natural persons 
whose income exceeded certain thresholds in alphabetical order. Markkinapörssi 
further transferred the data published in the newspaper to Satamedia Oy 
(‘Satamedia’). Satamedia used the data to distribute data regarding individual 
persons to customers via a text-messaging system for a fee (about €2). The Finnish 
Data Protection Ombudsman received several complaints from natural persons 
accusing Markkinapörssi and Satamedia of infringing their right to privacy. 
Consequently, the Finnish Data Protection Ombudsman requested the other Finnish 
Data Protection Authority, the Finnish Data Protection Board, to prohibit the 
processing of personal data conducted by Markkinapörssi and Satamedia. The 
 
66 Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy C-73/07 
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decision made by the Finnish Data Protection Board was appealed against, and the 
case proceeded all the way to the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court which 
consequently referred it to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. 
 
The ECJ ruled that the way Markkinapörssi was processing public tax information 
was deemed to constitute the processing of personal data as defined in the European 
Union Data Protection Directive67  and that documents that include personal data 
and are in the public domain under national legislation, must be considered to 
constitute activities involving the processing of personal data carried out ‘solely for 
journalistic purposes’ as defined in Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive if the 
sole object of the activities is ‘the disclosure to the public of information, opinions 
or ideas’. The ECJ did not conclude whether the processing in question fulfilled these 
criteria but decided that it was a matter for the national court to determine. The ECJ 
was further of the opinion that the consideration of activities undertaken ‘solely for 
journalistic purposes’ is not dependent on whether the object is profit-making or 
not, nor the medium which is used to transmit the data. The Finnish Supreme Court 
ended up ruling that the processing was not carried out for solely journalistic 
purposes as qualified by the ECJ and that the processing conducted by either  
Markkinapörssi or Satamedia was not allowed on the basis of the national Personal 
Data Act. Therefore, the mere fact that the data in question was public, did not 
constitute a right for the recipient to use this data for all types of purposes or to 
neglect the rules set out in the applicable data protection legislation.  
 
This Finnish case is important because it illustrates how public personal 
information could be used in ways which a number of owners of the information 
would not be inclined to have their data used. In the context of Nigerian public 
procurement, if open government data with respect to company ownership were to 
be fully implemented, an individual or member of the public could theoretically 
obtain a list of all the companies which have been awarded government contracts 
within a specified time frame, and then based on publicly available information 
would be able, via the Company’s Registry, to compile the list of all the shareholders 
in those companies, match the data together and write an article – ‘The Top 100 
 
67 95/46/EC 
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Nigerians profiting from Government Contracts’, thereby sharing information which 
has wide reaching privacy implications. The point being made here is not a value-
based judgment on whether such data use would be good or bad (most likely if the 
data supported a theory that certain usual suspects were being awarded contracts 
then it would generally be viewed as a good thing as it would put the contracts under 
more scrutiny). However, the issue is that the data clearly shows the private 
information of the citizens and once made available, could potentially be used for 
other purposes once the data is mapped68. Using the same scenario, we can imagine 
a situation where that same data is then used as data for profiling for potential 
criminals trying to choose wealthy targets. The latter potential is not mere idle 
speculation, in a recent article69 the authors describe a scenario where open data 
can be used by unscrupulous individuals to perpetrate fraud and scams by the use 
of social engineering, data analysis, knowledge discovery and data visualization. It 
lays out the exact technology that can be used for this, and how the data could be 
processed and converted for nefarious purposes. 
 
In order to solve the privacy and open data conundrum, the first step is to ensure 
that an adequate data protection system is in place before one can consider moving 
towards a system of open government data. As can be seen from the Finnish case, 
references were made to the European Union Data Protection Directive, the Finnish 
Data Protection Act, the Finnish Data Protection Ombudsman and the Finnish Data 
Protection Authority. Having a system in place where complaints about data 
protection can be submitted, reviewed and adjudicated on not only ensures that an 
adequate system exists but would also serve to build up the requisite national 
jurisprudence on data protection issues.  
 
 
68 In the USA, a local newspaper paper based in New York published the names and addresses of handgun permit holders — a 
total of 33,614 — in two suburban counties, Westchester and Rockland, and put maps of their locations online. The maps, 
which appeared with the article “The Gun Owner Next Door: What You Don’t Know About the Weapons in Your Neighborhood,” 
received more than one million views on the Web site of newspaper, the article, which left gun owners feeling vulnerable to 
harassment or break-ins, also drew outrage from across the country. The newspaper received threatening calls and e-mails 
and the paper had to hire armed guards to monitor the newspaper’s headquarters, some of their reporters received notes 
saying they would be shot on the way to their cars; bloggers encouraged people to steal credit card information of Journal 
News employees and other forms of intimidation and harassment. The paper published the data taken from publicly available 
records of people with local gun permit data. The data was obtained via multiple requests for public and then subsequently 
used in data mapping software to provide street numbers. – Christine Haughney, ‘After Pinpointing Gun Owners, Paper is a 
Target’, (New York Times, 6 January 2013) < https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/nyregion/after-pinpointing-gun-
owners-journal-news-is-a-target.html> accessed 4 November 2019  
69 Matteo Mauri, Alessio Mulas, Davide Ariu, ‘The Dark Side of Open Data’ <http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1748/paper-19.pdf> 
accessed 4 November 2019 
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4.4.2 Public Officer Asset Disclosure 
The issue of privacy also arises in the conversation about whether assets disclosed 
by public officials should be made public, or whether making this information 
publicly available would be an infringement of privacy rights. A recent World Bank 
study70, found that in the one hundred and six (106) countries in which the World 
Bank works which require some form of asset disclosure, a third of them require 
public disclosure, and two-thirds require disclosure only to a government agency. 
Nigeria is one of those countries where the requirement is not for public disclosure, 
but one for disclosure to a government agency – the Code of Conduct Bureau.  
 
In Legal Defence & Assistance Project (Gte) Ltd. V. Clerk of the National Assembly of 
Nigeria71 , a case where the issue was about whether the salary of a public officer is 
protected by the right to privacy - the Legal Defence & Assistance Project (LEDAP) 
applied to the National Assembly of Nigeria (NAN) for information “on details of 
salaries, emolument, and allowances paid to the Honourable Members of 
Representatives and Distinguished Senators, both of the 6th Assembly, from June 
2007 to May 2011”. The NAN did not respond to the request, prompting LEDAP to 
file a lawsuit in the Federal High Court. The NAN argued that the information 
constituted personal information that was exempted under Section 14 of the FoIA. 
The Federal High Court after reviewing argument, concluded that LEDAP “did not 
request any of the personal information relating to the Honourable Members, but 
simply what was paid to them while they were in service from the public fund,” and 
that such information was “not among those exempted” under Section 14(1) of the 
Freedom of Information Act and so the information should be released. Also, in 
Uzoegwu F.O.C. Esq v. Central Bank of Nigeria & Attorney-General of the Federation72 
, the Plaintiff requested from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) information 
regarding “the amount payable to the Governor, Deputy Governor and Directors of 
the CBN as monthly salary”. The CBN did not reply, although the Director of Finance 
at the CBN had acknowledged receipt of the request. One month later, Uzoegwu sued 
 
70 Aisuluu Aitbaeva, Daniel Barnes, Tammar Berger, Lissa Betzieche, Ruxandra Burdescu, Alexandra Habershon, Thomas 
Iverson, Modest Kwapinski, Massimo Mastruzzi, Hari Mulukutla, Yousef Nasrallah, Chiara Rocha, Susana Simonyan, Stephanie 
Trapnell, Income And Asset Disclosure: Case Study Illustrations, (World Bank 2013)  
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/664561468340842190/Income-and-asset-disclosure-case-study-
illustrations> accessed 4 November 2019  
71 FHC/ABJ./CS/805/2011 
72 FHC/ABJ./CS/1016/2011 
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for access to this information, the Defendants responded by arguing that the 
requested information was “personal information which was communicated [to the 
officers] upon their appointments” at the CBN” and that “the information is 
protected by trade and commercial secrets. The issue before the Court was whether 
the requested information regarding the salaries of high-level officials of the CBN 
qualified as “personal information” under Section 14(1) of the Act. The Court held 
that by the wording of Section 14(3) of the Act, the “legislature clearly intended that 
the public interest [be] placed above all else, including the personal interest of the 
individuals”. The Court therefore ordered disclosure of the information about the 
salaries of CBN officials. 
 
In a similar case of Wypych v. Poland,73 wherein the issue of whether the salary of a 
public official was private, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rejected the 
complaint of a local council member in Poland who refused to submit his asset 
declaration claiming that the obligation to disclose details concerning his financial 
situation and property portfolio imposed by legislation was in breach of Article 8 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights, which provides a right to respect for 
one's "private and family life, his home and his correspondence". The ECHR found 
that the requirement to submit the declaration and its online publication were 
indeed an interference with the right to privacy, but that it was justified and the 
comprehensive scope of the information to be submitted was not found to be 
excessively burdensome. The Court “considers that it is precisely this comprehensive 
character which makes it realistic to assume that the impugned provisions will meet 
their objective of giving the public a reasonably exhaustive picture of councilors’ 
financial positions ... that the additional obligation to submit information on property, 
including marital property, can be said to be reasonable in that it is designed to 
discourage attempts to conceal assets simply by acquiring them using the name of a 
councillor’s spouse.” The ECHR also endorsed the publication and internet access to 
declarations arguing that “the general public has a legitimate interest in ascertaining 
that local politics are transparent and Internet access to the declarations makes 
access to such information effective and easy. Without such access, the obligation 
 
73 (October 25, 2005, application no. 2428/05), <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-71236%22]}>  
accessed 4 November 2019 
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would have no practical importance or genuine incidence on the degree to which 
the public is informed about the political process.”  
 
This ECHR case therefore illustrates the fact that the ECHR has admitted that while 
making IADs public might prima facie be an interference of the right to privacy, 
however it is a violation which is justified74. Nigeria has a similar process with 
regard to its jurisprudence on human rights, as discussed above the right to privacy 
is guaranteed by the S.37 of the 1999 Constitution, however, S. 45 provides that 
‘..nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall invalidate any law 
that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society (a) in the interest of defence, 
public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or (b) for the purpose of 
protecting the rights and freedom or other persons…’, the 1999 Constitution therefore 
has a provision which allows for justifiable interference with the fundamental 
rights, similar to the position with the European Charter on Human Rights. 
 
Applying the reasoning of the court in the above Nigerian cases and the ECHR case 
(which is included as a persuasive authority), it is suggested that if the details of the 
salaries of the public officers in an Agency was to be made public data, and the 
argument of the privacy of these individuals were to be raised, it is unlikely that the 
argument would be upheld in a Nigerian court, as breaching privacy, and in the 
event it were upheld as breaching privacy, it is extremely likely that such a violation 
of the right to privacy would be permitted on the ground that it is a justifiable 
interference, however this would be based on the circumstances of the case75. It can 
be further argued that the judicial reasoning in the above two Nigerian cases mirror 
the position of the FoIA, where it states76 that a public institution shall cause to be 
 
74 The right to privacy is guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR as the right to respect for private and family life, home and 
correspondence, and is what is known as a ‘qualified right’. It may be subject to limitation on one or more of the following 
grounds:  national security; public safety; the economic well-being of the country; the prevention of disorder or crime; the 
protection of health or morals; and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
75 The discussion on Asset declaration in Nigeria by public officials was recently brought to the front burner of national 
discourse when the Senate President of the Nigerian National Assembly (the nation’s number 3 public official)- Senator Bukola 
Saraki, was charged by the CCB with false declaration of assets among other things, the matter went all the way to the Nigerian 
Supreme Court75 which threw out the charges. In another case the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria - Justice Walter 
Onnoghen was suspended and is being prosecuted by the Code of Conduct Tribunal for failing to declare his assets as 
prescribed by the law, as well as operated foreign bank accounts in contravention of the code of conduct for public officials. 
Both these cases brought against the heads of 2 of the arms of Government in Nigeria – the Legislature and the Judiciary, show 
just how pervasive the issue of failing to declare assets, is in Nigeria and only further solidifies the reasoning that if this 
information was made open, there would be transparency to know which government officials have not complied with these 
directives, and therefore would be a tool in driving accountability. 
76 FoIA 2011 s 2(3)(c)(vi) 
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published the names, salaries, titles and dates of employment of all employees and 
officers of the institution. Therefore, it is quite clear that information about the 
names and salaries of employees of public institutions, does not constitute personal 
information which is subject to protection as private information. 
 
4.5 Commercial Confidentiality and enhanced Access to Information  
Apart from the privacy argument, another argument which is frequently brought up 
against open government data in the contracting process is the fact that introducing 
complete open government data would provide details of the contracts awarded by 
these agencies, and making it public would potentially breach commercial 
confidentiality, and could therefore adversely affect the financial/economic 
interests of private parties. The crux of the arguments against disclosure which are 
made here is that there is commercially sensitive information in contracting 
documents and so they can’t be disclosed, in situations like this there would be the 
need to actually determine the existence of commercially sensitive information.  
 
The Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner in Canada77 provides some 
persuasive guidance on how to deal with these issues, it states that in proving the 
existence of legitimate commercially sensitive information, there must be a clear 
cause and effect relationship between the disclosure and the alleged harm, the harm 
must be more than trivial, and the likelihood of harm must be genuine and 
conceivable78. If indeed the information is determined to be commercially sensitive, 
then a way to cater for this would be to undertake minimal redaction of the 
commercially sensitive information before it is made public. Some countries 
including the United Kingdom and Australia insist that where redaction is carried 
out, the government agency needs to indicate and provide reasons for why the 
information was redacted. 
 
The Article 19 three stage test discussed earlier in this Chapter is also quite 
illustrative as it suggests the three-part test in determining whether commercial 
 
77 Canada is ranked joint first in the Open Data Barometer - https://opendatabarometer.org/?_year=2017&indicator=ODB ; 
and the Global Open Data Index - https://index.okfn.org/dataset/procurement/  
78 Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, Canada. (2016) Business Interests of a Third Party 
<www.oipc.nl.ca/pdfs/Section_39_Revised_Guidance_Document.pdf> accessed 12 March 2019 
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information should be disclosed. As commercial information is a legitimate aim, the 
next step is to determine whether substantial harm will be done to that aim, and 
then finally to determine whether there is an overriding public interest in disclosing 
that information.  
 
The Nigerian general process is a two-part test79, which is to determine if there is a 
legitimate aim, and after which to determine whether there is an overriding public 
interest for the information to be disclosed. However, the FoIA has a more specific 
provision for the disclosure of trade secrets or commercial information, it 
provides80 that a public institution shall deny an application for information that 
contains trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a 
person or business where such trade secrets or information are proprietary, 
privileged or confidential, or where disclosure of such trade secrets or information 
may cause harm to the interests of the third party, information the disclosure of 
which could reasonably be expected to interfere with the contractual or other 
negotiations of a third party; and proposal and bids for any contract, grants, or 
agreement, including information which if it were disclosed would frustrate 
procurement or give an advantage to any person, however a public institution shall 
disclose the information if that disclosure would be in the public interest as it relates 
to public health, public safety or protection of the environment and, if the public 
interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain 
to, or prejudice to the competitive position of or interference with contractual or 
other negotiation of a third party.  
 
It would seem that the FoIA legislative protection on trade secrets and confidential 
information has a three-part test, the second part includes harm to the interests of 
the third party. The FoIA therefore states that mere harm would be sufficient, it does 
not have to be substantial harm. Apart from harm to third party interests, another 
limiter stated in the FoIA is if the disclosure would interfere with contractual or other 
negotiations of a third party. The introduction of a three-part test at first glance 
would seem to suggest an improvement on the two-part test as contained in the rest 
 
79 FoIA 2011 s 12 
80 FoIA 2011 s 15 
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of the FoIA concerning other legitimate aims, but the reasons for refusal of 
disclosure seem to undermine access to information as only harm needs to be 
shown, and only some measure of interference with negotiations need be shown, 
these are arguably very flimsy grounds on which access to information may be 
denied on the grounds of commercial confidentiality. 
 
In Nigeria the issue of how to balance the need for transparency and the need to 
protect commercially sensitive information has been tested in the courts in the 
context of a Freedom of Information request. In Public & Private Development Centre 
v. Power Holding Company of Nigeria & The Honourable Attorney-General of the 
Federation81 the Public & Private Development Centre Ltd. (PPDC) requested 
information from the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) regarding the 
award of a contract for the supply and installation of 300 power units in several 
Nigerian cities. Among the requested items were a procurement plan for the project, 
the bidding documents issued to all interested bidders on the project, a list of all 
contractors that submitted bids, a copy of the bid evaluation, the minutes of the 
board meeting where the winning bids were approved, and copies of final contract 
award documents. The PHCN refused to furnish the requested information, 
prompting the PPDC to bring suit. The PHCN argued that the requested information 
fell under Section 15(1)(b) of the FoIA which allows public institutions to “deny an 
application for information that contains information the disclosure of which could 
reasonably be expected to interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of a 
third party”, and that since the bid evaluation report involved contractual 
information between the PHCN and the third party company who won the contract, 
the PHCN claimed it would be an injustice to the third party contractor and a breach 
of the privity of contract doctrine to grant PPDC’s request for information. The court 
considered the Section 15(1)(b) argument, and it outlined the three conditions 
which must be concurrently present for a public institution to deny a request for 
information on these grounds:  (1) the transaction must still be at the negotiation 
stage, (2) a third party must be involved, and (3) the disclosure of the information must 
reasonably be expected to interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of a 
third party. The Court found that the first condition had not been met; and even if 
 
81 FHC/ABJ/CS/582/2012 
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the transaction had been at the negotiation stage at the time of PPDC’s request, the 
third condition also would not have been met. The court therefore ordered the PHCN 
to produce the requested information. 
 
In another case, Public & Private Development Centre v. The Hon. Minister of The FCT 
& The Secretary, FCT Transport Secretariat82, the Court held that for exemption 
under Section 15 (1)(a) Freedom of Information Act, 2011 to apply, it must be 
shown that the information contains trade secrets or commercial and financial 
information which must be proprietary, privileged or confidential; that the 
information is in the possession of a third party and that the disclosure of such 
information may cause harm to the interest of the third party.  
 
Therefore, a reading of the decisions in the above cases shows that making 
contractual procurement information available as part of open government data is 
not an absolute fiat to release any and all information, and the law already has in 
place certain safeguards to protect commercially sensitive information. However, in 
order for contractors to assert this right, there is a high bar which they will need to 
scale, specifically the transaction must still be at negotiation stage, and the 
disclosure must be reasonably expected to interfere with the negotiation of a third 
party, the information contains trade secrets and actually commercially sensitive 
information, and most importantly that the publication of this information may 
cause harm to the party’s interests.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter has advocated for the improvement of access to information as a way 
to enhance horizontal accountability. It highlighted the importance of the FoIA to 
transparency in the Nigerian public space, but also addressed the many issues which 
the application of the FoIA has had to contend with, which has limited its 
effectiveness. It suggests improvements in the transparency by request process 
(FoIA application process), and also advocates for a move from transparency by 
request to transparency by default (open government data).  It posits that in order 
 
82 FCT/HC/CV/M/3057/13 
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for open government data to work effectively there has to be a legal/regulatory 
system which adequately addresses the key issues of data access, data reliability and 
data protection.  
 
The Chapter also addressed the critical issue of privacy and commercial 
confidentiality which are frequently used as reasons and arguments for the 
restriction of access to information. It discussed the issue of privacy and security 
concerns in the context of corporate ownership information and public officer asset 
disclosures, and used examples of cases from other jurisdictions to highlight how 
negative consequences have arisen, and then looked at what the approach of the 
courts in Nigeria has been with respect to those issues. 
 
The conclusion of the argument of this chapter is that in order for horizontal 
accountability to work as an effective corollary to vertical accountability, the issue 
of access to information is extremely critical, and access to information goes beyond 
just creating freedom of information legislation, as the experience in Nigeria as 
shown that the efficacy of a law is not only in its creation, but more importantly in 
its implementation. The implementation of the FoIA has left a lot to be desired, and 
in addressing those deficiencies in its implementation a lot of progress can be made 
in institutionalising an effective transparency by request regime. Ultimately 
however the ultimate goal should be introducing transparency by default through 
open government data, but this can only be effectively done where the relevant data 
access laws exist, the relevant data standards have been agreed upon which would 
ensure reliability, and the relevant legislation and institutions have been created to 
ensure privacy of data and protection of personal information and commercial 
confidentiality interests with the public interest being the paramount determiner.
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Chapter 5 - Improving Legal Empowerment  
 
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed the first half of the accountability equation in the 
Transparency and Accountability Matrix (TAM) – the issue of access to information 
and how transparency by request and transparency by default can aid the horizontal 
accountability process. In introducing the Transparency and Accountability Matrix, 
it was quite clear that access to information is but a part of the horizontal 
accountability  equation in order to achieve full accountability, and while access to 
information for the actors within the horizontal accountability system is essential, 
the other critical challenge of being able to use the information in order to achieve a 
legal solution still exists. 
 
In 2011, a legislation came into force in Slovakia1 which was focused on increasing 
active government transparency and openness. Under the new law, the government 
was required to publish almost all contracts, receipts and orders online, regardless 
of whether a citizen had made an active request for information. Most importantly, 
government contracts were not considered valid unless they were published within 
three months of being signed. After the portal was launched, there was a 25% 
increase in stories on procurement in the mainstream media, and an overall 
increase in the number of NGOs and scope of work undertaken by watchdog groups 
as a result of the legislation2.  Kunder3, from the Slovakian Fair Play Alliance, noted: 
“one lesson that we learned from publishing data … is that it is critical and totally 
important to have the state publish the data, but it is only one part of the success. The 
second part is that other institutions in the society and other aspects in the society need 
to work – judiciary, police and public pressure – and that is nowadays a bigger problem 
in Slovakia than the publishing of information.” 
 
1 Act No.546/2010 
2 Gabriel Sipos, Samuel Spac, and Martin Kollarik, ‘Not in Force Until Published Online: What the Radical Transparency Regime 
of Public Contracts Achieved in Slovakia’, (Transparency International Slovakia, 2015) http://transparency.sk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/Open-Contracts.pdf. accessed 4 November 2019 
3 Alexander Furnas, ‘Transparency Case Study: Public Procurement in the Slovak Republic’, (Sunlight Foundation Blog. August 
12, 2013) <http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/08/12/case-study-public-procurement-in-the-slovak-republic/> 
accessed 4 November 2019  
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Therefore, the experience in Slovakia apart from highlighting the benefits of open 
government data and transparency, is also illustrative of an important point, which 
is that transparency on its own is not enough, and the mere presence of 
transparency does not necessarily lead to accountability. In other words, effective 
freedom of information laws and open government data solves the access to 
information problem, but there has to be an accompanied similar increase in 
enforcement or institutional capacity to enforce accountability.  
 
For horizontal accountability to be carried out effectively, a key aspect of the 
implementation is to ensure that the other side of the accountability equation exists 
to be able to enforce the process. Therefore, this Chapter will look at the issues 
surrounding legal empowerment, how it can be enhanced, and the potential effect 
which an engaged group of actors with the right legal empowerment tools within a 
horizontal accountability process can work to improve accountability in the 
procurement process.  This chapter analyses the other half of the accountability 
equation – legal empowerment. The TAM states that there are two types of 
empowerment – low legal empowerment and high legal empowerment. Low legal 
empowerment is characterised by a system where the necessary legal framework, 
and remedies available to the person (the accountee) seeking to exercise 
accountability tools are either non-existent or have been severely hampered as to 
make their efficacy illusory, while one of high legal empowerment is where the 
accountee has all the necessary structure, reliefs, remedies and tools at their 
disposal in other to guarantee the effectiveness of the legal empowerment. This 
chapter therefore will focus on those issues within the public procurement process 
specifically, and within the wider Nigerian legal system framework more generally, 
which play a part in either improving or reducing the efficacy of the legal 
empowerment, and will identify how these issues interplay with the loopholes that 
currently exist in the process.  
 
5.2 Access to the Courts 
 In order to competently bring an action in court, a claimant has to show some 
special interest in the matter. This issue of proving interest in order to exercise some 
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legal right is one of the bedrocks of a legal system, as it ensures that only parties 
who have a genuine right/claim in a matter should be allowed to bring a case to 
court, as this would weed out meddlesome interlopers. This concept is known as 
locus standi, and the term denotes the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a 
court of law and it has been held in several cases to be the right or competence to 
initiate proceedings in a court of law for redress, or assertion of a right enforceable 
at law4. Locus standi focuses on the question of whether a party instituting or 
originating an action for remedies or judicial review is entitled to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court5.  
 
Locus standi in Nigeria, has its roots in English common law, and traditionally under 
the English common law, a person who approaches a court for relief is required to 
have an interest in the subject matter of the litigation in the sense of being 
personally adversely affected by the alleged wrong. The applicant/plaintiff must 
allege that his or her rights have been infringed. It is not enough for the 
applicant/plaintiff to allege that the defendant has infringed the rights of someone 
else, or that the defendant is acting contrary to the law and that it is in the public 
interest that the court grants relief. Thus, under the common law, a person could 
only approach a court of law if he or she had some special interest or had sustained 
some special damage greater than that sustained by an ordinary member of the 
public. The standard of interest to be shown for a declaratory order was stricter than 
the standard for prerogative remedies6, for non-prerogative remedies the applicant 
had to show that the declaration he/she sought related to a right that was personally 
vested in him/her and he had a ‘real interest’ at stake. This test was affirmed by the 
House of Lords in Gouret v Union of Post Office Workers7. In the Gouret case, the 
claimant sought an injunction to prevent the respondent Trade Union calling on its 
members to boycott mail to South Africa. In his pleadings he had not pleaded any 
special interests other than as a member of the public, and the House of Lords inter 
alia held that the action must fail as he had not proved any personal right or special 
 
4 Owodunni v Reg. Trustees of CCC (2000) 2 WRN 29; Ladejobi v Oguntayo (2004) 7 SC (Pt. 10 159 at 170; Sunday v INEC 
[2008] 33 WRN 141 at 164. 
5 Oyelowo Oyewo, 'Locus Standi and Administrative Law in Nigeria: Need for Clarity of Approach by The Courts' [2016] 3 
International Journal of Scientific Research and Innovative Technology 1 78-99 
6 Prohibiting, quashing and mandatory orders are prerogative remedies 
7 [1978] AC 435 
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damage. The court applied the principle laid down in Boyce v Paddington Borough 
Council8 that a private plaintiff has locus standi to sue for an injunctive relief in 
respect of a matter of public import only where (1) the interference with the public 
right also involves an interference with his private rights; or where (2) the 
impugned action causes him "special damage”. In 1978, England reformed its 
procedural rules on the requirement for standing9, now all prerogative remedies 
and declaration can be obtained under a single procedure with a unified standing 
requirement which is that the applicant must show a ‘sufficient interest’. 
Therefore, in the subsequent case of R v I.R.C. ex parte National Federation of Self-
Employed and Small Businesses10, the House of Lords applied this test.   
 
In Nigeria, the position has changed as well, and the test which is adopted is the 
sufficient interest test, as set out in the relevant court procedure rules11. Therefore, 
in order for an accountee to bring an action in the courts, the sufficient interest test 
will need to be met. The import of this position of the courts on locus standi is that 
a member of the public who wants to bring an action for a public procurement issue 
e.g. contesting a contract award, would have to show that he/she has sufficient 
interest in the matter. Members of the public looking to exercise their accountability 
rights would therefore have to consider this. For observers within the process or 
NGOs, this sufficient interest threshold would likely be met if they can show that 
they have been registered as civil society organisations created to ensure 
transparency and accountability within the procurement process, and in many 
cases, the courts have allowed such actions by civil society organisations12. 
 
Apart from the right to be able to bring an action in court, also important is the legal 
process for it. The accountability process and the process through which actors in 
the accountability framework can bring an action to enforce accountability is an 
important determiner of whether or not a system has low or high legal 
 
8 1903 1 Ch 109 (at 114) 
9 It was done through Ordinace 53 rule 3(7) that was incorporated in what was previously the Supreme Court Act 1981, but 
renamed the Senior Courts Act 1981, s.31(3) 
10 [1982] AC 617 
11 Federal High Court Civil Procedure rule 
12 PPDC v. FCT Minister & FCT Transport Secretariat FCT/HC/CV/M/3057/13; PPDC v. PHCN & AG Federation 
FHC/ABJ/CS/582/2012; LEDAP. v Clerk of the National Assembly of Nigeria FHC/ABJ/CS/805/2011 
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empowerment.  The bid review process under the PPA was identified in chapter two 
as one of the loopholes existing with the public procurement process in Nigeria. In 
actual fact, this loophole is one which has a direct effect on the efficacy of legal 
empowerment under the accountability framework. Under the provisions of the 
PPA, in order for legal proceedings to be initiated against the Bureau of Public 
Procurement (BPP), there are certain requirements which must be met13. A thirty-
day pre-action notice is required before an action notice can be commenced, 
however under the appellate powers of the Federal High Court they are mandated 
to hear appeals from bid review decisions of the BPP and this can only be done 
within thirty days of the BPP’s decision. The loophole identified therefore was that 
the wait period for appeals on BPP decisions, and the notice period for suits against 
the BPP seem to run concurrently, and the confusion with respect to the appropriate 
process to follow could lead to the disenfranchisement of the claimant.  
 
Section 14(1) provides – “Subject to the provisions of this Act, no suit shall be 
commenced against the Bureau before the expiration of 30 days after written notice 
of an intention to commence the suit shall have been served upon the Bureau by, the 
intending plaintiff or his agent…”. 
 
Section 54(7) which states – “…where the Bureau fails to render its decision within 
the stipulated time, or the bidder is not satisfied with decision of the Bureau, the bidder 
may appeal to the Federal-High Court within 30 days after the receipt of the decision 
of the Bureau, or expiration of the time stipulated for the Bureau to deliver a decision”. 
 
The literal application of Sections 14(1) and 54(7) of the PPA therefore raises the fear 
that it disenfranchises actors within the accountability framework, as on one hand 
they are required to wait thirty days before filing a suit, and on the other hand they 
must file an appeal within thirty days.  
 
Ordinarily, an assessment of the bid review process in the TAM should in theory 
result in one with conditional accountability, as there is transparency by request + 
high legal empowerment. However, the high legal empowerment in that process is 
 
13 PPA 2007 s 14 
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put in jeopardy by the uncertainty that is created by a literal application of the 
provisions of Sections 14(1) and 54(7) of the PPA. In order to ensure high legal 
empowerment however there is an argument that can be made to ensure that the 
conditional accountability is not made redundant, this is the fact that if the golden 
rule14 is used in the interpretation of the section 14(1), it shows that the thirty-day 
pre-action notice may not be the required in certain instances. The use of the words 
‘subject to’ presupposes that there are certain sections in the legislation which will 
take pre-eminence over the provisions of Section 14, and where there is a section 
that makes provisions contrary to section 14, that section will take pre-eminence, 
as section 14 is subject to it. Therefore, such an interpretation would mean that the 
provision of section 54(7) would take pre-eminence, and that would therefore mean 
that the bidder can bring a request for a review within thirty days of the decision (or 
lack thereof) without having to file a pre-action notice.  
 
The uncertainty discussed above therefore highlights a critical way in which a 
system which would be assumed to have high legal empowerment could still be 
ineffective and in actual fact could become one with low legal empowerment. 
Therefore, the relevant provisions of the PPA would benefit from an amendment to 
the section which clarifies the provision, a suggestion would be an amendment to 
section 14 to state thus: “Subject to the provisions of this Section 54(7) of this Act, no 
suit shall be commenced against the Bureau before the expiration of 30 days after 
written notice of an intention to commence the suit shall have been served upon the 
Bureau by, the intending plaintiff or his agent…”. 
 
5.3 Remedies 
In the context of the actors within the horizontal accountability framework of the 
public procurement process, the remedies available to the actors in the horizontal 
accountability process are essentially the tools which they use to ensure 
accountability. We will now review the available accountability remedies within the 
 
14 The golden rule is a rule of statutory interpretation which states that if the literal rule produces an absurdity, then the court 
should look for another meaning of the words to avoid that absurd result. The rule was closely defined by Lord Wensleydale 
in Grey v Pearson (1857) HL Cas 61 
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horizontal accountability framework in a public procurement process which are 
important to ensure high legal empowerment. 
 
5.3.1 Administrative Review of Contract Award 
When an actor in the horizontal accountability process alleges that there has been a 
breach of the procurement rules, or there has been some kind of malfeasance in the 
process, one of the potent tools used is to request that the award decision be 
reviewed. Where the reviewing authority agrees that there has been some breach of 
the rules, then the reviewing authority can order either the cancellation of the award 
or that the contract be re-awarded to another bidder. Under the PPA15, a bidder may 
seek administrative review for any omission or breach by a procuring or disposing 
entity. It further provides an appeal process that leads from the procuring authority 
to the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) and then finally the courts. 
 
Specifically, the process is that when a bidder wants to make what is termed a 
‘complaint’ against a procuring entity, the bidder shall first submit the complaint in 
writing to the accounting officer of the procuring entity, at this stage the accounting 
officer has the power to make any corrective measure, if any, including the 
suspension of the proceedings. If the decision of the accounting officer is 
unsatisfactory, or a decision is not made within the required time, the bidder may 
make a further complaint to the BPP, the BBP on receiving the complaint has the 
power to either dismiss the complaint or  nullify in whole or in part an unlawful act 
or decision made by the procuring entity, declare the rules or principles that govern 
the subject matter of the complaint; and revise an improper decision by the 
procuring entity or substitute its own decision for such a decision. If the bidder is 
dissatisfied with the decision of the BPP, the complaint can be appealed to the court. 
 
 In chapter two, this thesis identified a loophole as the fact that the PPA is silent on 
the issue of how complaints can be made with respect to the period before bids have 
been put in/or a selection has been made. Thus resulting in a situation that only a 
bidder has the right to request administrative review or make a complaint, and 
 
15 PPA 2007 s 54 
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therefore if there are contractors who are unable to bid for a project e.g. in a case 
where selective tendering has been allegedly unfairly used, they would not be able 
to make a complaint as they are not ‘bidders’ in the process. This category of actors 
who are excluded from the administrative review process would however be able 
to access the judicial review process as they would probably be able to prove that 
they have the right of access to the courts using the sufficient interest test. If it is 
accepted that the contractors who are excluded from the bid process are actors who 
can exercise the same rights as bidders in the judicial review process by proving 
sufficient interest to exercise high legal empowerment, then the right to be able to 
request administrative review should be extended to them as well. The exclusion of 
contractors who have not made bids/were unable to make bids in the 
administrative review of the horizontal accountability process is an issue which 
needs to be addressed in order to enhance legal empowerment. The PPA needs to 
broaden the base of who can request an administrative review, and to include those 
who may not necessarily have put in a bid, as allowing individuals who may not have 
put in bids to challenge decisions, is a way of improving horizontal accountability.   
 
The net effect of this in practice is that only contractors who have made bids can 
request for administrative review of a contract award. However, contractors who 
have not made bids, and also observers (NGOs) are able to still request for a review 
of a contract award, however they are only able to exercise this right by directly 
engaging the courts through a judicial review, and because of issues like the cost of 
taking cases to courts, it is unlikely that many actors in the process who were not 
bidders would engage the courts, therefore leading to a situation where legitimate 
actors are being effectively disenfranchised, thus leading to low legal 
empowerment. 
 
5.3.2 Judicial Review 
As discussed in the previous section, the bidders in a procurement process have 
access to the courts as a last resort when an administrative review of a contract 
award has been unsuccessful. However, access to the courts is also open to other 
actors within the horizontal accountability framework who do not have access to 
the administrative review process. Both observers, and the contractors/bidders 
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have access to the courts since both actors would be able to show sufficient interest 
in the matter they will be heard by the courts and can exercise this tool of seeking a 
review of the contract award. In an action to the courts for a judicial review, the 
courts have a number of remedies that it can grant, these include quashing orders16, 
prohibiting order17, injunction18, mandatory order19, declaratory order20, and 
damages21. Within the Nigerian procurement process all these remedies available 
for actors in the horizontal accountability framework can be useful to address 
loopholes which have been identified in the public procurement process. 
 
For instance, in chapter two of this thesis, we discussed the loopholes around the 
National Council on Public Procurement (NCPP), the major issue being the fact that 
over 12 years after the PPA has been passed, the NCPP is still yet to be constituted 
by the President. However, a way horizontal accountability could help in improving 
the overall accountability framework as it regards the NCPP, would be by an actor 
in the horizontal accountability process filing an action in court to seek a mandatory 
order compelling the Presidency to appoint the members of the NCPP. The PPA 
provides in section 1(4) that the Chairman and other members of the Council shall 
be appointed by the President. The Act unfortunately does not specify a time frame 
within which the President must appoint the NCPP. In the case of Ugwu v Ararume22, 
the Nigerian Supreme Court held that the word "shall", in its ordinary meaning is a 
word of command which is normally given a compulsory meaning because it is 
intended to denote obligation. Therefore, if that decision is to be applied, then there 
is an obligation created on the President to constitute the NCPP.  
 
A request for a mandatory order is a judicial review remedy which is open to the 
actors within the horizontal accountability framework, and it is more likely that this 
action would be brought by an observer/NGO. The actor can bring an action seeking 
an order to compel the President to act upon the obligation which has been placed 
 
16 This is an order which overturns or undoes a decision already made by the procuring entity. 
17 This stops a public body from taking an unlawful decision or action it has not yet taken. 
18 This is a temporary order requiring a public body to do 
something or not to do something until a final decision 
has been made in your case 
19 This makes a public body do something the law says it has to do 
20 The court states what the law is or what the parties have a right to do 
21 A pecuniary award by the court when it is proven that the claimant has suffered some special wrong.  
22 (2007) LPELR-3329(SC) 
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on the office of the President to appoint the NCPP, this mandatory order is known 
as an order of mandamus23. In the case of Akilu v Fawehinmi24 it was held by the 
Nigerian Supreme Court inter alia that the conditions required for the grant of an 
order of mandamus are  - that the respondent is a public officer, in this case this 
requirement is met as the President is a public officer; that s/he has a public duty, 
in this case the public duty is clear from Section 1(4) of the PPA 2007, the President 
shall constitute the NCPP; that all conditions necessary for the performance of his 
public duty have been satisfied, in this case no condition precedents have been 
specified save for the establishment of the NCPP and this has been done by virtue of 
Section 1(1) of the PPA 2007; that s/he has neglected to perform his duty, this is met 
as well because the President has not yet performed this duty. The fourth condition 
is that the applicant is aggrieved by such neglect - this deals with the issue of locus 
standi25 as was decided in Abraham Adesanya v President, Federal Republic of 
Nigeria26.  
 
From the earlier discussion on locus standi it is clear that the courts will grant 
standing to any observer/NGO who can show sufficient interest in the case, and this 
has been the position of the courts as regards NGOs in Nigeria in some decided cases. 
All that is necessary to prove is that the observer/NGO has sufficient interest or legal 
right in the subject matter of the dispute – this is proven if the NGO is one which has 
one of its stated aims and objectives to be ensuring probity, transparency or 
accountability in the public procurement process (or similar aims and objectives), 
and that their collective right or interests were in jeopardy or had been violated by 
the non-compliance with the statute and thirdly, that they had justiciable cause of 
action27.  This is a way that this loophole in the public procurement process can be 
addressed by actors within the horizontal accountability framework. 
 
 
 
23 This is a judicial remedy in the form of an order from a superior court, to any government body, or public authority, to do 
(or forbear from doing) some specific act which that person/body is obliged under law to do (or refrain from doing), and 
which is in the nature of public duty, and in certain cases one of a statutory duty. 
24 (1987) 4 NWLR, 797 
25 This is a right to be heard by a court of competent jurisdiction. This right arises where a party to a case shows that he has 
interest enough to link him with a court case and without showing such an interest, the court would not entertain his claims. 
This was introduced to prevent meddlesome interlopers from involvement in court claims and bringing vexatious litigation. 
26 (1981) 5 SC 112  
27 Bannuram v. Hillary (2013) LPELR-20854(CA) 
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A final issue to be discussed here is the issue of damages. The PPA does not provide 
this remedy, in fact one of the loopholes identified in chapter two was the fact that 
the PPA precludes liability to procuring authorities in certain situations including 
bid cancellation28. This does not prevent the contractor from approaching the courts 
to request damages if it can be shown that there has been some loss to the contractor 
as a result of the actions of the procuring authority. In fact, this is the position which 
is advocated for by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement. Article 19 of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 201129, prescribes that the 
procuring entity should not incur liability to bidders, ‘unless the decision for the 
cancellation is a consequence of irresponsible or dilatory conduct by the procuring 
entity’. The award of damages is one of the discretionary remedies at the disposal of 
the courts and is an order which a court of law can make when the relevant criteria 
for the award of damages has been met. Under Nigerian law, a claimant can claim 
special damages if the claimant can specifically plead and strictly prove the damages 
claimed30.  It should be noted that there is no provision in the PPA for an award for 
monetary damage for breach and there is no case law on this in Nigeria yet, however 
an instructive case from the United Kingdom is NDA v Energy Solutions31 where the 
Supreme Court held that for there to be an award of monetary damages, the breach 
complained of must have been sufficiently serious. Arrowsmith32 has also suggested 
that the legal principle of promissory estoppel could form the jurisprudential 
foundation for the award of compensation to bidders in certain cases where a 
procurement has been cancelled to the detriment of a bidder.  
 
From the above, it is clear therefore that in a system that guarantees some level of 
legal empowerment to actors within the horizontal accountability structure, either 
low or high legal empowerment, that empowerment allows the actors to be able to 
exercise some accountability over the system and these are by using the remedies 
 
28 PPA 2007 s 28 
29 This is the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law model law which deals with Public Procurement and 
serves as a template for procurement laws in several jurisdictions worldwide (particularly in developing and emerging 
economies)  
30 GTB v. DIEUDONNE (2017) LPELR-43559(CA) 
31 This was the case in Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (Appellant) v EnergySolutions EU Ltd (now called ATK Energy EU 
Ltd) (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 34 – where Energy Solutions were paid nearly £100m for lost earnings due to irregularities 
in the procurement process. 
32 Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Protecting the Interests of Bidders for Public Contracts; The Role of the Common Law’ (1994) 53 The 
Cambridge Law Journal, 1, pp. 104-139.  
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available either during the administrative review or judicial review process. These 
actors are therefore able to ensure horizontal accountability is present, and 
supports the vertical accountability system, in order to create a dual accountability 
system that works side by side effectively. 
 
5.4 Dual Accountability - The Ideal Structure? 
Some scholars have highlighted the negative elements that are associated with 
multiple accountability models, which include the fact that having it is too 
expensive33 and that it leads to situations where public officials are faced with 
competing and incompatible expectations34. The issue of multiple accountability35 
has also been identified as one of the challenges faced when trying to enthrone 
horizontal accountability as a corollary to vertical accountability. It refers to the 
demands for accountability from different relevant stakeholders which could serve 
to create confusing expectations in the public officers, not knowing whose goals and 
expectations to live up to, should it be those of the super ordinates within the 
hierarchical vertical accountability, or the citizens within a horizontal accountability 
framework. Koppell refers to this issue as multiple accountabilities disorder36, which 
is when there are conflicting demands for accountability which instead of improving 
accountability may actually serve the reverse function and paralyse the agents from 
performing their tasks by causing confusion and therefore paralysis. Organisations 
trying to meet conflicting expectations are likely to be dysfunctional, pleasing no one 
while trying to please everyone37. Linked to the perceived fear of multiple 
accountability, is the issue of accountability overload, Halachmi38, states that another 
issue assailing the quest for accountability and transparency in general, and the use 
of performance management in particular, is that the focus of public officers when 
they know they are being placed under intense scrutiny as a result of more improved 
transparency is that they focus on ensuring that things are done right, but not 
 
33 Christopher Pollitt, The Essential Public Manager, (Open University Press 2003). 
34 Donald E. Klingner, John Nalbandian, and Barbara S. Romzek .Klingner, ‘Politics, Administration and Markets. Conflicting 
Expectations of Accountability’, (2002) 32 American Review of Public Administration, 2, pp. 117-144 
35 Thomas Schillemans and Mark Bovens ‘The Challenge of Multiple Accountability: Does Redundancy Lead to Overload?’ in 
Melvin Dubnick and H.George Frederickson , (eds.), Accountable Governance: Problems and Promises (M.E. Sharpe 2011) 
36 Jonathan Koppell, ‘Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder”’, (2005) 
Public Administration Review 94. 
37 n 35 
38 Arie Halachmi, ‘Accountablity Overloads’ in Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Public Accountability (Oxford University Press 2014) 
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necessarily that the right things are done, and one of the reasons for this is the short-
term perspective used to establish accountability. Asserting that greater 
transparency can induce behaviour that makes blind following of the letter of the 
law and the desire to do things right prevail over the need to consider the spirit of 
the law and do the right thing from a rational, fairness or equity point of view. The 
argument therefore being that because the public officers are worried about the 
intense scrutiny which they are placed under when there is transparency, they 
become pre-occupied with trying not to make mistakes and therefore this impacts 
their decision making and the quality of their output. This is an issue also echoed by 
Hood39 where he refers to it as blame avoidance.  
 
On the opposing side of the argument, there have been some who have argued that 
there is the likelihood of better accountability when there are overlapping channels 
of accountability40. Landau41 argues that systems increase in reliability when they 
consist of different parallel and overlapping elements, with the advantage that these 
separate channels can serve as backups for each other, working independently. The 
idea being if one system fails to identify an issue, there is more likelihood that the 
other system would catch the issue if they were working independently.  
 
In this context therefore, this thesis is arguing that where vertical accountability and 
horizontal accountability exist as dual accountability systems over the same issues 
– contract awards, there is a greater likelihood of conflict of interest situations being 
identified and addressed. Another important advantage of having a dual 
accountability system is that such a system is able to legitimately incorporate 
different interests which may or may not be aligned. For instance, the interests of a 
contractor in seeking a review of a contract award would be to get the award 
reversed and probably re-awarded to his/her company, whereas the interest of the 
BPP in conducting an audit on the same award would be to ensure the public officers 
 
39 Christopher Hood, ‘What happens when Transparency meets Blame Avoidance?’, (2007) 9 Public Management Review,2, 
pp. 191-210 
40 Colin Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’, C. (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society, 1, pp. 38-60; John Braithwaite, 
‘Accountability and Governance under the New Regulatory State’, (1999) 58 Australian Journal of Public Administration, 1, 
90-93; Thomas Schillemans, ‘Redundant Accountability: The Joint Impact Of Horizontal And Vertical Accountability On 
Autonomous Agencies’, (2010) 34 Public Administration Quarterly, 3, pp. 300-337. 
41 Martin Landau, ‘Redundancy, Rationality and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap’,’ (1969) 29 Public Administration 
Review, 4, pp. 346-358 
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in the procuring entity were following the proper procedures, and ensuring that if 
there were any issues identified, these could be corrected with proper training, or 
disciplinary sanctions.  
 
Another fear which is expressed towards multiple accountability systems is that it 
could create a situation where there are too many accountability challenges in 
essence, that this would lead to too much litigation. That it would lead to a situation 
where there is too much engagement by the actors within the horizontal 
accountability framework, and the system is strained from allowing all these actors 
access to challenging the decisions of public officers, thereby potentially grinding 
the activities of the public office to a halt, or introducing unnecessary financial costs 
and burden to defending actions. It is argued that this scenario is even more likely 
where the actors in the process are not able to properly grasp the information that 
they are accessing, and in missing the nuance of the procurement transactions, they 
run the risk of working with assumptions based on improperly understood data or 
information, this problem is referred to as information assimilation42, it is a well-
known and often-cited finding of behavioural economics that very often the public 
is unable to properly process even rather simple information because of “wired in,” 
congenital, systematic cognitive biases43. The solution to this fear lies in the 
standard of sufficient interest in locus standi which is necessary before an action can 
be brought before the courts, as the use of this will weed out meddlesome 
interlopers who have no real stake in the accountability process.  
 
In advocating for enhanced horizontal accountability, this thesis is not in any way 
suggesting that horizontal accountability as a standalone process is sufficient to 
ensure accountability in the procurement process. This thesis is arguing that both 
vertical and horizontal accountability have to exist side by side and only with both 
functioning optimally can there be true accountability. The focus on horizontal 
 
42 Amitai Etzioni, ‘Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant? ‘, (2010) 18 The Journal of Political Philosophy 4, pp. 389–404  
43 Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler, ‘Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,” 
(1991) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, pp.193–206; Edward Russo and Paul J. H. Shoemaker, Decision Traps,  (Simon and 
Schuster, 1989); Arthur Lefford, ‘The influence of emotional subject matter on logical reasoning’, (1946) 34 Journal of General 
Psychology, pp. 127–51; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases,’ (1974) 
185 Science, pp. 1124–31; Marco Cipriani and Antonio Guarino, ‘Herd behavior and contagion in financial markets,’ (2008) 
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 8; Robert H. Frank, Thomas Gilovich, and Dennis T. Regan, ‘Does studying 
economics inhibit cooperation?’, (1993) 7 Journal of Economic Perspectives,), pp. 159–71. 
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accountability as the key is because of the multiplicity of actors who are able to 
exercise these accountability functions, thereby creating a veritable army of actors 
within the accountability framework, as opposed to vertical accountability which 
exists in a closed group. Ideas for this sort of dual accountability model within the 
public space, have existed throughout history, for instance in World War II private 
citizens voluntarily supplemented the enforcement activities of the United States 
Office of Price Administration by checking prices in retail stores and reporting 
violations of the price control rules to the public authority44. Becker and Stigler 
opine that where rules are mainly or exclusively enforced by the public 
bureaucracies, the result will be under-enforcement and some degree of corruption. 
They argue that a scheme of privatised law enforcement would make law 
enforcement more efficient and transparent45, and this is in essence what horizontal 
accountability advocates for a sort of privatised accountability mechanism. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter analysed the second part of the horizontal accountability equation – 
legal empowerment and discussed issues which are relevant to have a proper 
accountability process in place which ensures that the actors within the horizontal 
accountability process are able to exercise their accountability duties effectively. 
Issues like locus standi and the remedies available within the judicial process where 
addressed, and the current state of the Nigerian process as it relates to those issues 
were discussed. Also addressed were some of the loopholes identified previously 
within the public procurement process in Nigeria, and how high legal empowerment 
can be used to address some of those loopholes. Ultimately, it was determined that   
having the tools available to be able to challenge actions by the relevant 
procurement authorities through legal empowerment is a critical aspect of the 
horizontal accountability process, it is the tip of the spear, with the possibility of 
addressing quite a number of the loopholes that were highlighted  in chapter two, if 
only the actors within the process would take advantage of the platform which legal 
empowerment provides. 
 
 
44 Marver H Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission, (Princeton University Press, 1955).  
45 Gary Becker and George Stigler, ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers’, (1974) 3 Journal of Legal 
Studies, pp. 1-18. 
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Finally, the Chapter addressed the issue of a dual accountability systems and its 
alleged downsides including  multiple accountabilities, accountability overload and 
improper information assimilation;  noting that even though there are some 
procedural duplications which might arise out of a multiple accountability process, 
ultimately both the vertical and horizontal accountability processes work hand in 
hand for the overall health of the accountability framework, with the horizontal 
accountability system picking up the slack where the vertical accountability system 
has failed, or has blind spots.
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Chapter 6 - Regulations, Frameworks, and the Future 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis has put forward the argument that horizontal accountability if deployed 
properly can be one of the key weapons in the arsenal used to fight conflict of 
interest, and ultimately corruption in the Nigerian public procurement process. The 
rationale for this argument has been to acknowledge that currently the Nigerian 
public procurement process manages conflict of interest by using a dominant model 
of vertical accountability - a model wherein the activities of the public officers are 
managed or controlled by those who are super-ordinate to them within a 
hierarchical framework, and while this on its own works in certain instances as a 
tool of accountability, it is limited in certain respects, and therefore the key to 
improving this process of managing accountability is by broadening participation in 
the accountability process by introducing horizontal accountability.  
 
The right of actors in the horizontal accountability process to get involved in the 
accountability process is predicated within a stakeholder paradigm where the actor 
in the system is able to make accountability demands on the basis of the actor being 
a stakeholder within the procurement process, and that the acts of the authority or 
officials in the public procurement process have a direct impact on the actor or on 
its stated mission. Therefore, in order to create a framework within which the role 
and powers of the actors in the horizontal accountability system can be properly 
encapsulated, this thesis adopted a Transparency and Accountability Matrix as a 
framework for ensuring optimal actor participation in the horizontal accountability 
process to ensure full accountability. The thesis showed, that the first key 
determiner of whether a horizontal accountability process will be effective is the 
issue of access to information, and this issue needs to be solved effectively or else 
any drive for horizontal accountability would be meaningless. For access to 
information, transparency by request and transparency by default are the two ways 
in which access is allowed. Transparency by request, being firmly embedded within 
the freedom of information jurisprudence and legislation has multiple moving parts 
-  like what information can be requested, who can request it, when can requests be 
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denied etc, and these multiple moving parts could all conspire to create a situation 
where there is the illusion of transparency by request, when in reality the opposite 
is the case. This was what was discovered within the Nigerian system and the 
transparency by request regime, a system plagued with technical roadblocks and 
challenges which made access to information a difficult goal to achieve, roadblocks 
like the exceptions regime and its two-part test, the appeal process and its one-stage 
process, the lack of an independent body for appeals from a public authority, and 
finally the actual reality of most public authorities either ignoring or refusing 
requests for information (in contrast to the information being presented to the 
National Assembly by the Ministry of Justice). It was made clear that these issues in 
transparency by request need to be addressed properly or else any drive for 
horizontal accountability would be dead on arrival, this was made more evident 
when a number of the conflict of interest loopholes which were identified as existing 
in the public procurement process were predicated on a transparency by request 
process, in order to lead to conditional accountability, and therefore in all those 
instances of loopholes, a failed transparency by request process would mean failed 
conditional accountability. 
 
This thesis however argued that a way that a number of the challenges in the 
transparency by request process could be surmounted or leap-frogged, was to move 
to a transparency by default process through open government data. Open 
government data would make the access to information instant, steady and easy to 
access. The steady flow of information would allow the actors unfettered access to 
be able to properly engage in the accountability process without having roadblocks 
put in front of the requests for information, as the information would already have 
been made available. The thesis however acknowledged that even though certain 
sections of the Freedom of Information Act seem to provide for open government 
data, and the Nigerian government seems to be in favour of its implementation as 
evident from its involvement in the Open Government Partnership, there are 
foundational issues which need to be addressed around data access, data reliability, 
and data protection. Specifically, around data reliability and data protection, as 
those are the areas where there could be unforeseen negative consequences if the 
process is not managed properly with the right safeguards in place. Key pieces of 
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legislation need to be enacted, and key institutions created in order to midwife and 
manage the process. The thesis argues that while transparency by default should be 
the optimal end goal as it concerns access to information, that goal should not be 
rushed until the relevant things are in place to ensure it can be run effectively and 
with the proper safeguards. 
 
For horizontal accountability to be effective, access to information is the bigger 
challenge however that is not the only important ingredient, and chapter five 
discussed the fact that legal empowerment is what gives the actors within the 
horizontal accountability process the means to be able to hold the authorities and 
officials accountable, and in fact the enforcement tools that are needed for 
horizontal accountability by and large already exist within the system – access to 
administrative review and access to courts, with varying degrees of remedies 
available to the actors. If access to information is still a challenge that needs to be 
overcome, the legal empowerment aspect of the equation is one which it seems has 
not been properly exercised by the actors within the horizontal accountability 
system. The thesis identified that a number of the loopholes in the system can be 
managed by the actors actually taking action which they already have access to be 
able to carry out.  Access to information creates the ammunition for an 
accountability challenge, but ultimately the actors will still need to pull the trigger, 
and legal empowerment gives them the means to be able to pull the accountability 
trigger. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
From the discussion over the course of this thesis, it is quite clear that the area of 
the transparency and accountability matrix which needs the most support is around 
the access to information, and in that regard therefore a number of the 
recommendations which flow from the analysis of the relevant issues within the 
Nigerian public procurement process are targeted at improving access to 
information, either by ensuring a better transparency by request process, or by 
moving to a transparency by default process. This section, reviews some of the 
recommendations for enhancing horizontal accountability within the public 
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procurement process in Nigeria in order to effectively manage the conflict of interest 
loopholes that exist therein.   
 
6.2.1 Enacting a Data Protection Act 
As has been mentioned at various points in this thesis, Nigeria does not have any 
overarching legislation on Data protection. It is quite clear that having appropriate 
data protection legislation is critical to ensuring a robust Open Government Data 
system in any country. Therefore, the first step is to ensure that an adequate data 
protection system is in place before one can consider moving towards a system of 
open government data.  
 
Such a Law when enacted should adequately deal with the key issues like data 
collection and how organisations or public agencies may collect personal 
information and the purposes to which they can make use of it, it should cover 
consent and notice which the individual whose data is being collected must give 
before the data is collected and how the individual may withdraw that consent. The 
legislation should also make provision for what uses the personal information which 
is collected may be put to and which uses they cannot be put to, specifically detailing 
the limits to the use of the personal information. Disclosure should also be provided 
for, when and how the organisation may disclose the details of personal information 
collected. Apart from the above, the Data protection legislation should also cover 
issues like security of personal information, retention of records, and notification 
procedures when there has been a breach.  As was mentioned in chapter four, there 
is currently a subsidiary legislation – Nigeria Data Protection Regulation, which has 
been created to fill the void, however a more encompassing legislation is needed to 
address certain legal and structural issues which subsidiary legislation is ill-
equipped to handle, and examples of these issues are mentioned in the next couple 
of recommendations below.  
 
6.2.2 Three-Part Test for Requests for Information Exceptions  
This thesis identified that the current process for refusals for information requests 
citing an exception is generally a two part test under the FoIA, which states that the 
exception must be a legitimate aim, and then there must be no overriding public 
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interest that prevents the information for the release of the information. For 
requests for information where the exception being argued is confidential 
commercial or proprietary information, the test is a three-part test, which is that 
there must be a legitimate aim, then there must be harm to a confidential 
commercial or proprietary information interest of a third party or that would 
prejudice third party negotiations, and there must be no overriding public interest. 
The recommendation here is that the harm requirement should be one of substantial 
harm and substantial prejudice. It should not be enough that a third party can cite 
harm or prejudice, the harm or prejudice complained of should be substantial in that 
the release would do irrevocable damage. The bar to be able to use this exception 
should be set very high.  
 
6.2.3 Three Stage Appeal Process for Freedom of Information Denials  
This thesis determined that the appeal process when a request for information has 
been denied, under the Nigerian FoIA is that the appeal for review of the denial of 
freedom of information request goes directly to the court. The recommendation 
here is that there should be two other layers introduced – appeal to a supervisory 
individual within the public authority where the information request was made, and 
then a subsequent appeal to an independent authority or body, before an appeal to 
the courts. This would ensure that there is more access, as a direct court appeal leads 
to a lengthier and costlier appeal process for the information requester. 
 
6.2.4 Independent Authority for Freedom of Information Request Appeals 
Linked to the above recommendation, is the recommendation of an independent 
body/office which would be in charge of data protection issues in Nigeria, similar to 
the Data Protection Ombudsman which a number of countries have1, this 
Ombudsman would essentially be responsible for Data protection policy and for 
conducting reviews on complaints for unlawful access or processing of data. Such 
an office would ensure that there is better access to restitution in cases of data 
breach, without the need for a potentially cumbersome and expensive court 
litigation process. This thesis has suggested that based on the current legislation, 
 
1 Albania, Australia, Denmark, Canada, Iceland, Ireland, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago amongst many other countries have 
special purpose Commissions or Ombudsmen to deal with data protection and privacy issues, including reviewing Freedom 
of Information denial request 
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the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation (OAGF) could be given these 
powers, however best practice would be for the creation of an independent body, as 
the OAGF still sits within the government structure as well, and is not an 
independent authority 
 
6.2.5 Implementation of Data Standards for Public Data  
This thesis has advocated for the creation and implementation of an acceptable 
global standard for achieving data integrity and viability, for example the use of 
Trusted Digital repositories (TDRs)2. TDRs are an internationally accepted, 
technology-neutral means of ensuring long-term access to digital records and 
datasets as assets and protecting their integrity, completeness, trustworthiness and 
traceability. They can be created to capture and provide access to authentic data and 
digital records; link active and inactive datasets to hard copy or digital records that 
provide context; etc.  
 
Apart from the use of TDRs, what is fast becoming the world-wide standard for data 
standards for public data generally, and for public procurement particularly is the 
Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS). The OCDS enables disclosure of data and 
documents at all stages of the contracting process by defining a common data model. 
It was created by the Open Contracting Partnership3 to support organizations to 
increase contracting transparency and allow deeper analysis of contracting data by 
a wide range of users. The OCDS approach is to advocate that organisations publish 
early, and iterate: improving disclosure step-by-step, use simple and extensible 
JSON structure; publish data for each step of the contracting process; create 
summary records for an overall contracting process; adopt re-usable objects: 
organizations, tender information, line-items, amounts, milestones, documents etc.; 
recommended data and documents at basic, intermediate & advanced levels; 
organisations use common open data publication patterns; that organisations 
provide guidance on improving data collection and data quality; and cultivate a 
 
2 A trusted digital repository is one whose mission is to provide reliable, long-term access to managed digital resources to its 
designated community, now and in the future. There are different certifications for TDRs, however generally they all tend to 
assess things like organisation, management of the data, infrastructure, security, and audit processes. 
3 An independent not-for-profit created in 2015 and working in over 30 countries. That focuses on a drive for massively 
improved value for money, public integrity and service delivery by shifting public contracting from closed processes and 
masses of paperwork to digital services that are fair, efficient and ‘open-by-design’. 
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growing community of users and range of open source tools. The OCDS has a number 
of guides that advise on how best to implement it, and these are provided open 
source and publicly available. 
 
Under Nigerian Law4, the National Archives is statutorily charged with the 
responsibility for protecting and preserving public sector records, therefore that 
agency could by default be the appropriate agency to house the TDR.  
 
6.2.6 Implementation of Open Government Data provisions  
Finally, in chapter four it was identified that the current FoIA actually mandates that 
there should be open government data, where it states that5 public institutions are 
to ensure that they keep records and information of all its activities, operations and 
businesses, and ensure the proper organisation and maintenance of all information 
in its custody in a manner that facilitates public access to such information, and shall 
cause to be published (amongst other things) information relating to the receipt or 
expenditure of public or other funds of the institution; the names, salaries, titles and 
dates of employment of all employees and officers of the institution; a list of files 
containing applications for any contract, permit, grants, licenses or agreements; a 
list of all  materials containing information relating to any grant or contract made 
by or between the institution and another public institution or private organization 
etc. 
 
This provision has not been taken advantage of by the relevant actors in the 
horizontal accountability system, and a recommendation is that the relevant actors 
like NGOs, and other civil society organisations could test the provisions of the FoIA 
by seeking mandatory orders against public institutions for the publication of this 
information as mandated by the FoIA. 
 
6.3 Future Research and Conclusion 
The introduction of the transparency and accountability matrix into the discussion 
on horizontal accountability is one which is worthy of further research and analysis, 
 
4 National Archives Act 1992 
5 FoIA 2011 s 2 
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specifically the matrix can be further analysed within other public agencies in order 
to refine it and make it more amenable to analysis of horizontal accountability 
outside of public procurement. The utility of the matrix is that it has the potential to 
work in a toolkit for determining levels of horizontal accountability in any system 
with a view to identifying which areas of the matrix need enhancement in order to 
increase horizontal accountability. Within the Nigerian public procurement process, 
the transparency and accountability matrix has been able to identify access to 
information as the aspect which needs the most enhancement and improvement, 
and the matrix has the potential to serve the same purpose in order sectors in other 
countries around the world.  
 
There is also scope for further research around the administrative review process 
of the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) in Nigeria, this thesis uncovered a lot of 
data on the administrative redress process of the BPP which has built up over the 
period of time since the PPA was passed in 2007. This data presents a rich research 
pot for analysis on the approach of the BPP when dealing with administrative 
redress requests, and the analysis which is provided could serve as a helpful 
resource for creating a feedback mechanism in improving the administrative 
redress process. 
 
The overall thrust of this thesis has been that the public procurement sector, as with 
all sectors where there are public officers, is prone to incidences of conflict of 
interest, it is inevitable, however, there are certain steps which the system can take 
to minimise the risk of conflict of interest situations in public procurement resulting 
in corruption. The key lies in creating an accountability framework that is able to 
effectively identify and manage those risks. The thesis has argued that the optimal 
accountability framework is a dual framework that includes both vertical and 
horizontal accountability systems. The vertical accountability system by default is 
the predominant one based on the hierarchical network, and is the command and 
control system which most bureaucracies the world over operate to ensure 
accountability, however, the vertical accountability system cannot on its own be the 
sole system, as it is prone to its own mistakes, its own failings, and its own blind 
spots, and therefore needs support. It is this support that the horizontal 
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accountability system exists to provide, the horizontal accountability system has 
multiple actors who sit outside of the hierarchical network but who provide the 
necessary safeguards to ensure that the system is being checked by multiple actors. 
 
For the actors in the horizontal accountability system to be able to properly carry 
out their accountability tasks, there are two critical issues that arise – information 
and empowerment. The transparency and accountability matrix provide a 
framework for how these two critical issues are understood and identifies where 
either can be enhanced in order to improve the horizontal accountability system. 
Horizontal accountability could therefore be failing either from a lack of information 
or a lack of empowerment, the Nigerian public procurement process when analysed 
within the transparency and accountability matrix shows that the main problem is 
lack of information, and therefore in order to improve horizontal accountability 
within this process, access to information must be enhanced either through 
transparency by request or transparency by default. This thesis has suggested 
solutions for how access to information can be improved, and examples of how that 
can impact on the public procurement process were discussed in the context of the 
conflict of interest loopholes in the current public procurement process in Nigeria. 
 
Ultimately the goal of any accountability system should be to ensure full 
accountability at best, and conditional accountability at worst, and the analysis and 
suggestions contained in this thesis creates a framework for the Nigerian public 
procurement system to achieve that.  
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